The recent rapprochement between Iran and the United States, regardless of how fragile it is, has driven a number of analysts and politicians in Russia and abroad to speculate about the possible negative consequences for Russia’s relations with Iran of Tehran’s “pivot to America.” I find such speculation and fear of the possible decline of Iran-Russia ties baseless. Russia is interested in the normalization of the Iran-US relationship, and can clearly benefit from it.

First from the Russian perspective, Moscow is no less interested than the West in clearing up suspicions about the Iranian nuclear program, which is the main condition for normalization, and excluding the possibility of Iran's nuclear weaponization. Second, the lifting of sanctions would allow Russian companies access to the Iranian market. The Russian companies believe that they can compete with others successfully, particularly in the spheres where they have already acquired expertise and where they are able to offer better projects on better conditions. The geographical proximity of Russia and Iran can also ease the development of new projects, including the possible construction of new nuclear plants.

There was a leak from well-informed circles to the Russian media that the Iranians were negotiating with the Russian company Atomstroyexport on the construction of two new units in the Bushehr plant that would produce 1,000 megawatts each. Third, it will remove all barriers to Russian-Iranian military and technical cooperation (let us remember in this regard the failed delivery of the C-300 missile systems, met with outrage by Tehran). Fourth, as Moscow sees it, even in the case of full normalization with the West, Tehran will need diversification and counterbalances. Constructive diplomatic cooperation between Russia and Iran on the Syrian crisis and Russia’s recognition of Tehran’s regional role would support this.

During my visit to Tehran, just before Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visit to Russia, almost all my interlocutors, including several high-level officials, asserted that President Hassan Rouhani is determined to foster ties with Russia exactly now, when he is feeling an urgent need for that. During Zarif’s visit, a lot of issues were discussed, including a trade deal between Russia and Iran for the purchase of up to 500 barrels per day of crude Iranian oil in exchange of Russian goods worth of $18 billion annually.

The idea of this oil-for-goods deal was proposed for the first time to President Vladimir Putin by Rouhani in Bishkek, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in September 2013. This was, the Iranian diplomats said, followed up by them in the course of two telephone conversations, as well as during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Tehran Dec. 13, 2013. By the way, the Iranian side sees in Putin’s two calls to Rouhani a sign of a real breakthrough in Moscow’s approach toward cooperation with Iran at a time when the level of trade and economic exchanges dropped last year to an extremely low level of less that $2 billion. Iranians remember that during his visit to Tehran, Lavrov said that the volume of trade between the two states should be at the level of $30 billion.

The US administration expressed its serious concern about the Russia-Iran trade deal, and even considers it “inconsistent with the terms of the P5+1 agreement with Iran,” as Caitlin Hayden, spokesperson for the White House National Security Council, told Reuters. She warned that it “could potentially trigger US sanctions.” But Putin insisted in response that it was Russia’s right to buy oil from Iran, because it had never subscribed to any unilateral sanctions on Iran either by the United States or the European Union, and did not have any obligations related to them.

I don’t share the view of some analysts who think that the main incentive for accepting the Iranian proposal for Russia was of a political nature, though a political message can be also found in it. My guess is that in reality, the Russian leadership believes that the determination of Rouhani to solve the nuclear crisis by the means of concessions is genuine, and Iranians can be trusted. Projecting such a scenario, one can easily assume that pretty soon, lots of companies will rush to make deals with Iran. So far, even in the worst-case scenario, in which the sides are not able to immediately start working on the oil-for-food scheme, it is still practical to reserve a place to Russia for the future. Such a project is economically feasible and profitable for both sides. The experience of the Russian LUKOIL company's deal with Iraq under sanctions was also considered impractical by many experts, and after the fall of the regime it looked like Russia was going to lose Iraq, given its disapproval of the invasion. Now, I don’t know who exactly is losing Iraq — the worst thing that can happen is that all of us together lose it — and anyway, LUKOIL is already working there. The recently signed Russian contract with the Syrians on a Mediterranean shelf gas field stands in the same group of projects.

As of now, we don’t exactly know what goods will be delivered to Iran, or how. Russian experts say that it needs black metals, machinery and other equipment, vegetable oil and wheat. Anyway, this is not a purely barter deal, and there definitely should be financial transactions. We can presume that the purchased oil will be forwarded not to Russia but to its customers, probably in Asia. There is some speculation that the Syrian interests might have been somehow involved here, but that’s just a guess.

We’ll see how the events around this deal are going to unfold and to what extent it can really boost Russian-Iranian economic cooperation, which has always faced obstacles. Those are, for instance, a feeling of mistrust toward Russia deeply embedded in the Iranian mentality based on historic grievances and the feelings of vulnerability, fear, isolation and suspicion. I often hear from my Iranian colleagues complaints about not only the non-delivery of the C-300s, but even the conquest of the southern Caucasus in the 19th century (already three independent states) and the failure to submit to Tehran the original copies of the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828). There is also very strong pro-Western sentiment in the Iranian public.

As I was told some time ago, Iranian negotiators with the United States and other Western partners have been instructed by the supreme leader of Iran, given the priority of lifting sanctions, to concentrate entirely on the nuclear issue and to avoid negotiating all other topics. I can mention in this regard to one of the questions I recently got from an audience in the United States, about the possibility of striking a deal with Tehran on changing its position toward the Syrian crisis, Israel or the situation in Lebanon. One of the Iranian analysts I talked with suggested that new issues can be brought onto the negotiating table if the Americans demonstrate a “real desire” to make a deal with Iran on the nuclear issue. According to a senior diplomat, their complaints can be summarized into two issues: that the Americans begin bargaining after they have already signed documents, and that they are delaying the process. But the Iranians themselves will surely be interested in discussing the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are important for the Americans. By the way, I heard from the same source that Tehran is not very afraid of the scenario of the Taliban coming to power in Kabul because “They have learned lessons from the past and are not the same Taliban as they used to be before 2001.”

Moscow is also interested in expanding security cooperation with Tehran on Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US forces on two main tracks: deterring the threat coming from international terrorist groups, especially with a significant Central Asian component, and confronting the flow of narcotics into their territory. Last year, areas under the cultivation of poppy in Afghanistan grew by more than 30% because many Afghans started losing their jobs with American withdrawal and turned back to their old business.

Yet earlier this week, when I met former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, now the head of the Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research and an advisor the the supreme leader, he highlighted above all Iran-Russia cooperation toward the Syrian conflict, expressing his confidence in a political solution and “conditional” optimism about the future of Syria.

Original publication is available here. 

The 2013 is coming to an end. No doubt, that this year was extremely difficult, if we analyze it through the prism of international relations. The world has not become more stable, reliable and promising. On some dimensions it even gives more concerns than ever, and on other dimentions the shifts on the world geopolitical plateau can be considered as positive. The countries of the Arab awakening were still far from demonstrating the signs of recovery and stabilization. Syria went through one more bloody year of the civil war, that this time has become very Afghanistan alike – partisan extremist war against government forces. This year the growing interdependences between the continental Africa and the Middle East determined by the spreading of the radical Islam and intensification of its manifestations and activities have become more evident than ever. The 2013 has become a year of growing pressure on ethnic, and especially on religious minorities in the Middle East. This year we became witnesses of the decay of the hegemony of the United States, it has appeared even more fragile, than it could be expected. And this is true for both political and economic dimensions. One more interesting feature to be underlined is the reinforcement of the United Nations Organization that seemed very dilapidated during the decade. This year has shown that the UN can still influence international relations and order them in conformity with existing international lawes and the Security Council has sustained its status of effective crisis manager (for ex. cases of Mali and Central African Republic), even despite its inability to bring the Syrian war to an end. Iran has started its way back to the international community with major assistance of Russian diplomacy, reasonableness of Barack Obama and certainly thanks to the new face of the state political leader, thanks to the arrival into the presidentship of more liberal and less conservative in comparison to his predecessor, president Hassan Rouhani. 

            The 2013 has so many remarkable traits that it will be very long to enumerate them all.  So I’d like to attract your attention to the major trends, better say mega-trends. And these mega-trends appear to be relatively positive ones.

1. The first signs of a true multipolar world

            The 2013 should become an epochal milestone in the history of international relations. On the contemporary world stage no country has undoubted hegemony or advantage over the others. No country has an ability to dictate its will or impose whatever it wants. Even if the motivation and expectations of several powers stay the same, they face the overwhelming barriers to bring their will on the playground, as their old methods don’t work and the “new” ones are reluctantly taken from the dusty shelves.  Diplomacy has got its new birth as the key instrument of conflict and disputes regulation. If we talk about the outstanding accord on chemical weapons, the Syrian case and the incredible success of Russian diplomacy, are among the most significant manifestations of these trends. More than ever the countries are tuned on communication with each other, as the world is changing to fast to react on on-going challenges unilaterally, without intensive consultations with others. And so all players are trying to avoid any jerky movement and steps, as in the current situation it is too dangerous to take any actions without deep political expertise and analysis predicting possible consequences of political maneuvers. Political processes are slowing down. Countries that cannot be classified as great powers, however now feel that they can freely express themselves on the world stage and other international players will mostly hear their voices – this trend is demonstrated on the example of Latin American countries.

2. The changing roles of global players and institutions.

Following the previously mentioned trend, it’s evident that roles of actors are changing. The states are still the key players of the world stage, but their role is strengthening as of the basic and key element of international relations. Most of the existing international institutions are facing serious challenges. European Union is still struggling with the economic crisis, and several members are still far from recovery. Even the ugly-played-game, practically the hysteria over Ukraine seems to be more like desperate and vain attempts of a patient to prove that his is not ill anymore, than a policy of adequate and strong Union, international political institution. Several countries are thinking over the real possibility to leave the European family for the independent future.

            The partnership in the Mediterranean region is practically paralyzed, and exist only on the level of bilateral relations. For effective functioning of the Union for Mediterranean, or whatever integration processes or institutions in the region, there is always a need for  strong leaders on both sides of the Mediterranean sea. 2013 has shown, that there is still no leader. France, the main engine of integration in the region, according to talks and interviews with major French experts and politicians, feels itself lost in this field and has no idea what to do and French diplomacy just tries to do something  with no any strategy or even logic to avoid being accused of doing nothing on the field. The countries of the South Mediterranean are still far from stabilization and there is no leader and he cannot be expected in the near future, no leader who could bring the Southern Mediterranean to unite and to have effective talks over the common future.

            NATO is loosing its weight, becoming something like a political-debate club on trans-atlantic agenda.

            UN is recovering, and returns on the world stage as the key actor, damping down the voices of its criticizers. No country has appeared to dare break the veto and to intervene in Syria. However someone can say, Obama wanted to do it, but it was the Congress who didn’t let him realize his plans. One should be blind not to understand the game of Obama. He had known the results of the Congress vote even before his speech, when he declared that he would let the Congress decide to intervene in Syria or not (intervention would have been aerial, not a ground war). He was just flexing his muscle and he was trying to show the difference between him and Jeorge Bush Junior. And France, lead by a short-sighted president, proclaiming that what the US decides, it will fully support the decision, whatever says the National Assembly, showed itself as «a real free democratic state, keeping the title of a great power».

In the epoch of great transformations the states are trying to find something stable to lean on. And UN and international law seem to be the most reliable and stable institutions among the sea of blusterous uncertainty.

3. The outstanding victories of Russian diplomacy and the rise of emerging countries.

            Russia, like it or not, is a great winner of the 2013. Syrian treaty over chemical weapons, the success in constructing of the Customs Union, Iranian problem - these three pillars are enough to see how the Russian external policy has changed. The most expensive policy is a policy towards the Middle East as it demands really outstanding efforts to concur with the traditional players in the region such as the United States, United Kingdom or France. Russia was off the region for a rather long period after the collapse of the USSR, but this year it has shown that it will participate in the Middle Eastern processes, and moreover it will carry out its own politics, it wants to be active, and what is more important, it has already accumulated enough resources to defend its interests, at least in the current circumstances of democratic presidency and serious internal problems in the US, lack of understanding of what is going on and confusion of European leading actors. The first signs of changes had appeared earlier, but this year they were more concrete. We should not overestimate its capacities, but it would be wrong not to recognize its success. Russia has caught the right wave and adapted to the changing realities faster than others.

Russia feels no more limited in its actions by other «Great powers» and freely maneuvers in the geopolitical space. Furthermore the same freedom is felt by such undoubted actors as China, Brazil, India. All four members of BRICS have shown their power to be equal members of the international community. Russia and China have demonstrated their unity and firmness on the key issues of the international agenda and their firm adherence to the international law and to UN as the key instruments of the world community management and regulation.

            The world would never be the same. The shifts and large scale restructurisation leads to the new international world order, that for the first time could be justly called the «multipolar». Will the world be more stable and reliable? The time will show.  It can make the international community flourish, if the countries that got used to the hegemony and their peoples will rethink their stereotypes and admit the ability of others to have their own vision of international realities, their external interests, and to let others build their own future without any destructive influence of external players.

IMESClub presents the Report by IMESClub member, Ambassador Alexander Aksenenok, that he has delivered during the international conference " The Middle East - changes and upheavals 2013" organized in Switzerland this summer. The author expounds his overview of the major trends, that take place in the Middle East.
"Geopolitical and Regional Dynamics: an Overview" is available for download in PDF:

We present you the text of the speech "From Tunis to Damascus: the dissonant vision of Moscow" delivered by IMESClub Executive Director Maria Dubovikova during the international seminar "France, USA: different perspectives of a new Arab world" organized by IFRI in partnership with NYU Paris on the 15th March 2013. Report is in French. Can be translated in English on demand. 

Press to download "De Tunis à Damas: la vision dissonante de Moscou":