This September, President Vladimir Putin has, on several occasions including during the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, voiced Russia's readiness to act against the ISIS as part of a broad coalition incorporating countries in the West and the Middle East. This prompts some questions. What does a broad coalition mean in this context? Does Russia intend to join the U.S.-led alliance? Will Moscow continue advancing cooperation with Tehran and Damascus while coordinating its moves with Western states to avoid clashes? How feasible is interaction of all or at least some of the players in Iraq and Syria that are engaged in operations against ISIS, which is viewed as a major global threat? The statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on September 10, 2015 goes some way to providing answers to these questions, as he said that the war against the ISIS is viewed by each participant as entirely individual, including due to the convoluted nature of relations between the various different state and non-state actors in the region.
In fact, it is theater shared by two parallel coalitions, i.e. the United States and Europe on the one side, and Russia, Iran and Syria on the other. The past two weeks have seen European states declaring their varying degrees of willingness to take a more active direct role in the Middle East conflict. The U.S. allies in the region are also expected to join the Western coalition, even though they often choose to pursue their own interests, which frequently run counter to U.S. aims. In order to back Russia's effort, the West would obviously have to make its peace with the government and army of Bashar Assad being rightful members of the coalition, at least as along as the war against the ISIS lasts. As of now, we see Western leaders slowly drifting in this direction. However, this scenario remains only a remote possibility. Given the current state of U.S.-Russia relations, it is hard to imagine Russian troops under U.S. command or even a loose coordination of operations with the Syrian Arab Army, if Americans are not open to direct contact with President Assad.
In order to avoid the need to deploy its own ground troops, Russia may try to expand the existing alliance with Iran and Syria by appealing to such neighbors as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
At the same time, Russia and Iran continue to strengthen their cooperation in Syria and beyond, with their goal being to preserve its legitimate government. Russian and Iranian diplomats, generals and military experts have met several times in Moscow to coordinate their approach. A Russia-Iraq-Iran-Syria coordination center was recently established in Baghdad for planning operations against ISIS. Russia seems to have two opportunities under such a coalition. One involves a combination of missile and air strikes against ISIS positions plus engagement of its ground forces, and two, support for the Syrian army, Hezbollah contingents and Iranian volunteers with air strikes, logistics and intelligence. Although many global and regional actors would be happy to see Russian troops involved in ground operations against ISIS, this would not be desirable from Russia’s perspective because the inevitable losses would spark negative responses in Russia, reviving the ‘Afghan syndrome’ in Russian society’s collective consciousness. The second option is fraught with the same risks, although to a lesser extent. It would also be less efficient, since the Syrian army and its allies have all but exhausted their morale and physical resources. However, this is the scenario that seems to be developing, with Russia required to coordinate its operations with the U.S.-led coalition to avoid ‘collateral damage’ which would be undesirable for every party.
In order to avoid the need to deploy its own ground troops, Russia may try to expand the existing alliance with Iran and Syria by appealing to such neighbors as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. If this were to happen, then pressure on ISIS would mount, even though its crushing defeat would be by no means certain..
The Syrian crisis and the ensuing expansion of ISIS have triggered polarization in international relations, which complicates coalition building in the Middle East. In its anti-ISIS crusade, the United States has discovered to its dismay, that its allies are not willing to provide armies for a ground operation. The attempt to build a force comprising local combatants has failed, apparently prompting the resignation of General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS.
U.S. foreign policy flops in the Middle East have opened avenues for other countries to step up their activities. Enjoying the status of the key U.S. partner, Great Britain has considerably expanded its regional presence. China has followed Russia's example to streamline its Middle Eastern policy, positioning itself as an economic and military-technical alternative to the United States. In addition to China’s other recent moves, the trend has prompted Russian China specialist Vitaly Naumkin to the ostensibly utopian but de factorealistic idea of establishing a Russian-Chinese counterterrorist coalition.
This would rest on several factors. First, China is expanding its military-political role in the region, building a naval base in Djibouti for about 1,000 PLA troops. Talks are ongoing regarding engaging the Snow Leopards, i.e. Chinese special operations forces, in counterterrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Beijing has supplied UN peacekeepers in Lebanon and South Sudan with 1,000 troops each, in addition to 500 in Mali. Second, China is gravely concerned by the rise of jihad in its territory, especially after the Turkestan Islamic Party – a Uighur terrorist group – has been seen in Syria to capture an airbase. It also views the spread of ISIS affiliates in Asia and Africa as a clear threat. Third, Russian and Chinese forces are becoming increasingly operationally coherent thanks numerous joint land and sea exercises, which would be significant in any future joint anti-ISIS operations.
In its anti-ISIS crusade, the United States has discovered to its dismay, that its allies are not willing to provide armies for a ground operation.
Of course, there are certain limitations on China's Middle Eastern policy due to its ties with energy suppliers, primarily Saudi Arabia, as well as its intricate relationship with the United States. On the other hand, some U.S. officials seem to openly welcome involvement of China and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the war on ISIS. In any case, Chinese diplomacy is clearly testing the waters regarding joining just such a counterterrorist operation.
In terms of defeating ISIS, this latter scenario appears most feasible, although it is up to the interested leaders to take appropriate decisions.
