How would you evaluate the past decade for the Middle East? (Traditional question for our first round of interviews)
This question demands a very broad answer, but briefly: living conditions and societal relations are deteriorating despite a number of political transformations in several Arab countries as a result of social protests, coups and revolutions. In my view, in addition to numerous internal factors, the geopolitical games of the “great powers,” often acting on the principle of divide and conquer, have continued to exert a strong influence. Under Obama’s administration, however, US foreign policy has undergone some changes: if previously, the Americans pursued a unilateral policy of protecting the interests of allies Israel and Saudi Arabia, then during the past few years an awareness seems to have appeared in Washington that this support has been too one-sided. US policy towards Iran has also clearly changed. In my opinion, the significance of the “Arab Spring” for Arab societies is very debatable. Despite the blood spilt and numerous victims, the expected benefits have largely failed to materialize. But again, it is impossible to answer this difficult question briefly and succinctly.
Ahmadinejad’s Iran and Rouhani’s Iran? Two different Irans? Or the same Iran, but with a new face?
Yes, this is a very good question. More likely a new Iran. The electoral campaign and the voting results in the 2013 presidential elections have changed the distribution of power in the internal political arena. After the 2009 campaign, reformers were practically considered rebels, forces aligned with foreign countries seeking to overthrow the regime and change the political system in the country. During the previous eight years, the conservative-radical line dominated domestic and foreign policy while the liberal-leaning end of the spectrum was kept from all three branches of power; but Rouhani’s electoral victory created divisions within the conservative camp, changing the playing field. We should remember that Rouhani campaigned as an independent, but shifted toward reformist policies after his win. It is impossible to liken the current president with the former. Ahmadinejad did Iran a disservice in terms of foreign policy. In both word and deed, he set the international community against Iran. But now the country is undergoing serious changes, even if the results in terms of domestic policy have not yet come to fruition. A new cabinet has been formed which, in contrast to the previous one, can be called a cabinet of national reconciliation. New governors have been appointed who will support the president’s line. Crucially, a civil rights code has been published. Rouhani campaigned with the slogan: “We must implement and guarantee civil rights and do this in all spheres: freedom of speech and the press… for men and for women, for ethnic minorities.” Seventy political prisoners have been granted amnesty. I just returned from Iran, and people there were talking about how the situation within the country has improved. Many people I spoke with said that the former sense of tension has given way to a more relaxed atmosphere, meaning freer. The constant pressure on the people has been eased, and one can feel more leeway in media and websites. This new atmosphere has entered the universities, where I gave a series of lectures. Rouhani’s speech at Teheran University in the beginning of the academic year ushered in a process of reestablishing student unions. “We must remove the security forces and pressure from the universities and relax the atmosphere there,” he said. There is an ongoing process of reinstatement of students and professors expelled after the events of 2009 and of those prematurely pensioned due to their political convictions. This year, dozens of majors, such as sociology and Western literature, formerly prohibited by the Islamization of the humanities, have been returned to the university curricula. Students now have more opportunity freely to express their opinions on different political issues, and they are seizing these opportunities. Great attention is being paid to culture. Within the Supreme Security Council, a special office has been established to manage cultural and economic programs on the reasoning that security involves not only military defense but protecting the country’s cultural values and, of course, its economy. There are certain changes occurring in the cultural sphere, above all, changes and limitations in the way the government interacts with culture. The new Minister of Culture is meeting with cultural figures, theater personalities, and musicians. Other special programs are in development: for example, just after Rouhani’s election he prepared a nine point national program in order to draft legislation to realize fully the potential of the Iranian Constitution, mainly articles 3, 12, 15, 19 and 22. The main goal is to promote a government by meritocracy (regardless of language and religion, e.g. government functionaries selected according to their talents and skills, instead of connections and family clans) and the appointment of competent local officers all over the country.
How does the exclusion of Iran from Geneva-2 negotiations affect the international initiative on the Syrian crisis?
The exclusion of Iran from Geneva-2 negotiations seriously reduces the effectiveness of these meetings. Why? Because both Iran and Saudi Arabia play a powerful role in the internal situation in Syria. These are two of the most active foreign participants in the civil war in Syria. Saudi Arabia not only sponsors different opposition groups in Syria but employs special units in direct combat there. On the other hand, Iran supports Bashar Assad’s regime economically, financially and militarily as well as preparing Lebanese “Hezbollah” combat units in Syria, which have become a crucial player in the civil war and provide great support for the government. It’s worth mentioning that Syria is the only country Iran has signed a treaty of mutual defense with in case of aggression. So it is virtually impossible to resolve the Syrian issue without Iran and Saudi Arabia. The proposal by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold negotiations between Russia, the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran would have very good prospects, though be rather difficult to implement. The Syrian parties – both Bashar Assad’s regime and the opposition – are unable to come to any substantial agreement. It is the external powers engaged in Syria, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, who must provide the foundation for any agreement. US representatives previously supported the Russian proposal as well, so maybe it has a future. A breakthrough would be difficult even with the presence of all the interested parties: Bashar Assad’s regime, the opposition, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the US and the UN; but without Iran, impossible. I fear the situation may be here to stay for the long term, because a certain balance of power has emerged in Syria. Neither can Assad crush opposition, nor can the opposition can overthrow Assad.
What is the future of Russo-Iranian relations? What is Iran for Russia? And Russia for Iran?
Major changes in relations with Russia are unlikely, and for the most part Iran continues to see our country as an ally. That is not to say that there are not reservations. The failure to deliver the S-300 defense system under Western pressure played into the hands of Iranian skeptics about Russia as a partner. With the West now discussing possible sanctions against Russia, some analysts have gone so far as to suggest that sanctions on Iran might be lifted to allow Europe to go without Russian natural resource exports. This of course, would test the Russian-Iranian relationship, but is a very extreme case scenario. More likely is that Rouhani’s tentative rapprochement with the West will not detrimentally affect Iranian relations with Russia. In many spheres, Russia and Iran have similar geopolitical interests, such as security in Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, which require the maintenance of good ties.
What are the chances, if any, that Iran can be recognized as a fully fledged member of the international community while at the same time maintaining its doggedly independent course?
Much depends on the international situation, political developments around Iran: events in Syria, for example, or the outcome of the presidential elections in the US (Who will take office after Obama and what policies will he or she promote?). It will also depend on the internal situation in Iran. Just before the elections to the previous Majlis of 2011, right-leaning radicals formed a coalition called “The Front of Fidelity to the Islamic Revolution,” or “Paydari,” with Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi as their spiritual leader. The radicals and their candidate Jalili lost the elections and accepted the results but have been asserting their will to regain power ever since. Now they have a rather powerful fraction in Majlis and are challenging Rouhani’s government on international and, to some extent, domestic policy. They will continue to oppose the current government on many things. Radicals are trying to join forces and creating pressure groups against the new administration, and their representatives still have offices in governmental structures, namely in several ministries. It is worth mentioning that the radicals are launching preparations for the new elections to the Majlis (though they will take place only in two-and-a-half years). But Iran has great chances now.
Is the Majlis supporting the new President?
Just after the elections, it seemed the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) would vigorously support Rouhani, and speaker Ali Larijani voiced as much. Despite the apparent readiness to cooperate, however, the Majlis then dragged its feet in confirming newly appointed ministers when the new administration was being formed. And three ministers had to win a Majlis vote of confidence twice, and the last confirmation, the Minister of Education and Sports, was not even appointed until several days before the end of the first 100 days of Rouhani’s administration (moreover, they confirmed only the third candidate). Clearly, the Majlis does not unconditionally support Rouhani’s government. Differences between the Majlis and the administration are manifesting themselves in debates over a new bill called in Persian: “Eslahe modiriyat dar bakhshe omumiye keshvar” (Bill on Changing the Mode of General Governance of the Country), one of whose articles is devoted to regulating cooperation between the Majlis and government. It should be pointed out, however, that one does not see major opposition to Rouhani personally in the Majlis. And though moderate conservatives control the Majlis, Iranian political analysts currently estimate Rouhani’s support there as 50/50.
How do you see future negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program developing?
Let’s hope positively. Iran is tired of sanctions. It is ready for the concessions needed to drop the sanctions, from which ordinary people are suffering most. Unfortunately, there are interests and politicians who want to keep Iran in the “axis of evil.” If the ongoing negotiations in Vienna that began in Geneva fail, Iran will face more severe sanctions. Any broad-based agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany would be a solid success, as both Iran and the US have many internal opponents to fruitful negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Still, there is a more palpable willingness to resolve this issue now. Iran has made several concessions on the nuclear program: the joint action plan of November 24 (in effect from January 20 until June 20) is a serious breakthrough. They are trying to hammer out a final agreement, but it goes without saying that much difficult negotiating remains to be done.
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