M.K. Bhadrakumar's article on Vitaliy Naumkin's interview to Izvestiya
In an interview with the influential Russian daily Izvestiya, the well-known “Orientalist” scholar and establishment figure, Vitaly Naumkin, has floated the startling idea that Moscow must play a role in resolving the Palestinian problem. He said, “Moscow has long urged for [organizing] a top-level meeting between Palestinians and Israelis in Russia, on a Moscow platform. It is necessary to turn Moscow into a venue for such talks.”
Naumkin explains that Moscow has unique credentials to kickstart peace talks, since it is a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council with an obligation to pursue the implementation of relevant UN resolutions on Palestine and is also a member of the Middle East Quartet. Alas, US obduracy has stalled the Quartet, while Washington is stonewalling by casting its veto in the Security Council. He lamented that the US is hobnobbing with extreme right-wing elements in Israel who are not even representative of Israeli opinion.
The idea of Russia acting as a mediator in talks on the Palestinian problem dates back to the Soviet era. It’s been a non-starter due to the West’s dogged determination to keep the Soviets out of the strategic Middle East region. But although Cold War has ended, any Russian attempt to highlight the Palestine problem as the core issue in the Middle East will run into strong headwinds from Tel Aviv and Washington.
So, why is Naumkin, a top establishment pundit (who heads the Russian Academy of Science’s hallowed Institute of Oriental Studies), wading into the whirlpool? In a manner of speaking, he is actually using an “objective co-relative” to clarify the real state of play in the Russian-Israeli ties.
In the interview, Naumkin dispels any notion that Russia and Israel are in any “strategic alliance.” He prefers to call it a “normal trust-based relationship,” which enables the two countries to “fight terror together” and maintain excellent economic ties. Period. Quintessentially, as he puts it, the two countries “no longer see each other as enemies.”
Naumkin points out that Israel’s stance on Ukraine is helpful insofar as it refuses to join western sanctions against Russia, and, secondly, Israel is in harmony with Russia as regards attitudes toward World War II and fascism. But does it mean that Moscow and Tel Aviv have identical stance on everything under the sun? For heaven’s sake, no!
What makes Naumkin’s remarks very interesting is not only his subtlety of mind but that he belongs to the great Soviet tradition of scholar-diplomats who are on the frontline of Russian foreign policy. Quite obviously, Naumkin has marked some distance between Russia and Israel at a complicated juncture when the self-serving western narrative would be that the two countries have struck a deal at the highest level of leadership regarding the future of Syria, leaving Iran out in the cold.
Moscow feels that poison is being injected into Russia’s complex equations with Tehran and Damascus
Moscow feels that poison is being injected into Russia’s complex equations with Tehran and Damascus. Who else but Naumkin could provide the perfect antidote? The heart of the matter is that Russia has substantially improved relations with most countries in the Middle East in recent years after a decade of limited cooperation through the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russian diplomacy has shaken off the Soviet-era ideological baggage and is highly pragmatic. Thus, although Saudi Arabia and the UAE significantly contributed to the bleeding of the Red Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s and had covertly fostered “jihadism” in Chechnya in the 1990s, the Kremlin today is eager to build relations with them. In fact, Saudi Arabia is Moscow’s strategic partner in the so-called “OPEC+ deal” aimed at stabilizing the world oil market.
Again, Qatar, which has been called the “Club Med for terrorists” and was a latent ally of Chechen rebels, is currently negotiating the purchase of Russia’s advanced S-400 missile defence system.
Moscow’s diplomacy aims to convey the impression to its Middle Eastern interlocutors – be it Israel, Jordan, Iran or Saudi Arabia – that Russia keeps its end of a mutually beneficial bargain. But if anyone adds mystique to the bargain and elevates it to a Faustian deal, Moscow may be left with no option but to bring it down to terra firma.
Plainly put, Naumkin, (who, interestingly enough, also happens to be Russia’s advisor to the UN Special Envoy for Syria Steffan de Mistura) knows perfectly well what Russia is attempting in southern Syria – namely, to eliminate the remaining strongholds of terrorist groups ensconced in that region bordering Jordan and Israel. Indeed, if Israel could persuade Washington to shut down the base in Al-Tanf (which makes no sense from a military point of view anyway), it will help the overall Russian efforts. On the other hand, Israel has no reason to worry, because Iran does not intend to participate in the liberation of the provinces of Daara and Quneitra that straddle the Golan Heights.
Besides, it is no secret that Russia has nothing to do with Iran’s policy of resistance against Israel. But then, to put two and two together to shout and dance in jubilation that Russia is muzzling Iran is completely unnecessary – and can turn out to be counterproductive. Of course, if anyone tries to create confusion, Moscow will clarify. That is what Naumkin has ably done.
Article published in Asia Times: http://www.atimes.com/top-russian-pundit-calls-for-palestine-talks-in-moscow/
Photo credit: Vesti.ru
Iran remains under intense pressure from the United States, supported by Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration would clearly like to force Iran back into international isolation. Regional powers are also pushing back against what they see as growing Iranian influence among its neighbors. How is Iran negotiating these trends? What countermeasures can it employ?
There is nothing new under the sun here. From the first days of the Islamic Revolution, the country began its adjustment to the difficult conditions of international isolation – something it’s only recently been able to start coming out of. But hardly all countries see Iran as part of an “axis of evil” – the European Union’s stance is different from that of the US and its axis of Middle East allies.
The best Iranian countermeasures to the new US diplomatic and economic offensive are simply to continue to abide by the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif uses the word “restraint” quite often in interviews, and one gets a definite sense that the Iranian establishment is wary of being provoked into rash action.
It’s not even clear to what extent the Trump administration is playing an “Art of the Deal” game with noisy threats to withdraw from the agreement. Trump talked in his campaign a lot about US money wasted on recent wars, the cost of NATO, etc. – the expense of empire. A hot conflict with Iran would not be cheap. Of course, that’s assuming there’s some reasoning behind Trump’s actions…
In any case, as of now Trump has only passed the buck on the JCPOA to congress by requesting them to review the agreement. They may well stick to it – surely there is an awareness in Washington, despite the rhetoric, of the damage a unilateral US withdrawal would inflict on its own reputation and international security. If congress balks, Trump can still say he fought it, but lawmakers wouldn’t go along.
But there are and will continue to be new attempts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran, and new provocations. In this kind of game, Iran will continue its displays of “insubordination” to the will of the hegemon while taking care not to go too far.
Of course, if the US continues to use its influence and economic might to block the economic integration promised by the JCPOA – perhaps the deal’s primary incentive from an Iranian perspective – there is a danger that the Iranians will decide it’s not worth it. The tactic of signing an agreement but then stalling its implementation is also not new. It’s worth noting that the Iranian side was complaining about this during Obama’s tenure; it’s not something that cropped up with Trump.
How do you view the continuing hysteria surrounding Iran? Is “hysteria” an overstatement? What can be done to stop the escalation of the Sunni-Shia clashes?
You mean hysteria in the West? I don’t think we are hysterical about Iran here in Russia. I don’t know what can be done about Western hysteria. It’s a very old tradition. Somehow they’ve gone from the “Omar Hayyam Society” in Victorian England to the “Axis of Evil.” Although I think anti-Russian hysteria in some countries may soon outdo anti-Iranian hysteria – that might be a kind of solution to the problem: just replace it with somebody else.
Perceptions of Iran in many of the Gulf states also seem to verge on paranoia at times. There are historical divisions. Russia has great potential as mediator but much of depends on Russia being seen as objective and not too
What are Iran's national interests internationally? What are its foreign policy goals – both stated and unstated? In other words, where does it want to go? Where does it see itself in the medium term?
All players in the region (and some outside of it) are striving for influence, and Iran is no exception. But we should not underestimate the degree to which the perception of threat drives Iranian actions. Its goals are to ensure stability on its boarders, to avoid open conflict with the West, at the same time preserving and strengthening its defense capability. The more the perceived danger nearby, the more instability, the more urgent Iran’s need to have a strong influence outside of its borders – in Iraq and Syria, for instance.
But Iran also wants a better dialogue with the West – something that started to happen, but is now uncertain. Iran has become good at maintaining its “resistance economy” – some of my friends in Tehran laughed when I told them several years ago about sanctions imposed on Russia: “Oh, try dealing with it for thirty some years!” they said. But Iran wants and needs to build a better economy, and increasing ties with the West is part of this. Still, the Iranians will be loathe to engage in a dialogue that they feel is one-sided. From their perspective, there have been too many years – decades – of this.
You asked about foreign policy, but many domestic issues are closely connected with foreign policy, so I should talk at least a little about that as well. The economic and social burden of massive numbers of refugees from neighboring failed states – or states forced into failure – is one example that comes to mind. There is also the ethnic policy inside of Iran. Many of the tensions of minority groups in Iran – Kurds, Arabs, Azeris, Turkmen and others – depend on the situation with those same groups just across the border in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan – all bordering on Iran with ethnic populations spilling into Iran. In recent years, the central government in Tehran has taken steps to improve the living conditions of minorities in the country and to address their complaints, but the success of these measures is also dependent on outside factors.
It is reported that Iran was heavily involved in defusing the recent incident between Arab Iraqis and Kurds around Kirkuk. If you remember, they were on the verge of an armed conflict. Some will say: again Iran is meddling. But how could Iran not be considered a stakeholder? There are seven to eight million Kurds living in Iran.
It would seem that Iran really does view Russia as an ally. The two countries have achieved significant successes in Syria. How permanent is this alliance? How is it backed up by contracts, treaties, etc.?
It’s difficult to imagine Assad and his government still existing without Russia and Iran. Whether or not that is a success depends on your perspective. Preventing a radical Islamic takeover of Syria is certainly a success. Liberating Palmyra is certainly a success – there was no participation in the battle from the Combined Joint Task Force of half a dozen Western countries, unfortunately. From a logistics point of view alone, cooperation in Syria is not simple. There are diplomatic and cultural nuances too: Russian missile launches from Iranian territory raised questions in the Iran Majles (parliament) – the Iranian constitution categorically prohibits foreign military bases on Iranian territory – this is the specter of Iran’s colonialized history, in which Russia – alongside Britain and America – played a not always positive role.
It will take more work to develop a true alliance – and the long, complicated history between Russian and Iran is an important factor. There were multiple wars, the Turkmanchai Treaty of the early nineteenth century, giving much of northern Iran to the Russian Empire. At the moment, the two countries have common interests, not only in Syria, but security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia. For a long time now, Russia and Iran have been trying to boost trade, but economic ties are still not anywhere near their potential. Yes, some contracts have been signed, but not nearly as many as have been proposed. There are issues of trust, perhaps, but also pressure from outside.
The fact is that while we may both disagree with much of the United States’ foreign policy, the US holds the keys to the global economy, and access to US markets and financial systems is paramount. And most of the youth of Iran is enchanted with the West and particularly the United States – the pop culture. Although I should say that Russian high culture enjoys an excellent reputation in Iran – the writers, musicians and filmmakers. Iranian culture is also making more and more inroads into Russia. Even in Moscow, we now have an Iranian film festival, there are evenings of Iranian music and poetry. The Iranian Cultural Center here does an excellent job.
It makes little sense to me that we do not have stronger ties, and I hope the future will bring them.
Photo credit: Fotolia / Borna_Mir
IMESClub's Council Chairman, one of the greatest world experts on the Middle East was named this week as a mediator in the Syrian peace talks and advisor to Staffan de Mistura.
We share the article by Reuters on the matter.
A Russian academic named this week as a mediator in the Syrian peace talks is an acclaimed expert on the Arab world with the trust of the Kremlin, a sign of the influence Moscow has won at the negotiating table after a five-month military campaign.
Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations envoy on Syria, said he had appointed Russia's Vitaly Naumkin, 70, as a new consultant to support him in brokering peace talks in Geneva between the sides in Syria's civil war. De Mistura said he also wants to appoint an American, who has yet to be named.
The posts reflect the roles of the Cold War-era superpowers as co-sponsors of peace talks that began this week in Geneva, with Moscow a leading supporter of President Bashar al-Assad and Washington friendly with many of his enemies.
Naumkin's position is likely to ensure that Moscow retains its clout at peace talks, even as President Vladimir Putin has announced he is pulling out most of his forces after an intervention that tipped the balance of power Assad's way.
Reuters spoke to nine people who know Naumkin, and all described a talented and well-connected scholar who speaks fluent Arabic and has rich experience mediating in conflicts.
He has close working relationships with Russia's leaders, and describes himself as a protege of Yevgeny Primakov, a former Russian spy chief, foreign minister and prime minister who once served as an architect of Soviet policy in the Middle East and later as an informal mentor to President Vladimir Putin.
Naumkin did not reply to a Reuters request for an interview, but acquaintances said his views were likely to reflect Russia's policies.
"He has a political line, it's our good political line," said Alexei Malashenko, a long-standing Naumkin acquaintance and scholar in residence at the Moscow Carnegie Center think tank.
TIES TO OFFICIALS
Another person who knows Naumkin, who gave an assessment of his role on condition of anonymity, described him as a talented academic who would defer to senior Russian officials on policy.
Several of the people who spoke to Reuters said Naumkin was in regular contact with Mikhail Bogdanov, Russia's deputy foreign minister and presidential Middle East envoy.
De Mistura nevertheless said Naumkin's job would be to help the U.N. mediation team, not serve Russian interests: "He reports to me, not to his own mother country."
Born in the Ural Mountains, Naumkin studied Arabic language and history at Moscow State University, before serving for two years in the Soviet army teaching Arabic to military interpreters.
He gained a reputation as an outstanding simultaneous interpreter and was called on to translate at high-level meetings between Soviet officials and Arab leaders. It was in this role that he built up a rapport with Primakov, whom he met in Cairo in the 1960s.
Primakov later invited him to work as an academic at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow, according to Naumkin's own account. Naumkin did pioneering research into Socotra, an island between Yemen and Somalia, and spent periods living in Yemen and Egypt.
"He knows the Middle East not by hearsay, not from inside an office, but he's lived within it," said Alexander Knyazev, a Kazakhstan-based analyst who has known Naumkin for years.
In the early 1990s, Naumkin facilitated back-channel negotiations between rival sides in a civil war in the mainly Muslim ex-Soviet state of Tajikistan.
Naumkin arrived in the Tajik capital at the height of the fighting together with Harold Saunders, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State. Unsolicited, they offered their services as mediators to the Tajik leader.
When he accepted, they went to the Tajik foreign minister's house and slaughtered a sheep to celebrate, according to Kamoludin Abdullaev, a Tajik researcher who was present.
Naumkin's role in the talks was to make sure the opposition's views were heard.
"He was very assertive. The ... negotiations ended successfully," said Mars Sariyev, a former Kyrgyz diplomat who took part on the talks.
SYRIA MEDIATION
Naumkin has already played a back-room role in Syria negotiations, coordinating two rounds of talks in Moscow, backed by the Russian foreign ministry, to try to unite some of Syria's disparate opposition.
Those talks produced no major breakthrough, though not through any fault of Naumkin's, according to Nikolai Sukhov, an Arabist scholar and former student of Naumkin.
People who know Naumkin said he would be unflagging in his efforts to broker a solution in Geneva, would be on good terms with both sides and would not let emotion or frustration get in the way, even if the talks falter.
Western diplomats say it may be useful to have Naumkin in the room at the talks. One said it would encourage the Syrian government delegation to stay at the table despite its reluctance to sit down with its opponents.
Another said it could also be reassuring to the opposition, since the Kremlin has leverage over Damascus: “If the hypothesis is that the Russians will be putting pressure on the regime, maybe it is good to have this guy there.”
(Additional reporting by Olga Dzubenko in BISHKEK, Jack Stubbs and Dmitry Solovyov in MOSCOW, Olzhas Auyezov in ALMATY and Tom Miles and Suleiman Al-Khalidi in GENEVA; writing by Christian Lowe; editing by Peter Graff)
Vice-President of IMESClub has shared his analysis on the Syrian crisis and the Russia's involvement in a fight with ISIS.
Discussion was held in arabic by Al Jazeera TV.
However, he is more cautious about the development of the situation in other countries of the region (Syria and Lybia). “We opened the Pandora's box”, says Mustapha Tlili.
Source: http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/17963-quel-regard-porte-mustapha-tlili-porte-sur-la-tunisie-et-les-pays-de-la-region
Oui, s'il aboutit effectivement à un accord définitif le 30 juin. Il mettra fin à trente-cinq ans de relations conflictuelles entre Téhéran et Washington, réintégrant l'Iran dans le concert des nations et assurant le renoncement à l'arme nucléaire de ce dernier. Les protocoles de contrôle, pour éviter des tricheries de Téhéran, comme celles qui lui avaient permis de construire le site souterrain de Fordow, me semblent très sérieux, très précis.
Le texte est ambigu sur ce point, car il ne précise pas clairement quand elles seraient levées, hormis une mention du respect par l'Iran de ses engagements. En outre, il parle de « sanctions », indéterminées, et non pas « des sanctions » dans leur ensemble. Il s'agit de ce que les diplomates appellent des « ambiguïtés constructives », volontaires, qui permettent de ne pas bloquer la dynamique de l'accord, à charge ensuite d'être dissipées en juin. A noter au passage que les Etats-Unis maintiennent quoi qu'il arrive les sanctions qui ont été prises au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme ou pour les droits de l'homme. Les rivalités demeurent. D'ailleurs, l'Iran ne renonce pas à sa politique d'influence au Moyen-Orient, notamment en Syrie ou au Liban. On est encore très loin du « grand bargain » que certains pronostiquent entre Washington et Téhéran ou d'un renversement d'alliances. Les Saoudiens n'ont d'ailleurs pas réagi de manière critique à l'annonce de l'accord.
Ca leur sera difficile, même s'ils disposent toujours d'une capacité de nuisance. A Téhéran on entend à peine les adversaires du compromis et le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Javad Zarif, a reçu un accueil triomphal. Aux Etats-Unis, les républicains alliés aux faucons parmi les démocrates auront du mal à faire voter de nouvelles sanctions contre l'Iran à la majorité des deux tiers du Congrès nécessaire pour surmonter le veto présidentiel. Le gouvernement israélien n'a pas renoncé à faire échouer l'accord, mais ne dispose pas de beaucoup de leviers pour cela.
En savoir plus : http://www.lesechos.fr/journal20150407/lec1_monde/0204278905337-denis-bauchard-un-accord-definitif-reintegrera-liran-dans-le-concert-des-nations-1108847.php?PitSsIouZEezrrFc.99
I would like to start our conversation with an interesting and important question - the future of political Islam. This topic has been discussed in our conversation with Mustafa Tlili. Examples of Tunisia and Egypt, where Islamists coming into power had a short time in office then faced a complete defeat, let us raise this question. Many experts beleive that political Islam is not able to gain a foothold in power for a long time and will inevitably give way to secular forces soon. Some experts think that after this failure, both in Egypt and Tunisia, the political Islam is on the brink of complete decomposition. What do you think of the future of political Islam in the Middle East?
It’s a difficult question. It needs excursion into history to understand, firstly, what the political Islam is. Secondly we need an excursion into the history in order to understand why it has acquired such strength. It is difficult to answer unequivocally, what will happen to political Islam. A whole lecture is required.
But if not to take this question in a historical perspective, its formation, its development? What if to talk about the future of political Islam taking the Arab Spring as a starting point, which in turn was quite a unique phenomenon, given its absolutely secular slogans and then the subsequent arrival of the Islamists? And then these Islamists’ rule did not last long. At the current moment in history and in the foreseeable future, after this failure, in your opinion is it also difficult to make predictions about the future of political Islam?
Well, I would say that it is still very difficult to give an answer. Firstly, because there is no clear definition of what the political Islam is. The arrival into power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia has shown the two things: on the one hand, that the people wanted a change and rejected the autocratic regimes that did not give them the freedom and security, that they could not withstand the omnipotence of the elites, unemployment, corruption etc. any longer. On the other hand, political vacuum has been created, and it turned out that the most organised political force was Muslim Brotherhood that had carried out much work with the population in the social field and had a good position. As a result, the Islamists have won the elections, both in Egypt and in Tunisia. But in the future, indeed, they have failed as they did not have any adequate program, because all their slogans were designed to overthrow the existing regimes, there were no constructive, positive action programs: how to withdraw their countries out of the crisis, how to proved people with work. And so they have not existed for long. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, this failure of relatively moderate political Islamists led to a dramatic rise of the radical Islamists, who took advantage of the situation and have considerably strengthened their positions in many areas. Today they spread their influence in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya and in several African countries. And there is no understanding how the other events in the region of the Middle East will develop. The fact to be admitted is that the radical methods of struggle, barbaric, savage cruelty, are quite effective. The young people who are in a state of frustration, who were disappointed, because of being jobless with no perspectives, with no chances to live a decent life, more and more of them join these radical Islamists because they do not see another way. After all, all they want is to have everything they want here and now, as soon as possible.
All phenomena have a dialectical side. I think that the Muslim Brotherhood suffered a big blow, and it is unlikely that they will resurrect as a phoenix, at least in Egypt. But many of their supporters and fans now join the ranks of radical Islamists.
I would like to stress once again the fact that political Islam should be correctly identified - what do we mean by this term. Because those theocratic regimes that exist in the Gulf States may fall under the definition of political Islam too. And they do a lot to put the struggle, which is now underway, in the mainstream of the Shiite and Sunni Islam etc. I would not jump to conclusions that political Islam disappears or is weakened. It is transforming, taking new forms. I think that now we see the strengthening of radical Islam against the background of the moderate Islam weakening.
The future of political Islam depends on how the rulers will be able to solve the problems of social development. First of all: to get rid of the terrible poverty, to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, to deal with unemployment, corruption, etc. Anyway, in my opinion, we witness now if not a victorious march of radical Islam, then something like that. Boko Haram militants have sworn allegiance to ISIS. In Libya ISIS rebels are quite successful, having manifested themselves through the execution of the 22 Copts. And more and more Islamist movements swear allegiance to the Caliphate led by Caliph Ibrahim. So I think that these processes are far from being completed. We see them in the dynamics. What will the outcome of this process be depends, firstly, on foreign intervention, which always determines a lot. And secondly, it depends on how successful the Assad’s Syrian Army actions against militants of ISIS will be and how successfully the Iraqis will be able to press the ISIS. In any case, now even the US, who actually provoked the rise of these radicals, begins to realize that it’s impossible to defeat this terrible evil without cooperation with the Iraqi and Syrian authorities.
Despite the bombardments of the coalition forces the ISIS still augments its influence, which has already expanded beyond the borders of Iraq and Syria and even the Middle Eastern region as in case with Boko Haram in Africa, and according to some sources the ISIS is already entering Afghanistan. The efficiency of the measures taken by the coalition is debated. What do you think that the international community should undertake in order to stop and abolish ISIS? What should be revised in the current approach to this problem resolution? And what are the prospects of the struggle against the Islamic state in the current situation?
We should be ready for the new victories of ISIS and new complications, tensions, new conflicts. Why? The support of these radicals among the Muslim youth that does not want to wait is increasing. And despite its cruelty ISIS is considered efficient. The main thing attractive for the new recruits is the injustice of current conditions. Aspiration for justice is natural. The willingness to see this justice during one’s life makes many young people enter the ranks of these fighters. They believe that in such a way they will be able to deracinate the root of evil of the injustice.
New turmoil should be expected.
I always say that the Americans are interested in the instability in the Middle East. The do not depend on the Middle Eastern oil anymore. These conflicts allow them to control their allies – Europe and Asia as they depend on this oil much more.
The shortsighted position of Europe that depends much on these resources and moreover supplies many new recruits to these Islamist groups is unclear. In fact, by such position it sets fire in its own home. During the execution of the Copts the leader of this gang pointed his knife in the direction of Rome по тексту что-то другое было and said: “Wait for us”. The Europeans do not make proper conclusions from the latest terrorist acts.
They have focused all their efforts to cut Ukraine form Russia. This is a very shortsighted policy. And while it goes on there will be no progress in fight against ISIS. The so-called coalition with the US in head is active for a year and nothing has changed. The Iraqi are even unable to take Tikrit. They say they need help from coalition. Additional forces are required.
The international efforts should be combined. Not only in the military sphere but also the fight against this ideology, education measures for this Muslim youth, cutting the funding channels. But it is virtually impossible in the conditions of international tensions and ongoing Ukrainian crisis. The understanding that the international efforts should be united to fight this cancer tumor is coming to the Middle East. The efforts are fruitful only if the international community is united.
This was the same in the Syrian case. A big war – the US bombardments, was averted then. We have agreed on the chemical weapons destruction with the Americans. And now we are on the verge of a new turn of tension.
For example the Saudi already voice their intentions to get the nuclear weapons as they are not content with the US agreements with Iran. Egypt is considering nuclear programs. Turkey as well. That will be the result. The situation is difficult and explosive.
However our Western partners believe that they will manage to avert new terrorist acts – that is not the case. Western Europe is unable to elaborate an adequate program to integrate 30 millions of Muslims. They do not have an understanding of how to pacify their own Muslims, not speaking about the efforts to suppress radical Islamists in the Middle East. If they do not change their approach – the situation will not change and will severely deteriorate. I do not share the optimism that the bombardments will help to stop ISIS and vanquish them. I think that further everything will be worse and more complicated.
In the conditions of crisis with the West Russia has declared its turn to the East now. And the first step was an important strengthening of relations with Egypt. Moreover, Russia was among the first countries to declare support for Egypt after the execution of Copts. And that provoked some assumptions in the international community that Russia may even join the international coalition.
How Russia is important for the Middle East now? And is there possibility of its joining the international coalition?
Russia is a great power. And it has such potential that nothing can be done without it. All the more it concerns the Middle East, where we have rather strong positions. It is not only regarding the Syrian crisis. It is also about Turkey. Though there are some differences with Turkey on the Syrian crisis, the cooperation between our countries is increasing and Russian-Turkish cooperation is strengthening in all the spheres. There is also an intensive cooperation with Egypt. There is an active exchange of delegations. Many of them are not covered in media. We exchange information. There is an ongoing military cooperation. And all this will continue. Russia is awaited in Iraq. The Iraqi warmly recall their cooperation with Moscow in all the spheres, and mainly in the weaponry.
There is the same for Libya. I was an Ambassador there. Two Libyans from opposition have come saying that all the parties of the Libyan conflict, including the Islamists believe that Russian participation is essential to preserve a united Libya. They do not trust others. Even the Islamists! The Italian Prime Minister has recently arrived here and besides the discussion of the Ukrainian crisis he asked to help with Libya as the crisis there is the direct threat for the Italians. And this is really so. They are not so far away: the Libyan shore is close enough to Sicily. How to resolve the Libyan crisis? Only with the participation of Moscow.
The Eastern turn does exist and it will go on. The second meeting with Syrian opposition and representatives of the Syrian government will take place in April. Russia does much effort to achieve a real settlement. Russia sticks to a position that no conflict can be resolved from the position of force in the 21st century. Everybody should make agreements. This position is becoming increasingly attractive for the Arab capitals. Everybody is positive towards Russia.
And there are more and more examples. We have wonderful relations with Sudan, there are traditionally admirable relations with Algeria. In the Persian Gulf they also say that Russia is a trusted partner. And I believe that it will be soon reflected in the figures of trade and economic cooperation. But it requires some time.
The main idea is that there are so many issues today that they should be resolved exclusively by the political means and only on the basis of collective cooperation and efforts. There are some elements of understanding now. There were some attempts before to resolve the Syrian crisis by the “Friends of Syria”. There were constant meetings. And now Kerry says that this problem cannot be resolved without the dialogue with the government of Assad. And the CIA director says, “You take out Assad and what will happen? The thugs will come?” The signs of understanding are visible. But they are just the first ones.
As far as joining the international coalition is concerned – we have already voiced our position that we condemn this format. We believe that the struggle with ISIS should be complex. And it should be multifunctional: not only the military one by supplying arms, but by cutting the financial influxes, serious educational measures for the youth, not to make it susceptible to the blandishment of these wild preachers that say that one should live as in the 7th century. It is essential to cope with this evil. But as currently the West is focused on arguing with Russia over the Ukrainian issues, we are unable to speak about any real political, efficient cooperation now. It is an incorrect choice of priories.
The Europeans should understand that taking into consideration their problems with migration policy and successful recruitment of Europeans by the ISIS, they are able to resolve them only in cooperation with Russia. We coexist more than a millennium: the Christians of the Eastern and Western Churches. Of course we have misunderstandings. But we coexist perfectly. We have created our own system. But we should fight the extremism together. And the particular attention should be paid to the system of education so that it does not produce partisans of barbaric extremists.
Maria Dubovikova: Tunisia has become the first democracy in the Middle East, first of all due to the fact that its society is far more liberalized than any other country of the Middle East. Tunisia has once more confirmed that policy of “putting the cart before the horse” is useless, that obtrusion of democratic institutions doesn’t lead to the establishment of liberal democracy, and that to establish one, the society itself should be liberalized, which will automatically lead to the establishment of democratic rule. So can we say that Tunisian success becomes possible thanks to its historically strong ties with France? And in this case why didn’t the Arab Spring touch Morocco, which also has strong ties with France and a society that is more liberalized compared to the other countries of the MENA? Or, if Tunisia was and is the most liberalized country of the Middle East, why did the Islamists win the first elections after the fall of Ben Ali?
Mustapha Tlili: Tunisia and Morocco are different in many ways. First, they are different in terms of their size and population. On the one hand, you have about 30 million people in Morocco and approximately 10-11 million in Tunisia. Second, Tunisia is far more urbanized – you could even say far more advanced – than Morocco. Morocco remains a more rural country. Tunisia is up to 85% urban. That’s a big difference. If you look at the map of Tunisia, you’ll see that the concentration of the population is along the coast. And that concentration of the population along the coast orients its outlook towards the north, rather then towards the east or the west. When Tunisians think about their daily lives, of how to improve them, they don’t think east or west. They think north because Sardinia (Italy) is 20 minutes away by plane; Rome is 40 minutes. You can take a morning flight, do whatever you have to do in Rome, and come back in the afternoon. Paris is practically the same distance. The flight takes less then two hours. You can go there in the morning and come back in the afternoon. The whole length of Southern France and Southern Italy is so close – that has a huge impact. Also, the middle class in Tunisia is much stronger than the middle class in Morocco. Tunisia is more successful in terms of GDP, of buying power, of the level of comfort of middle class living. They invest in lasting things – houses and other property – connected with stability. If you are raised with these things, you are not going to burn down your own things or your brother’s – you are rising up because you want to change the structure. In Morocco, the population cannot even rise up because of the overwhelming power of the Monarchy and the tools of oppression the Monarchy has at its disposal. In Tunisia, when the break-down happened, it was a real revolution intended to stop the corrupt regime and the power it exercised through the police. The revolution was also connected with middle class ideology and demographics – hundreds of thousands of youth that were very well educated, with university diplomas, but jobless. If you look at the slogans of the revolution, they are dignity, employment, and freedom of expression. You’ll find them to be almost the same slogans of the Prague Spring – they were calling for freedom, for freedom of expression, for the end of dictatorship, and so on and so forth. In Morocco you didn’t have this. You had only a few demonstrations…
MD: Shut down by the government.
MT: Yes. These are differences that are very important and which we have to keep in mind. Also, the Islamists got into the picture later – they were not initially part of the revolution. The dictator fled the country on January 14, 2011. The following day «Project Syndicate» asked me to write a piece on the event. It appeared on January 20. By that time, most of the analysts expected the Islamists to come. But the Islamists were nowhere to be found. I started my piece this way. And this is a fact. Twenty years after The New York Times featured the fall of Bourguiba, the front-page article announced the flight of Ben Ali with a big picture. Look up that photo: it was a photo of a huge demonstration on January 14, the day Ben Ali fled the country. There is a sea of men and women. I looked at the photo trying to find a single woman with a headscarf or hijab, trying to find a single man with a beard. I started my column precisely with this observation. There is no way you can look at this image and find the Islamists present. If you look at the slogans that prevailed during these demonstrations, there was not a single call for the application of sharia. The protesters demands were – without exception – the typical demands of a middle class country for more freedoms. What happened, as history will show, is that Islamists were pushed by some powers to take advantage of the situation and to start making their presence known. And that is what happened in Tunisia. Suddenly, some of them who had been in exile, like Ghanushi, began showing their heads. And they had a lot of money. They were inundating the country with money to show their power. For instance, they bought a huge modern building to serve as their headquarters. Then they stated spreading their network across the country through local offices they established all over the place. They also started doing charity work in the country knowing very well there would be elections in few months. Spending huge amounts of money – and there are many indications that this money came from Qatar – the Islamists started preparing for elections. And given the sympathy that the Islamists had gained when they were in prison and in exile, and given the fact that secular forces (leftists, liberals, etc.) were not united and were fighting each other for power, the results of the elections were disastrous. The Islamists won over 80% of the vote. It had been agreed before the elections that the winning force would form the government. Despite their victory, the fact is, the Islamists were late to the party. The same is true for Egypt. If you go back to the history of that period (which already seems far away), the Islamists were not even thinking about presenting candidates for election. They said they were not thinking of running for the presidency. But then they changed their mind.
MD: Yes, as they could not imagine themselves coming into power after the years of oppression!
MT: Yes! And it should be said that when the Islamists came to power in Tunisia, instead of focusing on the demands of the revolution (jobs, dignity, freedom), they thought they had a mandate to change the identity of the country…. to impose sharia, to roll back the rights of women, to Islamize the country as if the country was not Muslim enough. And when Tunisians realized these objectives, they said no.
MD: I read, if I’m not mistaken, an article on the basis of your interview, given in February of this year to the Tunisian website. There you have said that there is an end of political Islam in Tunisia.
MT: Not only in Tunisia, but all over the Middle East.
MD: But what about ISIS? It’s not just Islamism, it’s extremism, and what’s more, it is an Islamic political extremism. I think it’s a new phenomenon we’ve never faced before in modern history. Are you taking into account the Salafists in Egypt who are much more conservative than the Muslim Brotherhood and still remain popular enough and have their electorate, or taking into account that there are many people who share the Islamist ideas, who even join the ranks of ISIS pushed by their faith? Can we really talk about the end of political Islam? Or maybe this is true for the current moment of history for some countries, and then the Islamists will return to power? Do you think that it is an absolute end with no possibility of recovery?
MT: Well, if we’re going to talk about the Muslim Brotherhood, we should look deep in its history. The movement's ideologue, Saïd al-Qotb, had spent one year in the United States and was overwhelmed by all the expressions of modernity, shocked by the decadence of the lifestyle and so on. And so he came back with a reaffirmed conviction that Muslim societies, which were lagging behind, could not in any way reach the West, nor improve their conditions within the Western model because the Western model was decadent – and therefore there should be an Islamic solution. He came up with the slogan: Islam is the solution. In the minds of al- Qotb and his successors, we should go back to the Islamic tradition, to the past. We have to renew the things that we have lost, we have to revive the ways of the Prophet, the ways of the caliphs, and the ways of those who the caliphs governed to solve today’s problems. Sometimes they got the chance to act openly; sometimes they were oppressed. But the Muslim Brotherhood persisted in Egypt through several different experiments in nation-building: first, the Pan-Arabism of Nasser, which failed, then pan-socialism. (This was also during Nasser’s time; what started as a Pan-Arabism evolved into the propaganda of Arab socialism under the influence of the Soviet Union and following Egypt’s problems with the U.S. due to the Israel issue.) That also failed. Then came Sadat, and a new period of authoritarian nationalism, which continued through Sadat’s rule and most of Mubarak’s rule. In the background, there was always a possibility of an “Islamic solution,” but until the revolution, the Islamists never had the chance to prove that their solution worked. And this is why they were elected by a majority in Egypt: because the people believed that since all the previous solutions had failed, these guys must have the answer. We know the result – in Egypt as well as in Tunisia. The Islamists were given a chance to rule for three years and they were a total failure. This is why I say the movement is over – because they had a chance to make an impact –
MD: But the chance is lost.
MT: It is for today. Take communism! It had its time. The industrial revolution saddled the labor class with numerous problems. Then came Marx with a beautiful theory, Engels to transform this theory into action, then Lenin and so forth. For all of them, communism was a solution. Seventy-five years later, it collapsed. It could not satisfy people’s demands and aspirations. The propaganda claimed, «We are better than the West», but the reality was different. Now having seen and lived in a consumer society, Russians are not going back to communism. Communism had its chance, but it failed.
Similarly, political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood won’t come back. That’s why there is a crisis within the MB. There is a big crisis within Ennahda in Tunisia, too, because they know that they have failed. They have to review and revise their ideology and rid it of ideas like the establishment of sharia. Perhaps they should think of themselves as a Muslim party in the same way Christian democrats in Europe are inspired by Christian principles, but do not try to create a system of governance based in Christian authority. As long as the Islamists continue trying to create a system of governance according to Islam (such as sharia), as long as they stay as they are, they have no chance of being part of the political system and the society.
MD: Ok! But if the Islamist ideas are no longer attractive to these societies – taking into account the dramatic catastrophe that is going in Iraq and Syria – why do they still appear to be attractive for Europeans, who are fleeing the countries they are living in and joining ISIS? Why, as this kind of Islamism loses its influence in the Middle East, is it at the same time gaining supporters and partisans in Western societies?
MT: The reason for this is a failure of European countries in integrating Muslim immigrants. If you look at those who are joining the ranks of ISIS, they are marginalized youth. Many have been in prison or were drugs addicts. This is what I love about sociology – you are going to the roots of social problems. It’s clear if you look at the biographies of those who have joined ISIS that there has been a failure of immigration policy and failure of integration of Muslim immigrants into European societies. The reason why the ideology is attractive is because the youth who are rejected, who are marginalized, find in the preaching of those extremists who approach them something they can identify themselves with while seeking revenge against the West. If you look at the videos they produce and analyze the language of these videos, they are all about revenge. Take another symbol– the robe their prisoners wear. Those orange clothes are meant to remind you of Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq where the Americans tortured their prisoners.
MD: Lakhdar Brahimi accused the West of contributing to the creation of ISIS. Do you agree with him?
MT: No. The West produced horrors that remained in the imagination of these young people, who saw these images on TV. And when you are living in a marginalized society, or society group, growing up with the images of torture of Muslim co-religionists in Syria and Iraq, then you are growing up with the feeling that you should take revenge. And in that sense, the West has contributed, but not – at least in my perspective – by allowing or helping ISIS to be formed. We have to be very careful. But in the sense of the 2003 Iraq war having influence on the formation of ISIS – yes, he is absolutely right. If you look at the composition of ISIS, at who the soldiers are…
MD: The ex-Saddam soldiers!
MT: Yes! And the U.S.’s big mistake in the early years of the occupation was the disbandment of the Iraqi army, which created an army of unhappy people dreaming of revenge.
Маria Dubovikova: The shelling of Gaza in 2014 has killed over 2000 people, many civilians. After that a new wave of Palestine recognition was launched by European countries. How much did it influence on the perception of the conflict abroad, in the West? Did it hammer one more nail in Arab-Israeli conflict regulation?
Tatiana Karasova : We can answer this question in a simple way, and that will be an inaccurate answer and distortion. And we can give a much more complex answer to explain what is going on. If to answer lapidary, yes, it has hammed one more nail in a coffin, there is a change in relations, after that shelling European countries pronounce for the recognition of the Palestinian State. Yes. And yes. And once again yes. And now let’s investigate the situation. Such escalations take place every two years. This happens not by chance! These 2000 people are dead, even if there were only 200 victims – to count by the piece is immoral. One child dead – this is enough.
The victims are inevitable in every escalation of the conflict but still the both sides are ready to a confrontation. Such a question is delicate and improper.
On the one hand this cyclicity is caused by the fact that one of the side arms itself, and at some point this party decides to go to the provocation, that inevitably will result in civilian casualties. This side deliberately goes for it. They perfectly know how their provocation will end up, knowing the Israeli’s law «Symmetrical retaliation». Under symmetrical retaliation Israel understands surgical strikes on the provocateurs and fire suppression of the launching points. The tunnels with people inside and the HAMAS leaders who fare clearly known to be the ideological inspirers are under the strikes.
Knowing the consequences, these representatives of Hamas go to apartment houses on purpose. What does Israel do? It drops leaflets on these houses, on the whole residential area, warning the civilians about the timing of the strikes against the certain persons and artillery systems, asking the civilians to leave the area. What happens next? Civilians don’t leave the area, as those who are in the basement don’t let them leave. Then comes a surgical strike aimed at the basement, but the whole building is pulled down. And someone passes by this house, children are playing. And the neighboring house is also destroyed as these building crashes. It happens every time. There is nobody who is completely culpable or right. This is a mean warfare provoked by the both parties.
M.D.: The motivation for Hamas is quite obvious. They gain additional support through the broad-scale media campaign and by the price of lives of Palestinians killed during Israeli bombardments and they also receive a required reaction of the international community. This reaction was not expressed only on the international arena but within the countries as well. For example, there were marches to express support for Palestine in France that once again have finished by the acts of vandalism.
T.K.: Absolutely true. But not only that.
M.D.: But what is the motive for Israel?
T.K.: Their motive is very simple. As soon as the Israeli territory is under fire, the enemy must be absolutely sure that the retaliation will be imminent, as it is an attack against a sovereign state.
M.D.: And what about the settlements construction? Israel is indeed escalating situation in this case? And the same question concerning the destruction of the Palestinians houses.
T.K.: No. It is a very tricky question. One should tell the propaganda from the truth. There is so much confusion and lies that everybody forget, that no settlements were built in more than 15 years.
M.D.: But the intentions are voiced!
T.K. Wait, there are no new settlements. Moreover, if a crazy settler attempts to build a strong point it is immediately destroyed by the IDF itself. In reality the situation is the following – a settlement built in 1952 inhabited that time by 100 persons is now inhabited by 2500. That is why apartment houses are built on the place of 60 years old dens. That is why their number has increased 5-6 times. They must have somewhere to live. It is not an expansion of settlements. And the discussion of the freezing or moratorium of the settlements is about building within the current borders of the settlements, about increasing the residential potential.
M.D.: This means that the words of Netanyahu are deliberately distorted and are presented in the altered sense?
T.K.: Yes. Why? Just because it is like a red rag for the community and all the more for the Palestinians. We are strengthening and expanding these settlements, thus we are not going to abandon them. Thus the new families will give birth to more babies. Thus new houses should be built.
M.D.: And the International Court…
T.K.: It is very selective, as we know.
M.D.: Netanyahu’s reaction on the decision of the Court to hear the case of strikes on Gaza was straightforward. He accused the Court of betraying its own principles.
T.K.: De rigore juris it is correct. But from my opinion the worst thing that can happen is the demonstrative recognition of the Palestinian state from the outside organizations or countries witout the conflict’ setllement. It will be a catastrophe primarily for the Palestinian state itself as it will be obliged to comply to all the legal standards of a state. They are too naïve believing that they will be able to oppose Israel in the Hague Tribunal – the loads of counter lawsuits are already being prepared by Israeli legal bodies. They already have them both for the current complaints and for the moment when Palestine becomes a state. The Palestinian administration is currently supplied by the electricity and fuel by Israel. As soon as Palestine becomes a state Israel will say “It is time to pay! Pay according to the market prices!”. And finally, the most important thing – while they are “a suffering Palestinian people”, they are sponsored by different, mainly Arabian countries
M.D.: That means that the situation is in a complete stalemate. We are unable to return to the solutions proposed in Oslo and even in the Arab Peace Initiative.
T.K.: The paradox of the situation is that it is really impossible now and in the nearest future. Just for example because of political situation in the Middle East. Every time Israel destroys the HAMAS infrastructure and kills its leadership, the new, more radical leaders come, Saudi Arabia and others offer some money, and in two years we can expect new provocations and escalation. Israel has inflicted major damage to the infrastructure now. On the one hand they were hiding their own mistakes – dozens of tunnels with wagon circulation were dug in Mossad’s own backyard, and nobody knew about it! But I believe that they do not have this two-year timeout this time, because Saudi Arabia had conflict with Qatar and in revenge it has stopped supporting HAMAS. HAMAS does not have much money now. And how to raise money? – Exclusively by a provocation. The civilians will die again as they are always a shield for HAMAS. The money will flow again.
M.D.: Speaking about Jihadism that spreads all over the region – now there are more and more radical groups all over the Middle East swearing allegiance to ISIS. What is the probability that the Palestinians, radical wings of the movements, mainly of HAMAS, will also side with ISIS upgrading the conflict to a critical level?
T.K.: It is the worst-case scenario. And I do not believe in it. They are anybody but no fools. If the ISIS arrives there, HAMAS will be out of business, the situation will be completely different there. Ramallah needs changes, Abbas does not have any official authority and thinks only about keeping his office, and he will no longer be needed after the recognition of the Palestinian state. It will be nice to replace him by, let’s say, Fayad as he was responsible for Ramalla’s develohment, and he is aware of what Israel is doing. Palestine needs moderate authorities, those who have already achieved something and want to live better. Israel is ready to help, they just need to deradicalize. And such breakthrough may allow some changes, stabilization. Choosing better life over bad death opens way for the dialogue.
M.D.: The upcoming elections in Israel may deteriorate the situation – the balance shifts towards a more rigid nationalism in Israel.
T.K.: The archaism does exist, however there is a secular wall that hinders the archaic initiatives. It is a very interesting situation with the elections. There is an attempt to unite all the left wing forces, but there are no proper political figures among them. Isaac Herzog, son of the President Herzog, is a smart and very cultured man, but I doubt that he will be able to form a ruling coalition. After all the Israeli society is very right-wing oriented. Then it will be B. Netanyahu once again. The US intervene everywhere and openly support the left, trying to get rid of Netanyahu by any means. It is unclear whether they will succeed. If they do not fail – everything should be revised, because their program is close to Oslo. I was in Israel during the Oslo process, and when they were saying “There will be peace!” – I was responding, “Are you kidding?” And then there were Oslo 1 and 2, I myself have believed in peace. And then…
M.D.: Yitzhak Rabin was killed
T.K.: Yes… So not everything is clear here for now also. Let’s wait.
IMESClub presents the extract of Vitaly Naumkin's interview to MK.
The informal meeting of Syrian authorities and opposition members decided to be held upon the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiative in Moscow on January 26-29th might be more representative and free than previous events of this kind. This was told by the meeting moderator Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vitaly Naumkin in his exclusive interview to MK. According to Dr. Naumkin invitations to Syrian opposition members were sent "on individual basis" in order the negotiating parties to present only themselves rather than some sort of organizations.
What will the inter-Syrian meeting that is being prepared in Moscow be? Are there any details?
It has character of preliminary consultation meeting or communications between different groups of the Syrian political opposition and civil society with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic government at "Moscow ground" offered by the MFA of Russia. I am honored to be assigned by the MFA as a moderator of this meeting. It will last for four days during January 26-29th and will consist of two parts. The first part to be held on January 26-27th is a meeting of the Syrian political opposition and civil society representatives without participation on behalf of the Syrian government. On January 28-29th the government delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic, ie the government in place, will join the meeting. In Moscow free dialogue will take place with open agenda to discuss all issues related to plausible reconciliation in Syria. Such inclusive dialogue is impossible without preliminary conditions. Moreover as one can see from the meeting format the MFA of Russia offers only place for negotiations, namely the Syrians will discuss all issues dealing with counterterrorism and political settlement on their own. I am informed (provided that I don't represent any state institution or civil society and act in modest role of all sessions' moderator) that Moscow dialogue is not an alternative to Geneva process or two Geneva conferences the second of which ended in nothing. There was the Geneva Communiqué as of June 20, 2012, adopted by the Security Council Resolution 2118. Russia is committed to principles of this Communiqué and the meeting will be held on the basis of this commitment but with no external interference as noninterference in inter-Syrian affairs is, in my opinion, one more principle that Russian diplomacy is guided by. I personally find this approach very attractive and affirmative. Additionally, as far as I know, this meeting is not only not an alternative to "Geneva" on the contrary it may serve a place for some kind of jump to "Geneva" aimed at turning back to the Geneva format if the Syrians succeed in reaching agreement on anything. Today it is absolutely obvious that there's a need to negotiate, a bloodshed must be stopped as it is clear that there are Syrian patriots in both parties to the conflict (or even in several parties to the conflict in a manner of speaking): on behalf of both the opposition and government forces, those loyal to the government. There are patriots among the opposition members and I hope that people who have agreed to arrive in Moscow will actually negotiate from stance of the Syrian patriots interested in keeping their country's integrity and stopping of fratricidal bloodshed. Invitations to participate in the meeting were sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to opposition members on individual basis. That is to say people who arrive to attend the meeting won't represent any kind of organizations. I hesitate to predict, but I think if they demonstrate will to express any consolidated opinion on behalf of their organizations, they will have opportunity to do so. However they were invited on individual basis in order to avoid any kind of competitive atmosphere and exclusiveness, i.e. that some organization is more or less important. I guess those who don't attend the meeting, maybe there are such people that don't accept the invitation, are isolating themselves and look in not very good way as this means exactly an open dialogue. Nobody imposes nothing and sets no preliminary conditions, and it seems to me there are a least two components of such dialogue. One the one hand, it is countering horrible terrorism and extremism, in particular ISIS and some other organizations threatening both the regime and moderate opposition. On the other hand, it is an absolutely obvious need for renewal, reforms, some kind of other movements aimed at conciliating positions of parties and making political settlement, that has no alternative, possible. Any dialogue is a two-way street. However everything should be settled by the Syrians and nobody would impose anything here. This will probably be the core of such meeting and my modest task is to conduct sessions and give everyone opportunity to express opinion.
Regarding the substantive part of the meeting is there any particular agenda?
No, there isn't. The dialogue has open agenda, the meeting organizers set no questions. The Syrians will decide what to discuss on their own. This is a national agenda defined by the meeting participants.
Translated by Evgeniya Efimova
Stay connected - IMESClub will provide the monitoring of the inter-Syrian meeting and exclusive materials.
Interview is available in Russian (click here).
Maria Dubovikova: The first question I would like to ask, following the recent changes on the battlefield of the everlasting conflic – what are the prospects of the Arab-Israeli conflict now? Are there still chances for a peace settlement in the short or maybe mid-term perspective? And why?
Vitaly Naumkin: I think there are no chances for a peace settlement in the short terms. It is a difficult confrontation, which will occasionally inflame and deescalate. Explosions will follow the pauses, and it may last long enough, maybe for several years. I do not see any chances for a resolution even in mid-term perspective. Why? First of all because there is no intention from the Israeli part to stop the occupation. It goes on. And the settlement is impossible without the end of occupation. Some dialog is possible – the parties will be forced to have it. Some experts believe that the reconcilement can be achieved only through an imposed decision. I do not much agree with such scenario. First of all, because there is no accord within the international community, among the global players. Let’s take,the US–Russia relations as an example. Is it possible to speak about agreement if the Americans still impose pressure on all the Middle-Eastern countries to make them stop the cooperation and the development of ties with Russia, trying to talk them into joining the sanction war, that is waged against Russia by the US, EU, and some other countries – Australia, Canada, etc.? Secondly, a decision may be imposed only on the parties, that are dependent much on the external players and obliged to listen to them. And even in such case it is not always possible. Israel has shown that it is not eager to listen even its closest partners, as it is sure that they will not abandon the strategic union with it and will continue to support it. And if Israel is criticized everywhere, even in the US, and this criticism is growing due to the atrocities against civilian population in Gaza, this will not make the US threaten Israel with any sanctions. There is nothing to talk about without sanctions. In this sense Israel is a quite sustainable state.
Thirdly, the positions of the two parties are so irreconcilable, that it is unlikely that something can be imposed on them now. And if we examine the consequences of the events in Gaza from the Arab angle, we will see that HAMAS positions are not undermined, but they have strengthened instead, despite they receive support in the region only from Qatar and Turkey. The sympathies towards HAMAS are very high among the population of the West Bank, which is however controlled by Fatah. Our Palestinian friends give such an assessment. HAMAS believes that it was victorious in this battle. Israel had to agree to cooperate with the coalition government. It is a technical, not a party one but is created on the basis of agreement between HAMAS and Fatah. At the beginning Israel refused to conduct dialogue with HAMAS, but agreed afterwards. Mutual concessions made a fragile ceasefire agreement possible.
But HAMAS has not managed to make Israel satisfy the demands presented in the beginning of the conflict – to lift the blockade and free Palestinian convicts. Israel, in its turn has suffered an important reputation loss. There was no choice as annihilating more than two thousand people including 400 children and trying to continue to present it as a counterterrorism is impossible. They wave no opportunities to calm the anger of the Palestinians. Some hot-heads in Israel say that they need to reoccupy Gaza, deploy troops there. It is a new occupation and it will lead to the further radicalization. It will cause violence, guerilla and subversive warfare and this will not have an end. There will be no security and that is why Israel has to retreat and free the territories. Israel says it has to provide its own security. Of course it has, but only through a settlement including the interests of all the parties.
Many of the projects of reconciliation proposed today include an idea of demilitarization of Gaza and establishment of Mahmud Abbas’s administration control there. Mahmud Abbas can not follow such decision as the Palestinians are using the concept of common sovereignty over the whole Palestine, which includes the West Bank, Gaza and Eastern Jerusalem – all three inseparable parts of Arab Palestine. Why the Palestinian authorities have to agree to demilitarize one part, not knowing what to do with the others? Demilitarization is only possible for the whole state, which should be created on these three territories according to the resolutions of the Security Council of UN. But Israel refuses to recognize East Jerusalem as a capital of Palestinian state as it considers it as an eternal and indivisible capital of the Jewish state. The Palestinian leaders also can not agree to demilitarize Gaza as they will be just smashed by their own population. The reputation of Abbas is already shaky and if he makes further unilateral concession, he will be just branded as a traitor and he will have difficult times. Moreover, there is no accord among the Palestinians. However, meanwhile Mahmud Abbas and Khaled Mashal manage to interact productively. It is difficult to say whether this cooperation will be long term or not. All the more so, there are parties of realists and radicals within HAMAS. I have often heard from the Palestinian public figures, that they could agree to the demilitarization in conditions of the international guarantees for the security and deployment of the international forces.
I will repeat, that such state should include all three parts of Arab Palestine – West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. May be, it is possible to fantasize over the granting this city a special status, giving the access to it to the representatives of all the Abrahamic confessions. It is possible to agree on that. There are some other variants of compromise solutions but Palestinians can give up Jerusalem on no conditions, let alone they have support of international community and the international law. And the Arab and the whole Islamic world will not support such “renegade”. This is out of question. A compromise should be found.
M.D.: You have mentioned the US pressure on the Arab countries to make them join sanctions against Russia. And it seems that mostly all their attempts are in vain. Is the Arab world interested in cooperation with Russia? Or the West is still more attractive partner for it?
V.N.: Unfortunately, there is no unity in the Arab world, it is atomized. There are pro-Western elites in the Arab countries, which at best do not care what policy towards Russia will their governments conduct. These elites will act only according to the US and their own interests. There are other elites, which are at least interested in diversification of their states external policy, and Russia is much needed here in all the spheres: political, economic, and military, just as a counterbalance for the Americans. This is the most humble estimation. Analyzing further, we will find some core elements in cooperation with Russia, which cannot be provided by anyone else today. Let’s take for example Egypt. Who can really provide weapons today if these weapons are not supplied by the US? Russia. But in this respect Egypt does not abandon the cooperation with the US and is not going to do so. There are some differences between Cairo and Washington and As-Sisi is willing to develop relations with Moscow. By the way, Egypt always had such tendency to work with both parties, even during the Cold war era, Nasser’s Egypt was considered a “client” of the USSR. President As-Sisi acts very reasonably; it is just common for Egypt. It is a big country with important geopolitical interests, international weight.
Saudi Arabia also tries to act independently. And it is also inclined to develop relations with Russia on many directions. But there are states that are attached to the US and depend in them in their own security. The Western countries limit theirmilitary cooperation and they are unable to quit this orbit. This also concerns some countries that had some contracts with Russia in this sphere and that are interested in development of the cooperation, say, the UAE. They cannot work on this direction without the US approval and they do not need this. Maybe such need will emerge due to the grave deterioration of the situation in the Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi directions.
Hardly anyone will dare to predict now how the situation in Iraq and over it will develop. What will be the further actions of ISIS? How will the de-facto third air war, launched by the Americans in the North of Iraq, finish? Will they bring it on the Syrian airspace and what could be the consequences in such case?
Alas, there are more questions than the answers. But these questions will also determine how the Arab countries will cooperate with Russia. No doubt, that nobody, including the US, will be able to isolate Russia in the Middle East. And even their closest ally – Israel is going to launch a broad cooperation with Russia. This country understands our open, fair and reasonable enough position during the last crisis, when we criticized the actions of Israel in Gaza, but showed the willingness to cooperate with them and highly appreciated the fact, that Israel had not supported the anti-Russian sanctions.
Israel did not take part in the voting on the anti-Russian resolution in the UN General Assembly in March concerning the inclusion on Crimea and Sevastopol into Russia. And Netanyahu does not conceal that during the last crisis he contacted President Putin on the phone several times (Israeli establishment does not like to have secrets) – this does show something.
M.D.: As for ISIS – it’s quiet evident that the crisis is extremely dangerous for the Middle East and for the whole international community as well. How do you think, do the Western powers, the Middle Eastern ones have a chance to stop the spreading of ISIS and to annihilate it? And wil the ongoing American operation on the North of Iraq be effective, or will they finally have to deploy their troops on Iraqi land once again?
V.N.: I would say it is impossible to defeat a movement that has deep mass and religious roots by bombardments. How is it possible to precisely identify the targets and then eliminate exactly those radicals by airstrikes? The Americans do have smart bombs, but they are not so smart to return back if the target is invalid. “It seems, that is not those guys!” That means there will be civilian casualties, as always, which cause a rise of anti-Americanism everywhere. The ISIS member may be untouched, but the one who fights against him may catch a packet and go to long rest. These are unforeseen consequences of airstrikes.
But in the modern warfare the air forces remain the key element in any combat activities. That is why the absence of planes in ISIS is their weak point. It is also important that this theater of operations does not provide much cover. So, generally it is easy to destroy large groups of vehicles and personnel by aviation – there is no cover for them. David Goldman from the “Middle Eastern Forum” even believes that the capabilities of ISIS are “overestimated” and reminds that the insurgents from this organization “operate on the terrain where the aerial reconnaissance may detect any stray cat”. That is why now the ISIS is hunting aircrafts – planes, helicopters, drones, and attempts to capture airfields in Iraq and Syria. They hunt pilots. The absence of aviation is partially compensated by the modern AA systems captured in Syria, if they will not be destroyed by the US air force, mainly by UAVs.
The Iraqi armed forces have not had aviation for long time – the West was afraid to give it to them, thus not numerous flying personnel has lost qualification. The dissolution of all the military units of Saddam Hussein’s state contributed to this issue. It was one of the gravest mistakes made by the US trying to make a new state in Iraq. And now the ex-officers of the old army fight on the ISIS side.
Russia has just recently provided airplanes to Iraq, but the pilots have still to do some training to operate them efficiently. There are countries having powerful air forces among Iraq’s neighbors. Saudi Arabia has more than 300 F-15, 75 “Typhoons” and more than 80 “Apache” attack helicopters. Jordan is armed with 60 F-16 and 25 “Cobra” attack helicopters. On the one hand if these countries engaged in combat, I am sure, they would demolish this ISIS. And they would not much care about the collateral damage. But on the other hand, such actions could cause hatred not only towards the Americans (who are already hated enough) but also against these regimes, which are already considered pro-Western. Moreover, my colleagues from these countries, including Saudi Arabia, mention that there are great sympathies towards ISIS among the population. And these sympathies are spread not only among the common people, religious activists, social outcasts, but also among the military. That is why in personal discussions they are voicing concerns, that if such war begins, no one knows on which side will fight several dozens of thousands Saudi Arabians, which are supposed to be engaged in combat. And let’s not forget about such crucial mobilization motivators for religious extremism like Israeli occupation, American invasion, unfinished campaign in Afghanistan (and it is unclear what will happen to this country in future), severe civilian war in Syria, which absorbs Jihadists-legionnaires from all over the world to fight the secular regime.
The US examine the possibility to launch strikes on ISIS on the Syrian territory, a part of which is controlled by the extremists, and where they are gaining sufficient military success – regions of Rakka, Deir az-Zora, Aleppo. However Washington rules out any cooperation or coordination of actions with Bashar al-Assad government – a natural ally of those who fight Jihadists from ISIS, connected with Al-Kaeda by a group “an-Nusra” and other groups. If these strikes will hit targets on the Syrian soil without Damask consent, even if these targets are the regions of concentration of the ISIS troops and weaponry, the Syrian government will consider such strikes a violation of its sovereignty. It seems nice, that the ISIS would be bombed out, but who knows what these Americans can do – the highest-ranking officials of the country, including Obama, are repeating “Assad should leave” like a mantra. What if they decide to bomb also (or event instead) the government forces? By the way, I think that Russia will be on Damask side, though we are also very willing to be done with the ISIS.
In Syria there is in fact a confrontation between the government forces and thuggish Jihadists. And where is a moderate, according to the Western classification, opposition? Where is the Syrian Free Army? It is impossible to see it. However, a positive tendency of forming coalition of all those fighting against the ISIS is falling apart. Today, as far as I know, even the Kurdish Working Party and the organizations connected to it, which have not collaborated with Arabs yet, are fighting the ISIS in cooperation with some moderate Islamists. ISIS threatens all neighboring countries – mainly Jordan, which has its own Islamist extremists, Lebanon, which has got a subdivision of ISIS with an unknown before Amir al-Urdunni. The head of ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi threatens to reach Kuwait, which he is going to punish for the cooperation with the US.
The situation is extremely dangerous. To sum up, the local regimes should not expect to defeat the ISIS by the US smart bombs and missiles. And nobody wants to fight on the ground – not the Americans, not even these regimes themselves, a part of them even refuses to list ISIS as a terrorist organization. It is better not to risk, who knows, how the situation will turn? Moreover, the defeat of ISIS would cause a reverse reaction as a sympathy and input of forces to cruel Jihadists who speculate in the feelings of Muslims. Meanwhile, the Iraqi army facing severe difficulties does not show its best. And the potential of Kurdish armed units “Peshmerga” was also overestimated. It was on thing to conduct guerilla warfare against Iraqi security forces in their mountains during Saddam Hussein rule. But fighting in open combats with reckless, wildly cruel and heavily armed ISIS fighters – it is absolutely another type of warfare. My Iraqi friends tell me that there are also ISIS allies among the Kurds, however they are not numerous. Kurds are not very religious in general. And the massacres against non-Muslim minorities on the North of Iraq – Ezids, Shabakh, Christians, were aimed to threaten all the population of the region. The capital of Iraqi Kurdistan – Erbil does not manage to deal with the huge mass of refugees.
I think that Peshmerga, which are still able to make a barrage against the murderers from the ISIS with the coordination with the Iraqi army and the US Air support, will not go further than their territories. They will not go to fight in the South of Iraq. It is a theater for the Iraqi army and the militia of Shia who live there. A so-called Golden division of Iraq – an elite unit consisting mainly of Shia, and destined mainly to defend Shia shrines in Kerbel, Nejef and some other places, has a good combat reputation.
Iran has recently declared that it has sent its advisors to Iraqi Kuristan. Prior to that the Iranian advisors were only in the Iraqi army and in the security forces. Will the Americans and their allies cooperate with Iranians? Will the West be able to overcome the anti-Iranian syndrome having the common interests with Iran to oppose the ISIS and al-Qaeda? It seems, that again, there are more questions than answers. But in general the battle will be long and bloody.
M.D.:And the Libyan crisis?
V.N.: Also seriously and for long!
M.D.: With no any chance?
V.N.: What chances? Libya seems to have few people and much oil – make a deal! It is possible to divide power and resources. Maybe someone in the region will not like it, but I will dare to say: the Arab League should think about creating a peacekeeping force (under the support of the UN) to make Libyans stop the internal conflict, not to allow the creation of an “Islamic state” on its territory, how it happened in Iraq. The countries like Egypt, Algeria, concerned about such threat could have played an extremely important role in realization of a such plan. Let’s recall how the Syrian troops have once entered Lebanon and stopped the civil war there. But the crisis should be settled by the Arabs only and not by a new Western intervention.
Interview is available in Russian: