Широко известные недавние успехи джихадистов в Сирии (и в Ираке) – как в военной, так и в политической  сфере – стали предметом серьезной обеспокоенности российского руководства. Россия, в отличие от западных и многих региональных партнеров по борьбе с террористами, продолжает видеть в Башшаре Асаде – возможно, даже в большей мере, чем ранее, – важного партнера в этой борьбе, едва ли не в одиночку ведущего это сражение. Но суть разногласий даже не в этом. Если те, кто отказывается сотрудничать с правительством Дамаска на этом поле, считают, что с уходом Асада волна джихадизма спадет, то в Москве убеждены, что это будет означать победу исламских радикалов, которые придут к власти в Дамаске и пойдут дальше.

Ориентация Москвы на инклюзивный национальный диалог как единственно возможный путь выхода из сирийского кризиса побудила российское внешнеполитическое ведомство провести в этом году,  как известно, две межсирийские консультативные встречи в столице России с участием представителей ряда оппозиционных групп и гражданского общества, а также делегации правительства Сирии, где я выступал в роли модератора. Думается, что они сыграли свою позитивную роль хотя бы тем, что конфликтующие стороны в течение нескольких дней слушали друг друга. Они подтвердили приверженность исключительно политическим, мирным средствам разрешения кризиса, принципам Женевского протокола от 30 июня 2012 г. и необходимости проведения Женевы-3. Им удалось договориться или почти договориться по ряду очень болезненных вопросов и о том, чтобы на следующем этапе консультаций приступить к обсуждению самой тяжелой проблемы – о переходной системе управлении страной, хотя непримиримость позиций по ряду наиболее острых проблем прервали диалог и помешали продвинуться вперед. Представители оппозиционных сил в ходе  второй встречи, состояшейся 6-9 апреля, вроде бы разработали консенсусный документ для предъявления правительственной делегации, но их продолжали разделять разногласия по текущей ситуации (например, о выводе иностранных боевиков и милиций из страны) и будущему Сирии (к примеру, будет ли это унитарное или децентрализованные, федеральное государство). Документ из 10 принципов «Московской платформы», который поначалу был согласован всеми участниками, но впоследствии дезавуирован рядом теми из них, кто остался недовольными упрямством официальной делегации, был все-таки уникальным достижением подобной встречи, которую в таком формате (с участием официального Дамаска) пока не может себе позволить провести ни одна страна-посредник. Кстати, часть представителей сирийской оппозиции от своего имени направили послание генсеку ООН Пан Ги Муну о необходимости созыва конференции «Женева-3».

          После второй встречи встал вопрос о том, стоит ли продолжать встречи в том же формате. На него пока не дано ответа. Возможно, нужны новые инициативы, над которыми в Москве задумываются. Россия продолжает оказывать воздействие на конфликтующие стороны, побуждая их к поискам компромисса. Здесь внимательно смотрят на усилия спецпосланника ООН по Сирии Стаффана де Мистуры, начавшего 5 мая в Женеве шестинедельный тур встреч с представителями различных сирийских группировок и правительства с целью последующей разработки «дорожной карты» политического урегулирования в Сирии. Находящийся в Москве секретарь партии «Народная воля», член руководства Фронта за перемены и освобождение (ФПО) Кадри Джамиль после встречи со спецпосланником заявил, что «позиции сторон давно известны и дополнительные консультации ничего не дадут, если не будет практических шагов для начала выполнения обязательств Женевы-1 от 2012 года.» Оппозиционер полагает, что сейчас нужно лишь заставить стороны конфликта выполнять Женевский протокол, «призывы уже недостаточны, и разговоры не дадут никакого результата». В дипкорпусе  московской столицы лишь стараются угадать, в какой мере слова Джамиля отражают и вообще отражают ли позицию официальной Москвы. 

          Но, не дожидаясь решения Кремля о том, нужно ли проводить Москву-3, инициативу проведения консультативных встреч попыталась перехватить группа оппозиционеров во главе с живущей в Париже руководительницей «Движения за плюралистическое общество» Рэндой Кассис (что дало основание некоторым российским аналитикам предположить, что за этим стоят официальные французские структуры). Они обратились к президенту Казахстана Нурсултану Назарбаеву с просьбой организовать подобное мероприятие в столице этой республики Астане. Москва никогда не стремилась монополизировать роль посредника и благожелательно отнеслась к этой инициативе, как и ко всем другим (в том числе встречам на каирской площадке), нацеленным на прекращение насилия в стране. Однако сирийское правительство не проявило интереса к участию во встрече в Астане, которая все же состоялась 25-27 мая с.г.  Большей части участвовавших в ней 27 представителей нескольких оппозиционных организаций также удалось согласовать документ о принципах урегулирования кризиса. В нем я считаю необходимым как значимые отметить два.

          Во-первых, это децентрализация Сирии и предоставление курдам и ассирийцам права «на защиту своих территорий в борьбе против любых форм терроризма.» По опыту переговоров на «московской площадке» знаю, что именно этот тезис встречает резкое неприятие со стороны арабских националистов, представленных как правительством, так и частью оппозиционеров. А курды, выступая за единство Сирии, вряд ли поступятся уже достигнутой ими де факто автономией на северо-востоке страны.

          Во-вторых, это вывод из страны всех иностранных боевиков. Вновь возвращаясь к опыту «московской площадки», замечу, что и этот тезис вызывал ожесточенные споры между участниками. Категорически не желают фактически ставить знак равенства между отрядами «Хизбаллы» и иностранными джихадистами не только представители правительства Дамаска, но и целый ряд оппозиционных организаций. Почему? Потому что без помощи ливанской шиитской милиции страна уже могла бы пасть жертвой ИГ и «ан-Нусры». Кроме того, бойцов «Хизбаллы» пригласило легитимное  правительство. И вообще, если чисто гипотетически их отряды могут организованно покинуть страну по приказу из Бейрута, то нет такой силы, которая бы смогла заставить уйти из  Сирии всех иностранных боевиков-джихадистов.

          Не удивительно, что под таким документом в Астане согласились подписаться не все участники: шесть из них написании свое отдельное заявление. Пока неясно, намерено ли казахстанское руководство собирать «Астану-2».

          Что касается Москвы, то предметом ее растущей озабоченности является рост числа экстремистов, отправляющихся воевать в Сирию – как из самой России, так и Центральной Азии. В этом контексте неприятным сюрпризом как для центральноазиатских правительств, так и для России стало резонансное присоединение к боевикам «Исламского государства» (ИГ) бежавшего из Душанбе вместе с десятком своих подчиненных командира элитного таджикского ОМОНа полковника Гулмурода Халимова. Командир, явно не лишенный харизмы и имеющий опыт подготовки в тренировочных центрах России и США (!), не только встал в ряды джихадистов, но и обратился к соотечественникам с призывом примкнуть к джихаду в видеообращении на одном из интернет-порталов (TajikistanLive). Многие российские аналитики опасаются, что призывы джихадиста-полковника  привлекут, в частности, какую-то часть трудовых мигрантов из Таджикистана, работающих в России (их общее количество превышает 1 200 тысяч человек). Они могут либо присоединиться к уже сражающимся в Сирии на стороне ИГ 4 тысячам выходцев из Центральной Азии, либо войти в так называемые «спящие ячейки» ИГ, которые эта группировка создает на территории многих государств. О существовании таких ячеек мне, в частности, рассказывал один бывший член ИГ в Сирии, не пожелавший открыть свое настоящее имя. Как полагает российский аналитик Аркадий Дубнов, людей может привлечь критика официального Душанбе, запрещающего мусульманам «отправлять обряды в полной мере, а также закрывающего мечети» и преследующего легальную Партию исламского возрождения, которая «является альтернативой радикальным исламским группировкам» [Независимая газета, 29 мая 2015 г.]. 

          Нетрудно предположить, что все это обсуждалось во время недавней встречи Владимира Путина и Сергея Лаврова с Джоном Керри в Сочи. Керри подчеркнул, что Сирия не станет мирным государством до тех пор, пока не произойдет политическая передача власти. Россия и США договорились продолжить диалог по сирийскому урегулированию в ближайшие недели Оценивая итоги встречи, заместитель госсекретаря США по общественной дипломатии и связям с общественностью Ричард Стенгел 29 мая резюмировал, что в вопросах ситуации в Йемене, Ливии, Сирии и соглашения с Ираном интересы Москвы и Вашингтона могут пересекаться.
          Россия готова развивать сотрудничество с Западом и государствами региона в борьбе с терроризмом. При этом выступая 31 мая в программе «В центре событий» по российскому телеканалу ТВЦ 31 мая с.г., Сергей Лавров заявил, что для этого необходимы, во-первых, «выработка стратегии на основе честного совместного анализа под эгидой Совета Безопасности» и, во-вторых, «принятие резолюций, которые будут делать легитимными те действия, которые необходимо предпринять для борьбы с этой угрозой», будь то ИГ, «Джабхат ан-Нусра или иные группировки.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2015/06/russia-syria-conflict-strategy-moscow-meetings.html#ixzz3cmCw4DsQ

April has been a month of vibrant Russian foreign policy activity in the Middle East. A number of Middle Eastern leaders visited Moscow; Russian diplomats held the second consultative meeting between representatives of the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition; Russian planes evacuated all Russian citizens from Yemen, as well as citizens other countries, including the United States and Europe; Russia took an active part in reaching an interim solution in the Iranian nuclear talks; and Russian diplomats have been working on draft resolutions at the UN Security Council.

Some of the Russian leadership's decisions turned out to be rather unexpected. These included President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that a ban on deliveries of S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran be lifted, causing a negative reaction from some influential global and regional players, especially Israel, with which Russia has recently been successfully developing multilateral cooperation. Significantly, when explaining this decision, Russian officials put forward both commercial and reputational arguments related to the suspension of the contract with Iran between 2007 and 2010, as well as political ones.

In particular, during his four-hour televised conversation with Russia’s citizens April 17, Putin declared, "In no way is this a threat to Israel. This is only a defensive weapon. Moreover, we believe that given the conditions that are unfolding in the region, especially in connection with the events in Yemen, the supply of such weapons functions as a deterrent." Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was even clearer: "For Iran to have a modern air defense system is very urgent today, especially considering the rising tensions in the region, including around Yemen."

It's wrong to suggest — as some Western analysts did — that behind this decision stands Moscow’s desire to torpedo the deal between six world powers and Iran: The systems won’t be delivered any time soon, and Iran won’t be in a position to put serious pressure on Russia in the oil and gas market for some time. It's significant, however, that in this case the concerns of Israeli leaders were not taken into account. I recall that in the recent past, Moscow canceled the delivery of analogous weapon systems to Syria because of Israeli objections, as Putin mentioned in his TV appearance.

No less surprising was Moscow’s decision to refrain from vetoing the draft UN Security Council resolution on Yemen that didn’t include all of Russia’s proposals. Words of gratitude were expressed from Arab capitals to the Russian leadership. Undoubtedly, Tehran didn’t like this decision, but this is hardly reason enough to explain the restoration of the contract with Iran for the S-300 as a way to sweeten the pill.

Also unusual was the Kremlin’s activity in the Libyan context, which many already thought was a lost battle for Moscow. On April 14-15, and for the second time this year, Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni traveled to Moscow. He stated that the main purpose of his visit was to persuade Russia to participate in "restoring Libya’s stability and military might."

But there was no agreement on an immediate supply of arms. Mikhail Bogdanov, Putin’s representative for the Middle East and Africa, declared that Moscow may begin arms shipments to the country only after the lifting of the embargo by the UN Security Council. At the same time, he added, Russia "is of the opinion that there is a legitimate government in Libya that should be helped to strengthen its position." Bogdanov said Russia is not only interested in supplying weapons to Libya, but also stands ready to "assist in strengthening the Libyan army, government agencies and security forces." During the visit, the issue of reviving old Russian contracts was discussed, in particular the construction of a railway in Libya and energy resources exploration.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas also visited Moscow in April. Although the details of the high-level talks are unknown, the fact that on April 17 the issue of the Middle East peace process was raised in the Russian Security Council testifies to its importance. This can clearly be interpreted as a sign of the increasing relevance this issue has among the country’s foreign policy priorities. So far it's unclear whether we are talking about any new initiative by Moscow or only about the possible buildup of its activity, for example in the framework of the Middle East Quartet. On the Palestinian issue, however, one cannot speak of a change of course, as at its base are the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Russia reiterates its commitment to the concept of the peace process, but it is conceivable that it will renew its efforts to promote the unification of the Palestinian organizations, whose fragmentation continues to hinder their participation in negotiations with Israel. A factor in the intensification of Russia’s attempts to revive the struggling Middle East process is the desire to preserve cooperation — in these times of crisis in relations with its Western partners, primarily the United States — in those areas where Russian and Western positions are close, positive experience has been gained and where without Russia, it would be very difficult to make progress.

At the same time, some Arab analysts drew attention to the constant attacks by some Russian experts on Moscow’s Middle East policy. In particular, a presentation by Yevgeny Satanovsky at the Moscow Conference on International Security April 16-17 stood out. Satanovsky is known for his critical statements about the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Middle East policy, and he regularly appears on air on the main Russian TV channels. Following Russia’s support of a draft UN Security Council resolution on the necessity of ending the occupation of Arab Palestinian land, Satanovsky earlier this year accused Russian diplomacy of "betraying national interests," stating, "Either the Russian Foreign Ministry is still living in Soviet times, or, even worse, diplomats are taking care of their own business, or the lobbying of some elderly, yet influential colleagues made them take this position." One journalist acquaintance suggested that with the latter, Satanovsky had clearly in mind Yevgeny Primakov, who has long been an object of his attacks.

At the Moscow Conference, Satanovsky made a statement, the essence of which was that there is no need to create any new Arab state (namely, a Palestinian one) in the current circumstances, in which all other Arab states, as he put it, are crumbling before our eyes. It's good, of course, that this expert has the opportunity to express his point of view, which contradicts the official position of the state. However, Arab participants and journalists — who hotly debated Satanovsky’s speech with me on the sidelines of the conference — expressed surprise that he was given the podium at a respectable official conference (with Lavrov and other officials), and that he was almost the only representative of the expert community who was given the floor in the session dedicated to the Middle East region.

Baffled Arab journalists asked whether this speech wasn’t an indication that Moscow had been thinking to revise the plan to create an Arab Palestinian state alongside Israel. In my response, I expressed my deep conviction that there is absolutely no basis for such an explanation, as this expert’s bias on everything that concerns the Arab and Islamic world is well known and doesn’t reflect the official position of the state.

Equally surprising for international observers were the direct accusations of Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia of supporting Islamic terrorism in the same speech by Satanovsky. Given the fast developing relations between Ankara and Moscow, that such a charge would be uttered at an official event by an expert — sometimes considered close to the Kremlin and, at the very least, influential on public opinion — also raises some questions, as some guests from the region told me privately on the sidelines of the conference. Usually it's acceptable to make such statements on a confidential basis, behind closed doors. But again, I am positive that we are only talking about this expert’s personal stance, which reflects the point of view of a small group of individuals.

In summary, we can draw some conclusions about Moscow’s Middle East policy at the present stage. First of all, it maintains a strong focus on bilateral relations. Second, it attempts to refrain from confrontational statements and, even more so, actions toward those countries with which Russia disagrees on certain issues of global and regional policy. (Thus, criticizing the Arab coalition’s use of force against the Houthis in Yemen does not prevent Moscow from actively reinforcing ties with Egypt.) Third, it strives to diversify or develop relations with states in conflict with each other. Fourth, it wants to create active contacts with opposition forces, in addition to official authorities (to whom Russian diplomacy was limited in the past). And, finally, it wishes to play a mediating role in conflicts, without claiming a monopoly or opposing other players, in particular the United Nations.

Source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/kremlin-unexpected-syria-iran-yemen-israel-decisions.html#ixzz3YSJ21gDR

The crisis in Yemen could well turn extremely tragic. Making overall predictions is difficult because how the situation develops will depend on how certain players behave, and we aren’t privy to their intentions. I do think, however, that the Saudis and their coalition partners have made a mistake with aerial bombardments. It’s simply inconceivable that such a destructive approach — particularly in an already impoverished country — could provide any resolution.

The Houthis’ objectives seem clear enough: They want to get their share of the distribution of power and resources and are not at all, in my opinion, trying to establish full control over the whole country. I think they understand that simply won’t happen. It looks as if they are using military force to secure strong starting positions for the inevitable subsequent negotiations — in order to get their piece of the pie. But do they understand that the assault on the southern part of the country, where they are perceived as outsiders, involves great dangers for them? Here they also seem to have made a mistake, miscalculated. They shouldn’t have meddled in Aden and the southern provinces. They are doing it under the pretext of striking at the Islamist radicals, at Al-Qaeda, based in the south; but the reality is that they will end up pushing the local population toward Al-Qaeda as a powerful force able to resist the onslaught of the Houthis. There was no point in the advance. They should have been satisfied dominating the northern part of the country, having expelled their longtime enemies, the Salafis. Then they could have dictated their own terms during negotiations with a better chance of achieving their political and economic demands.

Yet if we look at the opposing coalition, it’s not remotely clear what it wants. To destroy the huge portion of the population that supports the Houthis? That’s impossible. What, will they just keep on killing people without end? Do they want to completely destroy the infrastructure of the country? It’s incomprehensible what this could do for them. Do they want to force the Houthis to surrender? To lay down their arms? To say: Let Hadi return; let him imprison, hang or shoot us instigators while everyone else can live long and happy lives? What is it they want? Do they want to deploy ground forces to force the Houthis back to where they’ve always lived, to the north, and to secure some strategic spots in which to place people connected to Hadi’s administration? But it doesn’t seem as if anybody is preparing for a ground war — which would be a bloodbath. So the goals of these people simply aren’t wholly evident. Even if foreign boots were committed on the ground, it’s quite likely that Yemeni Shia and Sunni would unite against the outsiders. That’s already happened, in the 1960s, when Egypt supported the revolution of 1962 and sent forces into Yemen. Over the course of a few years, Egypt lost almost 26,000 lives — losses much greater than those of the USSR in Afghanistan — even though Yemen is a small country and the Egyptians did not have a large contingent. Today the very same story can be repeated anywhere. The coalition is quite aware of this, and no one is burning with desire to fight in the mountains of Yemen — especially when it’s not even clear whom to fight. But even if we assume the coalition forces could break the Houthis and push them back North: Who, then, would take their place?

Incidentally, I told my Egyptian friends: “You’ve taken your place under the Saudis’ banner. You want to defeat the Shia. You are afraid they might supposedly gain control of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and interfere with maritime traffic through the channel. That is unlikely: They’ve never set themselves such a goal and couldn’t if they tried. It’s another impossibility. They are well aware that they would run into big trouble. But still, let’s say you disperse them. Who will come to power? The very people you consider your enemies: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic bloc Al-Islah[a1]  (the same Brotherhood), or even Al-Qaeda or related groups. In other words, a Salafi alliance will rise up and govern the country; you’ll get a country ruled by your enemies. You’re thinking that Iran is calling the shots in Yemen now, or afraid it will in the future. But what you’ll get instead is those you consider your enemies in power. It’s obvious that the fruit of your labors will be much worse for you.” This military, interventionist approach, recalling the Libya playbook of internal conflict resolution, is another dead-end in a fragmented and heterogeneous country like Yemen, with one possible outcome being the division of the country. I do not rule out the partition of Yemen, with the most likely split between North and South; although even further fragmentation is possible. Perhaps this is what the enemies of Yemen want. A worst-case scenario would involve a bid for Hadhramaut to secede, a region with historical ties to Saudi Arabia and one which is drawn to it: There are tribes continually crisscrossing the border with a vested interest in keeping it open. It’s not impossible that the tribal and trade elite in this region would like to place Hadhramaut under Saudi control. If utter mayhem ensues, Al-Qaeda could proclaim a state there. People are afraid to fight them, so they don’t strike Al-Qaeda but strike the Houthis.

A degeneration into complete chaos is not beyond the realm of possibilities — something along the lines of the current situation in Libya, with roving tribes, gangs and fighters killing each other, plundering and destroying. At that point it will be senseless to talk about restoring the country. This is not Libya; it is a comparatively large country with about 26 million people and a large, inaccessible, mountainous territory. It is filled with a whole lot of weapons. It is situated at a strategic trading crossroads. The situation is very alarming. And the only road to a settlement is peace talks, peace talks with the participation of the Houthis. But apparently Saudi Arabia does not want the Houthis to participate, although at some point early on the Saudis themselves proposed such negotiations. To sum up, I fear that for now there is little reason for optimism.

The commentary was taken on the 3rd of April, 2015
by the IMESClub President Maria Dubovikova

One would expect that the dramatic events taking place in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Libya and now in Yemen would monopolize the attention of Russian politicians and diplomats involved in the Arab East. However, this has not been the case. Among the old yet unsolved and "dormant" conflicts in the region is that of Western Sahara. But as recent events demonstrate, long-standing conflicts can flare up unexpectedly, causing outbreaks of violence, in particular where the interests of influential external actors — often guided by economic considerations — clash. 

The international media, fully absorbed with "hot" conflicts, overlooked the recent first visit to Moscow of a delegation of the Polisario Front (Western Sahara). The delegation was headed by a member of Polisario’s Secretariat and by M’hamed Khaddad, Polisario’s coordinator with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Although the visit was not official — the delegation arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences — it was received by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov as well as by members of the Council of the Federation, the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly. It also held a meeting with a group of Russian experts on the region.

The visit is yet another sign that Russia seeks to play a more active and independent role in the region. It also stands as further evidence — as manifested in recent years — of the ability of Russian diplomacy to take atypical steps to lay the groundwork for solutions that fit Russia’s interests to the greatest extent possible, and to expand contacts with political forces of different orientations. Contrary to its former, more cautious style of diplomacy, Moscow has taken to acting more often without regard for others, and doesn’t shy away from opposing the actions of any one regional player, if it sees fit. In a way, this diplomatic style has something in common with that of the United States. In the region, special attention is paid to the crucial role played by Bogdanov — a brilliant diplomat and expert on the Arab world — in leading Russian foreign policy there. Even those who disagree with Russia’s foreign policy hold him in high esteem.

Read the whole article: http://geidi.al-monitor.com/pulse/sites/almonitor/contents/articles/originals/2015/04/russia-western-sahara-interest-polisario-active-role.html##ixzz3WYkwd3K0

IMESClub presents the extract of Vitaly Naumkin's interview to MK.

The informal meeting of Syrian authorities and opposition members decided to be held upon the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiative in Moscow on January 26-29th might be more representative and free than previous events of this kind. This was told by the meeting moderator Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vitaly Naumkin in his exclusive interview to MK. According to Dr. Naumkin invitations to Syrian opposition members were sent "on individual basis" in order the negotiating parties to present only themselves rather than some sort of organizations.

What will the inter-Syrian meeting that is being prepared in Moscow be? Are there any details?

It has character of preliminary consultation meeting or communications between different groups of the Syrian political opposition and civil society with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic government at "Moscow ground" offered by the MFA of Russia. I am honored to be assigned by the MFA as a moderator of this meeting. It will last for four days during January 26-29th and will consist of two parts. The first part to be held on January 26-27th is a meeting of the Syrian political opposition and civil society representatives without participation on behalf of the Syrian government. On January 28-29th the government delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic, ie the government in place, will join the meeting. In Moscow free dialogue will take place with open agenda to discuss all issues related to plausible reconciliation in Syria. Such inclusive dialogue is impossible without preliminary conditions. Moreover as one can see from the meeting format the MFA of Russia offers only place for negotiations, namely the Syrians will discuss all issues dealing with counterterrorism and political settlement on their own. I am informed (provided that I don't represent any state institution or civil society and act in modest role of all sessions' moderator) that Moscow dialogue is not an alternative to Geneva process or two Geneva conferences the second of which ended in nothing. There was the Geneva Communiqué as of June 20, 2012, adopted by the Security Council Resolution 2118. Russia is committed to principles of this Communiqué and the meeting will be held on the basis of this commitment but with no external interference as noninterference in inter-Syrian affairs is, in my opinion, one more principle that Russian diplomacy is guided by. I personally find this approach very attractive and affirmative. Additionally, as far as I know, this meeting is not only not an alternative to "Geneva" on the contrary it may serve a place for some kind of jump to "Geneva" aimed at turning back to the Geneva format if the Syrians succeed in reaching agreement on anything. Today it is absolutely obvious that there's a need to negotiate, a bloodshed must be stopped as it is clear that there are Syrian patriots in both parties to the conflict (or even in several parties to the conflict in a manner of speaking): on behalf of both the opposition and government forces, those loyal to the government. There are patriots among the opposition members and I hope that people who have agreed to arrive in Moscow will actually negotiate from stance of the Syrian patriots interested in keeping their country's integrity and stopping of fratricidal bloodshed. Invitations to participate in the meeting were sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to opposition members on individual basis. That is to say people who arrive to attend the meeting won't represent any kind of organizations. I hesitate to predict, but I think if they demonstrate will to express any consolidated opinion on behalf of their organizations, they will have opportunity to do so. However they were invited on individual basis in order to avoid any kind of competitive atmosphere and exclusiveness, i.e. that some organization is more or less important. I guess those who don't attend the meeting, maybe there are such people that don't accept the invitation, are isolating themselves and look in not very good way as this means exactly an open dialogue. Nobody imposes nothing and sets no preliminary conditions, and it seems to me there are a least two components of such dialogue. One the one hand, it is countering horrible terrorism and extremism, in particular ISIS and some other organizations threatening both the regime and moderate opposition. On the other hand, it is an absolutely obvious need for renewal, reforms, some kind of other movements aimed at conciliating positions of parties and making political settlement, that has no alternative, possible. Any dialogue is a two-way street. However everything should be settled by the Syrians and nobody would impose anything here. This will probably be the core of such meeting and my modest task is to conduct sessions and give everyone opportunity to express opinion.

Regarding the substantive part of the meeting is there any particular agenda?

No, there isn't. The dialogue has open agenda, the meeting organizers set no questions. The Syrians will decide what to discuss on their own. This is a national agenda defined by the meeting participants.

Translated by Evgeniya Efimova

Stay connected - IMESClub will provide the monitoring of the inter-Syrian meeting and exclusive materials.

Interview is available in Russian (click here).

Maria Dubovikova: The first question I would like to ask, following the recent changes on the battlefield of the everlasting conflic – what are the prospects of the Arab-Israeli conflict now? Are there still chances for a peace settlement in the short or maybe mid-term perspective? And why?

Vitaly Naumkin: I think there are no chances for a peace settlement in the short terms. It is a difficult confrontation, which will occasionally inflame and deescalate. Explosions will follow the pauses, and it may last long enough, maybe for several years. I do not see any chances for a resolution even in mid-term perspective. Why? First of all because there is no intention from the Israeli part to stop the occupation. It goes on. And the settlement is impossible without the end of occupation. Some dialog is possible – the parties will be forced to have it. Some experts believe that the reconcilement can be achieved only through an imposed decision. I do not much agree with such scenario. First of all, because there is no accord within the international community, among the global players. Let’s take,the US–Russia relations as an example. Is it possible to speak about agreement if the Americans still impose pressure on all the Middle-Eastern countries to make them stop the cooperation and the development of ties with Russia, trying to talk them into joining the sanction war, that is waged against Russia by the US, EU, and some other countries – Australia, Canada, etc.? Secondly, a decision may be imposed only on the parties, that are dependent much on the external players and obliged to listen to them. And even in such case it is not always possible. Israel has shown that it is not eager to listen even its closest partners, as it is sure that they will not abandon the strategic union with it and will continue to support it. And if Israel is criticized everywhere, even in the US, and this criticism is growing due to the atrocities against civilian population in Gaza, this will not make the US threaten Israel with any sanctions. There is nothing to talk about without sanctions. In this sense Israel is a quite sustainable state.

Thirdly, the positions of the two parties are so irreconcilable, that it is unlikely that something can be imposed on them now. And if we examine the consequences of the events in Gaza from the Arab angle, we will see that HAMAS positions are not undermined, but they have strengthened instead, despite they receive support in the region only from Qatar and Turkey. The sympathies towards HAMAS are very high among the population of the West Bank, which is however controlled by Fatah. Our Palestinian friends give such an assessment. HAMAS believes that it was victorious in this battle. Israel had to agree to cooperate with the coalition government. It is a technical, not a party one but is created on the basis of agreement between HAMAS and Fatah. At the beginning Israel refused to conduct dialogue with HAMAS, but agreed afterwards. Mutual concessions made a fragile ceasefire agreement possible.  

But HAMAS has not managed to make Israel satisfy the demands presented in the beginning of the conflict – to lift the blockade and free Palestinian convicts. Israel, in its turn has suffered an important reputation loss. There was no choice as annihilating more than two thousand people including 400 children and trying to continue to present it as a counterterrorism is impossible. They wave no opportunities to calm the anger of the Palestinians. Some hot-heads in Israel say that they need to reoccupy Gaza, deploy troops there. It is a new occupation and it will lead to the further radicalization. It will cause violence, guerilla and subversive warfare and this will not have an end. There will be no security and that is why Israel has to retreat and free the territories. Israel says it has to provide its own security. Of course it has, but only through a settlement including the interests of all the parties.

Many of the projects of reconciliation proposed today include an idea of demilitarization of Gaza and establishment of Mahmud Abbas’s administration control there. Mahmud Abbas can not follow such decision as the Palestinians are using the concept of common sovereignty over the whole Palestine, which includes the West Bank, Gaza and Eastern Jerusalem – all three inseparable parts of Arab Palestine. Why the Palestinian authorities have to agree to demilitarize one part, not knowing what to do with the others? Demilitarization is only possible for the whole state, which should be created on these three territories according to the resolutions of the Security Council of UN. But Israel refuses to recognize East Jerusalem as a capital of Palestinian state as it considers it as an eternal and indivisible capital of the Jewish state. The Palestinian leaders also can not agree to demilitarize Gaza as they will be just smashed by their own population. The reputation of Abbas is already shaky and if he makes further unilateral concession, he will be just branded as a traitor and he will have difficult times. Moreover, there is no accord among the Palestinians. However, meanwhile Mahmud Abbas and Khaled Mashal manage to interact productively. It is difficult to say whether this cooperation will be long term or not. All the more so, there are parties of realists and radicals within HAMAS. I have often heard from the Palestinian public figures, that they could agree to the demilitarization in conditions of the international guarantees for the security and deployment of the international forces.

I will repeat, that such state should include all three parts of Arab Palestine – West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. May be, it is possible to fantasize over the granting this city a special status, giving the access to it to the representatives of all the Abrahamic confessions. It is possible to agree on that. There are some other variants of compromise solutions but Palestinians can give up Jerusalem on no conditions, let alone they have support of international community and the international law. And the Arab and the whole Islamic world will not support such “renegade”. This is out of question. A compromise should be found.

M.D.: You have mentioned the US pressure on the Arab countries to make them join sanctions against Russia. And it seems that mostly all their attempts are in vain. Is the Arab world interested in cooperation with Russia? Or the West is still more attractive partner for it?

V.N.: Unfortunately, there is no unity in the Arab world, it is atomized. There are pro-Western elites in the Arab countries, which at best do not care what policy towards Russia will their governments conduct. These elites will act only according to the US and their own interests. There are other elites, which are at least interested in diversification of their states external policy, and Russia is much needed here in all the spheres: political, economic, and military, just as a counterbalance for the Americans. This is the most humble estimation. Analyzing further, we will find some core elements in cooperation with Russia, which cannot be provided by anyone else today. Let’s take for example Egypt. Who can really provide weapons today if these weapons are not supplied by the US? Russia. But in this respect Egypt does not abandon the cooperation with the US and is not going to do so. There are some differences between Cairo and Washington and As-Sisi is willing to develop relations with Moscow. By the way, Egypt always had such tendency to work with both parties, even during the Cold war era, Nasser’s Egypt was considered a “client” of the USSR. President As-Sisi acts very reasonably; it is just common for Egypt. It is a big country with important geopolitical interests, international weight.

Saudi Arabia also tries to act independently. And it is also inclined to develop relations with Russia on many directions. But there are states that are attached to the US and depend in them in their own security. The Western countries limit theirmilitary cooperation and they are unable to quit this orbit. This also concerns some countries that had some contracts with Russia in this sphere and that are interested in development of the cooperation, say, the UAE. They cannot work on this direction without the US approval and they do not need this. Maybe such need will emerge due to the grave deterioration of the situation in the Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi directions.

Hardly anyone will dare to predict now how the situation in Iraq and over it will develop. What will be the further actions of ISIS? How will the de-facto third air war, launched by the Americans in the North of Iraq, finish? Will they bring it on the Syrian airspace and what could be the consequences in such case?

Alas, there are more questions than the answers. But these questions will also determine how the Arab countries will cooperate with Russia. No doubt, that nobody, including the US, will be able to isolate Russia in the Middle East.  And even their closest ally – Israel is going to launch a broad cooperation with Russia. This country understands our open, fair and reasonable enough position during the last crisis, when we criticized the actions of Israel in Gaza, but showed the willingness to cooperate with them and highly appreciated the fact, that Israel had not supported the anti-Russian sanctions.

Israel did not take part in the voting on the anti-Russian resolution in the UN General Assembly in March concerning the inclusion on Crimea and Sevastopol into Russia. And Netanyahu does not conceal that during the last crisis he contacted President Putin on the phone several times (Israeli establishment does not like to have secrets) – this does show something.

M.D.: As for ISIS – it’s quiet evident that the crisis is extremely dangerous for the Middle East and for the whole international community as well. How do you think, do the Western powers, the Middle Eastern ones have a chance to stop the spreading of ISIS and to annihilate it? And wil the ongoing American operation on the North of Iraq be effective, or will they finally have to deploy their troops on Iraqi land once again?

V.N.: I would say it is impossible to defeat a movement that has deep mass and religious roots by bombardments. How is it possible to precisely identify the targets and then eliminate exactly those radicals by airstrikes? The Americans do have smart bombs, but they are not so smart to return back if the target is invalid. “It seems, that is not those guys!” That means there will be civilian casualties, as always, which cause a rise of anti-Americanism everywhere. The ISIS member may be untouched, but the one who fights against him may catch a packet and go to long rest. These are unforeseen consequences of airstrikes.

But in the modern warfare the air forces remain the key element in any combat activities. That is why the absence of planes in ISIS is their weak point. It is also important that this theater of operations does not provide much cover. So, generally it is easy to destroy large groups of vehicles and personnel by aviation – there is no cover for them. David Goldman from the “Middle Eastern Forum” even believes that the capabilities of ISIS are “overestimated” and reminds that the insurgents from this organization “operate on the terrain where the aerial reconnaissance may detect any stray cat”. That is why now the ISIS is hunting aircrafts – planes, helicopters, drones, and attempts to capture airfields in Iraq and Syria. They hunt pilots. The absence of aviation is partially compensated by the modern AA systems captured in Syria, if they will not be destroyed by the US air force, mainly by UAVs.

The Iraqi armed forces have not had aviation for long time – the West was afraid to give it to them, thus not numerous flying personnel has lost qualification. The dissolution of all the military units of Saddam Hussein’s state contributed to this issue. It was one of the gravest mistakes made by the US trying to make a new state in Iraq. And now the ex-officers of the old army fight on the ISIS side.

Russia has just recently provided airplanes to Iraq, but the pilots have still to do some training to operate them efficiently. There are countries having powerful air forces among Iraq’s neighbors.  Saudi Arabia has more than 300 F-15, 75 “Typhoons” and more than 80 “Apache” attack helicopters. Jordan is armed with 60 F-16 and 25 “Cobra” attack helicopters. On the one hand if these countries engaged in combat, I am sure, they would demolish this ISIS. And they would not much care about the collateral damage. But on the other hand, such actions could cause hatred not only towards the Americans (who are already hated enough) but also against these regimes, which are already considered pro-Western. Moreover, my colleagues from these countries, including Saudi Arabia, mention that there are great sympathies towards ISIS among the population. And these sympathies are spread not only among the common people, religious activists, social outcasts, but also among the military. That is why in personal discussions they are voicing concerns, that if such war begins, no one knows on which side will fight several dozens of thousands Saudi Arabians, which are supposed to be engaged in combat. And let’s not forget about such crucial mobilization motivators for religious extremism like Israeli occupation, American invasion, unfinished campaign in Afghanistan (and it is unclear what will happen to this country in future), severe civilian war in Syria, which absorbs Jihadists-legionnaires from all over the world to fight the secular regime.

The US examine the possibility to launch strikes on ISIS on the Syrian territory, a part of which is controlled by the extremists, and where they are gaining sufficient military success – regions of Rakka, Deir az-Zora, Aleppo. However Washington rules out any cooperation or coordination of actions with Bashar al-Assad government – a natural ally of those who fight Jihadists from ISIS, connected with Al-Kaeda by a group “an-Nusra” and other groups. If these strikes will hit targets on the Syrian soil without Damask consent, even if these targets are the regions of concentration of the ISIS troops and weaponry, the Syrian government will consider such strikes a violation of its sovereignty. It seems nice, that the ISIS would be bombed out, but who knows what these Americans can do – the highest-ranking officials of the country, including Obama, are repeating “Assad should leave” like a mantra. What if they decide to bomb also (or event instead) the government forces? By the way, I think that Russia will be on Damask side, though we are also very willing to be done with the ISIS.

In Syria there is in fact a confrontation between the government forces and thuggish Jihadists. And where is a moderate, according to the Western classification, opposition? Where is the Syrian Free Army? It is impossible to see it. However, a positive tendency of forming coalition of all those fighting against the ISIS is falling apart. Today, as far as I know, even the Kurdish Working Party and the organizations connected to it, which have not collaborated with Arabs yet, are fighting the ISIS in cooperation with some moderate Islamists. ISIS threatens all neighboring countries – mainly Jordan, which has its own Islamist extremists, Lebanon, which has got a subdivision of ISIS with an unknown before Amir al-Urdunni. The head of ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi threatens to reach Kuwait, which he is going to punish for the cooperation with the US.

The situation is extremely dangerous. To sum up, the local regimes should not expect to defeat the ISIS by the US smart bombs and missiles. And nobody wants to fight on the ground – not the Americans, not even these regimes themselves, a part of them even refuses to list ISIS as a terrorist organization. It is better not to risk, who knows, how the situation will turn? Moreover, the defeat of ISIS would cause a reverse reaction as a sympathy and input of forces to cruel Jihadists who speculate in the feelings of Muslims. Meanwhile, the Iraqi army facing severe difficulties does not show its best. And the potential of Kurdish armed units “Peshmerga” was also overestimated. It was on thing to conduct guerilla warfare against Iraqi security forces in their mountains during Saddam Hussein rule. But fighting in open combats with reckless, wildly cruel and heavily armed ISIS fighters – it is absolutely another type of warfare. My Iraqi friends tell me that there are also ISIS allies among the Kurds, however they are not numerous. Kurds are not very religious in general.  And the massacres against non-Muslim minorities on the North of Iraq – Ezids, Shabakh, Christians, were aimed to threaten all the population of the region. The capital of Iraqi Kurdistan – Erbil does not manage to deal with the huge mass of refugees.

I think that Peshmerga, which are still able to make a barrage against the murderers from the ISIS with the coordination with the Iraqi army and the US Air support, will not go further than their territories. They will not go to fight in the South of Iraq.  It is a theater for the Iraqi army and the militia of Shia who live there.  A so-called Golden division of Iraq – an elite unit consisting mainly of Shia, and destined mainly to defend Shia shrines in Kerbel, Nejef and some other places, has a good combat reputation.

Iran has recently declared that it has sent its advisors to Iraqi Kuristan. Prior to that the Iranian advisors were only in the Iraqi army and in the security forces. Will the Americans and their allies cooperate with Iranians? Will the West be able to overcome the anti-Iranian syndrome having the common interests with Iran to oppose the ISIS and al-Qaeda? It seems, that again, there are more questions than answers. But in general the battle will be long and bloody.

M.D.:And the Libyan crisis?

V.N.: Also seriously and for long!

M.D.: With no any chance?

V.N.: What chances? Libya seems to have few people and much oil – make a deal! It is possible to divide power and resources. Maybe someone in the region will not like it, but I will dare to say: the Arab League should think about creating a peacekeeping force (under the support of the UN) to make Libyans stop the internal conflict, not to allow the creation of an “Islamic state” on its territory, how it happened in Iraq. The countries like Egypt, Algeria, concerned about such threat could have played an extremely important role in realization of a such plan. Let’s recall how the Syrian troops have once entered Lebanon and stopped the civil war there. But the crisis should be settled by the Arabs only and not by a new Western intervention.

Interview is available in Russian:

President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China on May 20-21 culminated in the signing of roughly 50 agreements ushering in a period of unprecedented convergence between the two countries. Does this affect the situation in the Middle East and, if so, in what way?

Everything seems to indicate that the answer to the first part of this question is yes. Seemingly, the Middle East was not the focus of the talks between the two leaders. For all the obvious asymmetry in interests, however, the consensus between Russia and China seems to allow the two parties to seek further coordination in their actions, thus taking each other's concerns into greater account. Such consensus includes Syria, despite Beijing’s lesser involvement on this issue, relative to Moscow; Iran, within the P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program; the fight against terrorism and extremism; the creation of a weapons of mass destruction-free Middle East; the condemnation of external intervention and the strategy of "regime change" as well as the push for "color revolutions;" the policy to reach a settlement in the Middle East; and relations with the new Egyptian regime and with respect to the Sudanese issues.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/russia-china-convergence-consequences-middle-east.html##ixzz34SQ854fx

Relations between Russia and Turkey today remain stable and friendly, despite being severely tested by the Syrian crisis and the deterioration of Russia's ties with the West due to the events in Ukraine.

According to Russian Turkey experts Natalia Ulchenko and Pavel Shlykov, "in the current format, relations between Moscow and Ankara have reached their ‘growth limits’: The current model of mainly economic cooperation has largely exhausted itself, while the potential for collaboration on political issues remains untapped." Thus, the situation around Syria has taken "the trust deficit to a whole new level." So, can Moscow keep up the momentum in its dealings with Ankara, or will existing differences cause significant damage?

One of the main issues on the agenda for the talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, held during the latter’s visit to Moscow in late May (just after the presidential elections in Ukraine), was Crimea. Although Turkey has not recognized the legality of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Turkish foreign minister has pointed to the positive side of this move. Turkey, where nearly 5 million descendants of the Crimean Tatars live, is not indifferent to the fate of their kinsmen in Crimea. As was reported, Davutoglu intended to speak in favor of the fact that they "should benefit from rights of autonomy like when they were under Ukrainian administration." It was still unclear, however, to which rights of autonomy the Turkish foreign minister was referring.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/russia-turkey-davutoglu-syria-crisis-ukraine-tatar.html#ixzz33nDkv1Er

The sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the United States has not prevented them from continuing their cooperation on issues such as the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria, the holding of the P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) negotiations with Iran or the preservation of stability in Afghanistan. Disagreements over the Syrian crisis, however, are clearly showing signs of worsening. Russian analysts fear that, once the process of removal of the Syrian chemical arsenal is concluded, the United States — which has not renounced the idea of overthrowing the regime in Syria — may revert to the plan of a military strike against the country, 

It's precisely this plan that Moscow has seen in the recent UN Security Council draft resolution, which it vetoed, together with China. Speaking on May 23 at the conference on international security — held in Moscow by Russia’s Ministry of Defense and in which I participated as part of a group of Russian and foreign experts — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, "Just yesterday, our Western partners in the UN Security Council put to the vote a draft resolution that, with reference to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, suggested that the whole situation come under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In fact, this would be the first step to justify external intervention: there is no doubt about that. Knowing full well how fraught with danger that is, Russia and China vetoed the resolution, which didn’t pass."

The main topics of discussion at the conference were the spreading of the "color revolutions," the consequences of the Arab Spring and the prospects of preserving stability in Afghanistan.

Reed more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/moscow-strengthens-damascus-ties.html#ixzz33nDPWKIj

Over the past few weeks, Russia has taken steps to develop its trade and economic ties with Tehran, which plunged to a record low of $1.59 billion last year. In 2013, according to Russian Minister of Energy Alexander Novak, this amounted to a reduction of 31.5%, a consequence of the unilateral US and EU sanctions imposed in mid-2012, which forced companies such as Lukoil and Gazprom Neft to leave the Iranian market.

The situation should have changed with the agreement reached between Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, during the SCO Summit in Bishkek in September 2013, which caused a stir and under the terms of which 500,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil would be delivered in exchange for Russian goods and equipment. By rough estimates, that is 12% of the oil extractable daily in Iran.

Nothing was known, however, about concrete steps to put this agreement into practice until Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit last December to Tehran, during which ways to implement it were discussed. One of the items on the table appears to have been the price of the oil, given Moscow’s request for a discount. It was clear that, with the sanctions still standing, the problem would also likely be who would purchase the oil and make the payments and how, considering the threat of US sanctions. According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, one of the possible options initially suggested was that Rosneft buy the oil. But at the beginning of April the Ministry of Energy decided to choose an authorized trading company which, as the newspaper source explained, “will be a company registered in Russia that — contrary to Rosneft —does not trade on the world market and is thus immune from pressure.” 

While it was undeniable that the Iranian side was interested in breaking the trade embargo and obtaining the goods it needed, analysts had to ponder the reasons guiding the Russian side. It was evident that Moscow was not moved by an urgent need to obtain energy carriers from its Middle Eastern partner. During one of the talk shows on the Russian TV channel RBC, participants were even asked the question: “Why should Russia buy Iranian oil?” Actually, back in February, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanai suggested that, in the negotiations on the supply of Iranian oil in exchange for Russian goods, Moscow and Tehran might agree to invest in the construction of a second unit at the nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

Many Russian analysts were convinced that Russia, predicting the possibility of, if not a full, then at least a partial normalization of Iran's relations with the West and seeing a sharp increase in interest in Iran in Western business circles, set as a first priority the task to “stake out” a place for itself in the Iranian market. While the range of Russian products to be delivered to Tehran in exchange for oil is generally known, though not precisely defined (e.g., metallurgical products, machinery, power equipment and other goods), the basic parameters of the Iranian oil deliveries to Russia have not yet been revealed. It is unknown whether the sides have managed by now to resolve all the issues linked to this deal and come to a final agreement on its implementation.

Read the whole article: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/iran-russia-oil-exchange-goods-cooperation.html#ixzz31cymuXI6