Few days ago Russian president Putin stated Russia’s readiness to supply Turkey with advanced S-400 air defense systems. Turkey’s spat with the EU and growing discord with the NATO may be reason behind Turkey’s demand for Russian weapons. For its Arab neighbors the key question is whether this move is aimed against the newly proposed ‘Arab NATO’ or just a Turkish self-defense response following Washington’s arming of Syrian Kurds.

Erdogan may fear meeting the fate of his neighbors in Iraq and Libya, both former US allies, and preparing for the plan B ― turning eastward.

A number of factors, including its growing alliance with Russia and Iran, may have forced Turkey to look to boost its defenses independent from its traditional Western, NATO allies. Diplomatic spat with Germany over refugee deal, strained military relations over Incirlik base, last year’s failed coup, recent American arming of the Syrian Kurds ― all are seen by Turkey as Western moves against its sovereignty. Disliked as he is in the West, with current set of circumstances surrounding his country, Turkish president is wise to strengthen ties with Russia, a country with which the country shares borders and many interests, and most importantly, a reliable ally as witness in Syria and Iran. This is especially important considering that despite Turkey’s being an extremely important Western ally, Erdogan himself is considered a political persona non grata in the US ― the fact that only pushes him further into Russian arms.

While some Arabs may consider the move as targeting the recently announced ‘Arab NATO’, the move actually has different aim. The Arab NATO for now exists only on the paper, and even on the paper not all its signatories are in agreement on all of its stated goals. Moreover, the actual formation timeline is questionable and depends on the pace that Trump administration and Pentagon would take to deliver the weapons they have just sold to the Saudis, and the internal dynamics of the alliance in the making, and its individual members that have widely different military capabilities. As the NATO itself seems to be in disarray, the formation of its Arab equivalent is even more quizzical ― especially as a Trump project.

Erdogan is buying Russian S-400 because he fears that should the war in Syria and Iraq escalate, and the US pushes for the Kurdish state, Turkey itself would be subject to territorial loss. The shifting alliances and abandoning of allies is not a novelty in the American foreign policy, on the contrary ― it is something of a rule rather than the exception, and Erdogan seems to have grasped the possibility of this scenario being replayed with him at the helm of Turkey, and is trying to avoid ill fate of his neighbors.

At this stage Turkish president probably fears the destiny of Iraq’s long time ruler Saddam Hussein whom America first supported against Iran, then labeled dictator and finally deposed in the most gruesome way.

Erdogan has been already widely described in the Western media as a villain and a dictator. There was an attempted military coup last year, which he believes was directed (and likely aided) by the US. From this vantage point, Erdogan is justifiably cautious.

Doğu Perinçek, leader of the Turkey’s Patriotic Party (Vatan), believes that the Erdogan “got caught on the hook” by Washington.

In an interview with Russian Sputnik Turkey, he said “An attempt to divide Syria or Iraq would mean an attempt to divide Turkey. Moreover, this is also an attack aimed to shatter Erdogan’s power. Washington’s tactic is to isolate Erdogan in the international arena”. The only way for Turkey to “avoid a territorial division” is to “develop cooperation with Russia, Syria, Iraq and Iran,” he believes.

The pressing question then is, if Turkey is seriously reconsidering its alliance with the West and turning towards Russia and Iran led regional block, what is the future of NATO Incirlik base? What role would Turkish base in Qatar play? What with the US base in Qatar, should Qatar too change priorities and form alliances with Russia and Iran?

Amidst a serious and deepening rift between GCC countries and Qatar, Turkey’s key ally in the Gulf, there’s a possibility that the announced purchase of Russian systems might end up in the Gulf peninsula nation should the US decide to move its base, and Turkey decides to fill the void, as it already has a military base in the country.

International isolation and campaign of demonizing both Turkey and Qatar seem to have counter-effects. Instead of pushing them apart this strategy is pushing two once major Western allies firmly and inevitably into the Russian embrace.

Trump’s truly big (arms) deal with the Saudis has so far only managed to divide the Arab Gulf states. The security the deal promised to deliver seems further now than ever. Was it a genuine mistake by the inexperienced Trump administration, lack of strategic forethought or something more sinister, and who are the real villains in the Middle East?

Article published in Geostrategic Media: http://geostrategicmedia.com/2017/06/russia-ready-to-supply-turkey-with-s-400-but-why-does-turkey-need-it/

Photo credit AFP

Published in Tribune
Friday, 02 June 2017 16:56

Jordan Not to Send Any Troops to Syria

Jordan’s official stance regarding Syrian conflict supports peaceful resolution, yet reports have appeared in the media claiming that the kingdom is readying for a ground invasion of Syria. As “Eager Lion” military exercises in Jordan this year coincided with the intensified anti-terrorist fighting along Jordan-Syrian border, the media speculated about the US, British and Jordanian joint plan to send ground troops across the Syrian border. The news triggered brief war of words between Syria and Jordan, while Jordanian officials reiterated that no Jordan’s troops will be sent to Syria. 

Late in April during a meeting with Jordanian journalists King Abdullah II reiterated his country’s commitment to the peaceful solution of the Syrian conflict, adding that Jordan will keep its military in combat readiness in order to prevent any conflict spillover across the border onto its territory.

The King then stated that, “We will not allow the developments in Syria to pose threats to Jordan. We are continuing with our policy of deep defence without the need to have the Jordanian army involved inside the Syrian territories.”

The King’s aforementioned statement, along with other Jordanian official statements, clearly demonstrates that the news about Jordanian troops in Syria can be labeled ‘fake news’, the kind the media has been awash with since Trump’s election.

What could then be behind these and similar allegations and fake news reports about the Syrian war situation and peace negotiation attempts, and why should they appear now?

A look back at recent developments in the diplomatic circles, including the US and its Arab allies, where Jordan plays prominent role as a peace broker, including Syrian and the Palestinian-Israeli files, there are evidently elements both in the US political establishment and elsewhere that prefer the continuation of conflict to peace.

For example, during the last round of Syrian peace negotiations in Astana, Kazakhstan a tripartite agreement on establishment of ‘de-escalation zones’ in Syria was signed, with Russia, Iran and Turkey as guarantors. While the US administration welcomed the ‘safe zones’, the anti-Trump establishment attacked it and liberal media continued with familiar tune that America ‘should do more’, calling for military involvement in both Syria and Iraq.

Shortly after the safe zones agreement was reached, president Trump hosted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the ambassador to the US, Sergey Kislyak. Right after the meeting the uncorroborated reports appeared in the leading US media that the US president has shared sensitive intel with the Russians, allegedly endangering an ally’s spy embedded within the ISIS/Daesh ranks.

Israeli media claimed the intel sharing put the life of its agent in jeopardy, while some Arab media disputed it saying the ally in question was Jordan. Israel complained that the intel sharing was undermining its efforts to establish an historic alliance with some Gulf Arab states.

The key issue regarding the intel sharing claim is the timing of the news release and its effects on the efforts of the US president to resolve the problems inherited from previous administrations while establishing credibility in the eyes of the electorate.

Since inauguration Trump and his close associates have been targeted by the US mainstream media on diverse accounts, including his campaign promise to collaborate with all countries, including Russia. The Trump Russian connection saga culminated in ‘Russia hacking the elections’ claims, and the subsequent dismissals and resignations of number of Trump’s key allies.

Until today the war within the US establishment against Trump has not ceased, in fact, it seems to have intensified. Following the establishment of the Syrian de-escalation zones spearheaded by Russia, and Trump’s meeting with two Russian diplomats, the US president’s antagonists had to turn up the heat. So, it is likely that the whole story regarding intel sharing is in most part fabrication aimed to undermine Trump as president, as well as derail his efforts to find the solution for the Palestinian – Israeli issue where both Jordan and Israel are important actors.

Jordan has played a prominent role in promoting two-state solution for Palestine issue, and in anti-terrorism efforts in Syria and Iraq, hence those who oppose either may seek to undermine Jordan’s reputation as a reliable partner of both Russia and the US. Such unsubstantiated media claims have only one purpose – spoiling relationships.

In a similar vein, claims of Jordan’s troops intervening in Syrian south seek to undermine the efforts the kingdom has made in preserving its own security amidst mayhem on its doorstep, while building cooperation with both the US and Russia – two major international actors in the region.

Various Jordanian officials, including Jordan’s King, consider Russian role in Syria crucial in diminishing terrorist activities in the country. Jordan and Russia face similar situation in Syria, regarding terrorism, as the kingdom does. Around the same number of Russian citizens have joined terrorist ranks in Syria, as have Jordanian, so Jordan understands Russia’s vital need to prevent these fighters from returning home, carrying out terrorist acts and indoctrinating others on Russian territory. Latest statement of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is a proof of this, as he stated that Russia will destroy ISIS/Daesh terrorists in every part of Syria.

As for Russia so for Jordan – geography is destiny. Jordan’s central location in the Middle East determines its foreign policy orientation. Situated in the heart of the Middle East the Kingdom is deemed an oasis of peace and stability in the region fraught with peril and an important partner by both Russia and the West. As its future hinges on the regional security and stability relationships with all countries, especially those with high stakes in the Middle East are paramount. Riddled with the problem of Syrian, Iraqi and Palestinian refugees Jordan seeks to balance its foreign relations in line with its national security interests.

The security of the Syrian southern border is of great concern to Jordan, and the quickest possible reestablishment of law and order, and cessation of hostilities in Syria are very much in Jordan’s interest. As the global powers have stepped up anti-terrorist efforts, including Russia and the US-NATO and its Arab allies, Syrian Army will succeed in reestablishing control over the country. Government retake of territorial control and elimination of terrorist pockets would enable the refugees to return to their homes, and most importantly, relieve the economic and security burden the refugee issue has placed on Jordan.

Whether we like or dislike Assad, he is a legitimate president of the Syrian Arab Republic, according to the international law. Every country in the world has political opposition, and whether it has a say in a particular country’s governance is an internal issue of each country.

The world has witnessed the outcomes of Iraqi, and Libyan regime change interventions. Egypt had also ousted its long-term president Mubarak during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ only to elect an even worse one, who within a year managed to bring country’s economy and security to the brink of collapse, and had to be removed by a military coup.

International relations studies recognize that every country’s road to democracy takes a different trajectory, and the majority of political experts today admit that Syrian conflict was not entirely of internal making. As for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it is certainly not its job to decide the ruler of Syria. This is the matter that Syrian people have to decide on through a political process embedded within the country’s constitution and the norms of the international law. No country, including Jordan, would like outsiders to dictate its system of governance, and the same goes for Syria. Moreover, Jordan sees no threat from the current government of Syria, and has no intention of sending its troops to fight on its territory as doing so would represent the breach of its neighbors sovereignty and territorial integrity – which Jordan respects and will continue to respect.

Shehab Al Makahleh is a co-founder of Geostrategic Media, author, security and policy analyst

Published in Tribune
Sunday, 21 May 2017 14:45

Russia keeping a close eye on Algeria

The news about establishing safe zones in Syria, the leadership reshuffle in Palestine’s Hamas and the Abu Dhabi meeting of two Libyan leaders, Khalifa Hifter and Fayez al-Sarraj, stole the limelight from the Algerian parliamentary elections held May 4, making them seem a more or less mundane event unworthy of much media scrutiny.

True, one can confidently say on seeing the unchanged post-election landscape two weeks later that there was hardly anything sensational about the campaign. Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Rally for Democracy (RND), the two major parties in the presidential coalition, retained their majority; moderate Islamists’ share of seats remained almost intact, and other traditional competitors predictably lagged far behind.

Still, Moscow keeps Algerian developments on its radar screen — especially in light of what is happening in neighboring countries.

For Russia, Algeria has been a vital Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region partner for technical-military cooperation dating back to the 1960s, when the Soviets helped Algeria equip its newly created army. Algeria has been a major Russian market for wheat and metal, while Russian energy companies have been developing Algeria’s hydrocarbon mining and building pipelines since at least the mid-2000s.

So Algeria’s election held interest for Moscow and revealed some trends.

One of these trends was the low turnout, which was just above 37% (unless overseas constituencies are included, then the figure was 38.25%). The Algerian government’s attempts to galvanize voters into casting ballots did not bear much fruit, even when Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal promoted the election as he toured the country.

Citizens’ disillusionment with the country’s economic situation has simmered for years. In 2007, as many as 14.4% (965,064) of the ballots were disqualified, with the figure increasing to 18.2% (1.7 million) in 2012.

Earlier this year, falling oil and gas prices triggered an economic crisis, driving people to the streets in protest. The economy could have produced a disastrous result at the polls. But Robert Parks, a seasoned expert on Algeria, was right when he claimed Algeria has not yet faced a crisis of the presidential regime. A decline in electoral participation has been characteristic of recent regional campaigns as well as national ones.

However, the number of disqualified ballots this year — more than 2 million (24.47%) — can be interpreted as a sign of some crisis, even if it is not in full swing yet. Some people feel sidelined and excluded from participation and abstain from voting. Some people go through the process of voting but intentionally deface or otherwise invalidate their own ballots, demonstrating mistrust of the current government and the opposition alike.

Many Russian experts on the MENA region believe the decision of all the major parties to join the race — which distinguishes the 2017 electoral campaign from the one in 2012 — reveals the parties’ complete integration into the highly consolidated political elite and desire to work within the constitutional framework.

To Russians, the problems the Algerian elections brought to light are reminiscent of the difficulties Russian society experienced during the September elections. Deputies of the State Duma, Russia’s lower legislative house, enjoyed the support of all the parties, which went almost unnoticed by ordinary citizens. Voter turnout was 13% lower than in 2011.

Both cases prove that the political establishment has completely divorced itself from the concerns of ordinary people, with the latter unable to find effective representation and disillusioned with all political ideologies.

France and the United States have witnessed similar situations. France’s recent presidential runoff saw a fourfold increase in blank and spoiled ballots over the first round. US President Donald Trump’s electoral success was widely interpreted as a rebellion against political elitists.

Thus, the developments can be referred to as part of a global trend. In fact, nobody knows what most of the world’s population wants. Nor do people have a clear vision of their own aspirations. Consequently, the Algerian parliament represents the interests of the estimated 6.4 million people who actually voted, out of more than 41 million citizens. Central governments face a clear credibility gap all across the world.

Waning support for the FLN and the RND’s growing popularity deserve special attention. As Russian pundits believe, this trend testifies to the strength of former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, one of the RND’s founders and the party’s current leader. Ouyahia is considered one of the most likely candidates for the presidency, backed by his considerable government experience and credibility among most establishment forces, his moderate but pro-national stance and a fluent command of Tamazight (which was recognized last year as an official language of the country).

At the same time, Algeria’s political system allows little scope for accurate predictions. Regardless of further developments and Ouyahia’s role, it is evident that any government in power will have to press ahead with some unpopular reforms, which, in their turn, will require confidence-building measures among the people. Making progress in foreign policy issues would help with that greatly, especially regarding Western Sahara, the Algerian-Moroccan relationship and Libyan issues.

Algeria shelters an estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees, the indigenous people of Western Sahara — a disputed territory claimed by Morocco.

Morocco left the African Union more than three decades ago when the union recognized Western Sahara’s independence. Morocco recently rejoined the AU, which Algeria takes as a sign that Morocco also will acknowledge Western Sahara — but more likely it will only mean Morocco will have a louder voice on the continent and will perhaps gain better cooperation from other countries. The Moroccan royal family’s strong international positions leave little room for fence-mending on Algeria’s terms.

Therefore, working on the Libyan issues looks to be the most logical play.

In this context, the May meeting of representatives of Libya’s neighboring countries — which brought together the foreign ministers of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt — comes into sharp focus, as does a subsequent security-related conversation among Sarraj, Sellal and Abdelkader Messahel, Algeria’s minister for Maghreb, African and Arab affairs.

Nevertheless, when Algeria’s activity is appreciated by Tripoli, it raises the ire of the rival government in Tobruk, which backs the “renegade general” Hifter. This situation is illustrated by the House of Representatives meeting during Messahel’s recent trip to southern Libya, where he was met with howls of outrage.

The response seems to have been conditional upon the differences between regional stakeholders — pro-Qatar Algeria and largely pro-Saudi Egypt — as well as the split state of affairs in Libya. Russia, backed by its partners and maintaining close relations with Hifter’s Libyan National Army and Algeria, could help soften Tobruk’s and Algeria’s stances toward each other, which would benefit all the North African countries.



Initially published by Al Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/russia-monitor-algeria-north-africa-economy.html#ixzz4hiGfE5NE

Published in Tribune

Fighting terrorism by the military means has always required a surgical precision and in-depth understanding of people and forces that take part in a local conflict. A well-known French expert on Islamic studies Gilles Kepel in 2000s explained a model of counter-terrorist activity that can still be applied for modern conflicts. According to this model if a responsive strike against Islamists is carried out without decent planning and leads to the casualties among the civil population, the civilians will start to sympathize terrorists, creating an impasse for conflict resolution.

Let’s imagine that the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor are freed from the Islamic State. It does not matter who will free them - Syrian Democratic Forces alliance with direct US military support or pro-government forces operating together with the SDF to claim some territories in these provinces. We may also omit the topics, which may fuel the conflict and contribute to ISIS revival: partition of the territories, ethnic and confessional misbalance and the timeframe for political settlement in Syria. It is just important that the East of the country is free from ISIS thanks to the joint effort that somehow resembles a broad international coalition, which Kremlin has long been pleading to create.

So, it may seem that the mission is accomplished – Russia and US have achieved their goals and can go on arguing which one of them has defeated ISIS. But will it mean that the terrorism has been obliterated? In order to answer this question some other issues should be cleared out…

Inconvenient questions

The military intervention in Syria has predictably divided Russian public into three main camps: those who are firmly in favor or against the participation of the country in the conflict and those who have a shifting position. The last group is mainly represented by the middle-class.

The partisans of the operation are sure that Russia has a long-term strategy in the Middle East, knows how to get out from the Syrian impasse and they approve of Kremlin’s decision to wage war against all the militants in Syria that is required “for us and for the whole world”. They discard any criticism towards Assad regime as “the Western conspiracy” and believe that Russia may risk being attacked on the rear by the remaining “other terrorists” if it engages ISIS in the East. They do not acknowledge that these “other terrorists” may be an opposition to the regime and consist of Syrians.

The opinions of the critics of the pro-government media are portrayed as cries of madmen, who are condemning unreasonably high military spending and losses, participation of Wagner Group, imperial ambitions and interests not only in Syria, but also in Egypt and Libya.

Ordinary Russian citizens who are fed by the media which blames everything on US and Gulf countries, speak about “fighting terrorism early on”, “ruining the plans of the damned West” and about the resolution to support the strategic allies – Damascus and Teheran. Although sometimes Afghanistan is recalled, Russians always comfort themselves by saying that it is a completely different case – the scale of involvement was different and the losses were significantly higher.

It is not worth an effort to participate in this argument. As always the truth is somewhere in between. But the qualified experts prefer not to risk their career and begin their publications or speeches on Syria by mentioning “the machinations of the West” and the terrorist nature of the entire Syrian opposition to please the ruling regime.

For instance, analysts in Russia should avoid the following topics:

  • Why Russia launched its operation in the end of 2015 when the Syrian army was loosing and decided to side first with Shabiha and then with Iranian Shia International, letting them into the country?
  • Whether the late intervention of Russia into the Syrian crisis is directly related to the Ukrainian crisis and to the willingness to impose a “dialogue on an equal footing” on the West?
  • Whether Kremlin projects its perception of Russian opposition on the Syrian one and whether the list of the moderate groups is related to the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia?
  • Why did Assad regime fuel Jihadi ideas among Sunnis during the Iraqi war and send “green buses” with militants from Aleppo and Damascus provinces to Iraq through border town of Al-Bukamal?
  • Why did Assad regime free the most extremist imprisoned Islamists at the beginning of peaceful demonstrations?

If these issues are considered, Russia will have to admit that at first Damascus supported Islamists and suppressed healthy opposition, ignored Russia’s requests for extradition of extremists who fled to Syria after the war in the North Caucasus, and then took part in islamization of protest movements. For Russia it is better not to comment on the cooperation of Russia with Free Syrian Army in 2015 and on the bombardments of Liwa al-Haqq in Raqqa and Jabhat al-Nusra - in Deir ez-Zore, while these groups were not actually present in these cities.

So, it is very inconvenient to comment on these issues and it is in fact useless – any honest answers will be silenced by the wave of criticism. It is trendy to fight terrorism now. Thus, many Russian experts and media wrote about the “fall of ISIS in Aleppo” in the end of 2016 without even suspecting that the first ones to engage ISIS in Syria were the FSA units in Aleppo but not the Kurds in Kobani.

Syrian counter terrorism

From the very beginning of the military operation Moscow in fact refused to acknowledge the civil character of the war in Syria, depicting the conflict only as a struggle of Damascus against terrorists. Unfortunately, this idea became hardwired in Russian expert community and represents one of the gravest mistakes in the fight against terrorism made by Russia. The truce achieved in December despite the regime’s attempts to suppress the enclaves of opposition is surely the correct way to counter terrorism. However, even in the event of successful negotiations in Astana and the armistice preservation, there is still a risk that these measures will not be sufficient to resolve the real causes of the conflict.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that Syria and Iraq resemble communicating vessels (the so-called Wilayat al-Furat). And not only on the ground, but also underground: the Syrian-Iraqi border is crossed by the system of tunnels that was upgraded during Saddam Hussein rule. It is a perfect hiding place and R&R base for ISIS militants in case they lose Mosul and Raqqa.

Causes of “disease”

Despite the accusations of the US for ruining the balance in the region by launching the invasion in Iraq in 2003 that eventually led to the creation of ISIS and Sunni resistance, Syria is also partially responsible as it was a hiding place for many leaders of the would-be monster. Syria was a favorable country for the growth of then “Islamic State of Iraq” not only because of its refugee camps for the Iraqis but for the following reasons:

  • Extremely violent means of protest repressions during the first eight months of the Syrian uprising;
  • Ideological vacuum: a large share of Syrian Sunni were politically passive and lacked religious education;
  • Confessional nature of the war waged by the Alawite Assad’s regime and his elites against the Sunni population, which became a gift for Al-Qaeda and later for al-Nusra, ISIS and other groups.

Instead of concentrating its efforts against Al-Qaeda and ISIS from the very beginning, Damascus focused on eliminating ideologically moderate armed groups thus augmenting the opportunities for extremist organizations. The strengthening of Shia groups just upgraded the scale of war.

The fight against Al-Qaeda and ISIS

The leadership of Al-Qaeda set a course to infiltrate Syrian revolutionary movement back in 2012 and used ideological pressure on poor Sunni population to achieve this goal. Generally speaking, Al-Qaeda’s involvement in Syria was not limited to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. For instance, the exit of Jund al-Aqsa (then Sarayat al-Quds) in 2013 from al-Nusra when the latter confronted ISIS on the North of Syria, was conceived to assure the influx of foreign Mujahedeen to Idlib and Hama. In this sense, the religious rhetoric of Ahram al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam largely prevented Syrians from joining international al-Nusra and Islamic state. Nevertheless, in the context of struggle with the regime in the West al-Nusra gained a reputation of the main military movement participating in the large-scale opposition operations. The rebranding of al-Nusra into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and its divorce with Al-Qaeda was supposed to dissolve it among other fractions and make it an exclusively local movement. This new image was presented mainly for the Syrians themselves.

Unfortunately, Russian airstrikes, which continued the strategy of Damascus and Teheran, led not to the dispersion of the opposition but to consolidation of radical and moderate movements and to enforcement of al-Nusra by more than 3-4 thousands new Syrian recruits. So, the situation is aggravated by the fact that al-Nusra became a movement with a Syrian majority.

It seems that the IS will retain its capacity of the international terrorist organization, even in the event of the defeat in Syria and Iraq. Firstly, due to the spread in more than 20 countries they will still be able to maintain the brand of a “state”. And the independence of the branches of the parent company makes the situation more difficult. Secondly, the experience of the survival of Al-Qaeda after the defeat in Afghanistan tells that a relatively small area is needed to lead terrorist operations form "safe haven".

But the experience of Iraq shows that even a few dozen experienced jihadists are able to revive an old structure. In these conditions, reactionary methods should be replaced by a long-term counter-terrorism strategy.

Published in Tribune

On April 22, the Russian Federation Council — the upper chamber of the Russian parliament — stated that Moscow could supply Damascus with air defense systems “on a priority basis.” However, no specifics were provided. A day before the statement was issued, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad noted that Syria and Russia were holding talks on new arms deliveries, including air defense systems.

As early as April 7 (shortly after the US airstrike on Syria’s Shayrat air base in retaliation for Syria’s alleged use of chemical weapons on its own people), Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov told the media that Russia would soon help strengthen Syria’s defense systems to shield the infrastructure. 

If approached critically, the statements can be taken with a grain of salt. Bolstering Syria’s air defense doesn’t benefit Russia. Rather, Russia should use the threat of US airstrikes to pressure Damascus and Tehran to work toward a political solution and should also take advantage of Syria’s dispersed aircraft to control the Syrian air force. At the same time, Russia's military and pundits refuse to recognize that Tehran, by becoming involved in the battles for Wadi Barada and East Ghouta, derailed the struggling negotiations in Astana, Kazakhstan, under the far-fetched pretext that it was fighting Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in places where the group doesn’t even operate or has very few soldiers. That action provoked moderate opposition groups to join jihadi group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, so that Syria's pro-government forces would release their grip on opposition enclaves outside Damascus.

However, it is hard to say what lessons the Kremlin has drawn from the results of Tehran’s actions. In a bid to impose "equal-footing dialogue" on Washington, Moscow has repeatedly changed its stance on Syria regarding both Russia’s military presence and the Syrian opposition. In October, Russian journalists reported on a possible dispatch to Syria of a Pantsir-S1, a short-range air-defense system designed to protect strategic military and civil targets. Under the pretext of the potential for American strikes, Moscow may expand its previously "behind-the-scenes" steps to strengthen the military infrastructure.

Any information about additional troops or the military’s use of Syria’s infrastructure is labeled media hype. Russian and American commanders prefer not to disclose details about their “boots on the ground,” and they deny any rumors or reports. In 2015, in his comments on the deployment of a Russian task force at Shayrat, Konashenkov emphasized "the absence of any operational need to establish additional military bases in Syria, whatever ‘couch strategists’ predicted.” Yet satellite imagery has repeatedly confirmed Russia is using Shayrat as a stage airfield.

Russia’s military presence in Syria goes beyond Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval base. Despite the international media’s and experts’ current keen interest in Khmeimim air base at Latakia, the country’s deployment of Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles there remains uncorroborated. However, there have been sightings of Iskander transporter erector launcher vehicles.

While some Russian experts are quick to highlight the sub-strategic and deterrent role of the missiles, especially given Turkey’s unpredictability, others are disposed to link the Iskander with a new modified combat support vehicle known by the Russian acronym MOBD. Although July 2016 commercial photos of the air base revealed two Iskander-M launch and transport vehicles at the site, the evidence is inexplicably overlooked.

Moreover, Russia’s activity at the Kuweires air base in Aleppo, recaptured by Syria's army in November 2015 and fully reopened in March 2017, stays under the radar. In early January 2016, rumors about increased Russian military presence at the airport and deployment of air defense forces started to circulate. Those reports were substantiated in July 2016. When comparing satellite pictures of different years, analysts saw both the prepared ground for installing S-200 launchers and their deployment in the northwestern part of the airport.

Russian specialists undoubtedly had rendered assistance, since the sophisticated systems were deployed in Homs and south of Damascus decades ago, back in Soviet times. Moreover, they cannot be redeployed elsewhere, given their concrete bases and the length of some cables, exceeding a kilometer. The Pantsir-S1 air defense systems were also detected at the site. However, it still remains a mystery whether MiG-31 supersonic interceptor aircraft, able to fire long-range missiles, were deployed at the Kuweires base to patrol the area. An Al-Monitor source indicated that photos of the fighters were actually taken at the Kuweires base rather than at Khmeimim, and their redeployment was needed to improve the Russian air defense system.

The presence of Russian artillery units, special operations forces, military police and fighters from the private Wagner military group in other provinces does not imply that they are constantly based in an area. Russian military experts engage in combat for tactical purposes, and in most cases they train recruits and retrain the soldiers of the fifth corps of the Syrian army. They also deliver humanitarian aid and negotiate with the opposition. Al-Monitor has been informed that since the conflict between the pro-government Syrian forces and the Kurds erupted in August 2016, the Russian military has been acting as peacekeepers. Since then, Moscow has maintained a reconnaissance mission in Qamishli.

The Russian Aerospace Defense Forces and their effectiveness are extensively covered in the media, but helicopter activity at Kuweires, Shayrat and Tiyas air bases remains obscure. The tasks carried out by helicopter units include protection of the Khmeimim military base and support of Russian troops and Syrian pro-government forces as they combat Islamic State (IS) militants.

To complete the operation to retake the IS stronghold of Raqqa, the United States is building up its military presence and developing new airfields in Syria. It remains to be seen how many airfields will be built and how long they will remain, but the view in Russia is that after the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor are liberated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition, the United States will be reluctant to abandon its military infrastructure in Syrian Kurdistan. In fact, that infrastructure would enable Americans to remain in the heart of the region and to annoy Erdogan by responding symmetrically to his threats of restricting US use of Incirlik Air Base.

Formally, the US military states that it uses the facilities in northern Syria only to deliver and handle the cargo dispatched to its anti-IS allies. However, at least two tactical missiles are known to have been launched against IS units with the high mobility artillery rocket system deployed in Kobani. The United States has two facilities in this area. One is on the territory of the former Lafarge plant, where AH-64 Apache, Black Hawk and CH-47 helicopters have been detected, and a new one with a landing strip is being constructed about 20 miles south of Kobani. Apart from Manbij, where US military forces halted the advance of the pro-Turkish Free Syrian Army in late February, Americans and their NATO allies use Ayn Issa facilities to train SDF fighters, as well as the Abu Hajar airport in the Rmelan area. US engineers are rebuilding the Taqba air base freed from IS in late March, transforming it into the Qayyarah-2, a logistics center similar to the Qayyarah base in Iraq.

Although the external players, in particular the United States and Russia, officially deny Syria is being divided into de facto zones of influence, the separate use of the military facilities testifies to the opposite. However, if the parties manage to channel the conflict onto a political track, Russian and US troops may act as guarantors of the Syrian-style Dayton Agreement.

Article published in Al Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/04/us-russia-staking-out-territorial-clout-syria.html

Published in Tribune

Responding to Trump’s cruise missiles attack on Syrian Shayrat airbase, the tripartite meeting of foreign ministers of Russia, Iran and Syria was held today in Moscow. The meeting ended with a resounding ‘no’ to the Washington’s ‘Great Middle East Project’, and with equally resounding confirmation of already established policy of common fight against the plight of terrorism.

A week ago Trump made a sudden change in his proclaimed policy of de-escalation and international cooperation, and during a meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping ordered a cruise missile strike on a Syrian airbase near Homs, aiming to force Iran and Russia to cease supporting Syrian government.

The trilateral meeting of Lavrov, Zarif and Muallem in Moscow today proved Trump, his enemies and his foes wrong about Russian and Iranian responses to the strike. The meeting confirmed that there is no basis for rumors that Russia would abandon either of its two allies in Syria. Moreover, the three parties confirmed that Western media and political establishment are so deeply entangled in their own narratives that they are unable to see the reality.

The reality is that the legitimate Syrian Army under the command of the Syrian government led by its president Bashar al-Assad, with the support of Russia and Iran, is winning the war against various militant groups ― most of which are internationally designated terrorist groups. The strike has clearly not accomplished what it was made to look like. It did not stop or deter Russian or Syrian armed forces, but has only strengthened their resolve to obliterate the terrorists.

Moreover, the strike was conducted based on the information about a ‘chemical attack’ that the US military and intelligence, supposedly, have collected from online sources. The key information sources being al-Qaeda linked ‘rebels’, with dubious tweets and other social media posts that have appeared before the strike was reported to have happened―leading many analysts to conclude that the attack was another ‘false flag’ alike the Iraqi war WMD fabrication.

This was reiterated by Russian and Syrian officials, including yesterday’s interview with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Without verifying the data, without a proper, internationally approved investigation of the alleged attack, and moreover, without a UNSC approval – US once more unilaterally attacked a sovereign country, something that the world has witnessed few times before. Flagrant breach of the international law by the United States went unsanctioned again.

The message sent from the meeting back to the US and its allies is that three parties agree the US strike was "an act of aggression, a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter." The three top diplomats reiterated insistence on “the strict fulfillment by all without exception of those obligations set forth in the UN Security Council resolution, including full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic".

With the airbase strike Trump team hoped to send a warning message to Syrian president and his allies Russia and Iran that the US still plays a role in the Middle East. The tripartite meeting shows that the message has not accomplished the hoped for result in that target audience.

The offensive against terrorist and militant groups has only intensified in Syria, and at this juncture seems unlike to abate. The only thing that could change the balance of power on the ground in Syria would be another surprise from the American side. The rumors have it that tens of thousands of ground troops are being prepared to deploy in Syria. Should that happen things will get extremely messy and spillover effects will be felt in a number of countries in the region, as well as Europe.

However, to show that they mean business, Russians have intensified their diplomatic efforts on other fronts as well. Tomorrow Moscow is hosting another key figure for the resolution of the Syrian crisis, a Qatari foreign minister Mohammed al Thani. Not less important was the BRICS meeting in India’s Visakhapatnam, on April 12 – where special envoys for the Middle East have issued a similar communiqué strongly supporting sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria.

Not to forget two other key players in the Syrian game of war – Turkey and Saudi Arabia, there is action on those fronts as well. Today, Russian and Turkish presidents have both called for an objective international investigation into the use of the chemical weapons in Khan Sheihoun in Syria, that served as a pretext for the US cruise missile attack. The unreliable one remains Turkish president who keeps switching sides. Following the alleged attack Turkey ‘confirmed’ the use chemical weapons and after the US strike on Syria offered its military support for further actions against its neighbor.

High level meeting headed by the Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko in which Russia reportedly counts on Saudi support, will be held in Riyadh from 15 to 17 April, during which the fight against terrorism will be discussed. The meeting follows early April discussions between the Saudi King and the Russian president on the importance of bolstering international joint efforts in the fight against terrorism.

Published in Tribune
Saturday, 15 April 2017 02:46

On Tillerson's visit to Moscow

Rex Tillerson arrived to Moscow on Tuesday, having paralysed the traffic in Russia's capital, as police was blocking the roads to make a free way for his cortege, making blocked in traffic Muscovites send millions of curses in his address. The paralysis on the roads caused by Tillerson is very similar to the paralysis that has recently occurred in bilateral ties between the two powers, following the chemical attack in Idlib province reportedly committed by the loyal to Bashar al-Assad forces and then the strike of the SAA air base in Homs by the US «Tomahawk» missiles. The bilateral ties have reached the very low since the collapse of the Soviet Union and were about to pierce the bottom. The global uproar was at such extent that clash between the West and Moscow over Syria seemed inevitable. Russia has withdrawn from the the US-Russia air safety memorandum in SAR airspace and made it clear that in case of any further aggression threatening its safety will respond correspondingly to the challenge. Before the visit Rex Tillerson has sent Russia a kind of verbal ultimatum-like message to chose the side: with Iran and Assad or with the US. He was expected to bring to Moscow this ultimatums and tough rhetoric. But apparently he has lost them on his way to Moscow. The talks were finally constructive.

The global attention was engrossed to the visit of Tillerson. The allies were impressed by strong démarche of Trump all had been waiting from him, as it has put to an end the US Obama’s doctrine of relative non-involvement. So they expected that Rex Tillerson, will talk tough with Russia’s officials and make them sense how far the US can go and that it is in Russia’s interests to abandon the policy that brings it «to the wrong side of history». The «tomahawks» gave Tillerson a very strong position for talks. However, Russia has appeared to be not frightened, or at least demotivated, but concentrated and preparing for the tougher times and deeper confrontation, though keeping the doors for talks open. And the Secretary of State entered exactly those doors.

Tillerson held two much awaited meetings: with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and with President Vladimir Putin, meeting with whom was under the question mark until the last moment. The bilan is not so negative as it was expected to be. However, negative moments can hardly be overcome in the nearest foreseeable future.

Ukrainian issues apparently will not be resolved for a long time, until the US change position, so sanctions and damaged relations are likely to remain. In case of Ukraine only issue of Luhansk and Donbass may be settled in the framework of Minsk agreements. But Crimea, return of which to Ukraine was added by Trump's administration as an obligatory condition for ties normalisation, will literally never be returned to Ukraine, both because of historical justice and choice of the Crimean people, who have been struggling for independence from Ukraine since the very collapse of the Soviet Union. The history never lies.

Tillerson and Putin have failed to find the common ground in evaluations of the deadly chemical attack in Idlib province,situation in Syria in general and Russia's support of Assad. Support, which Russia continually rejects, explaining its role in Syria exclusively as of backing of the SAA forces in their fight with terrorists.

Russia keeps on demanding the investigation of the chemical attack while for the US and its allies it is an absolutely clear affair. Russia has once again blocked resolution in the UN Security Council that condemns regime of Assad for committing the atroce attack, calling for independent investigation. Previously Vladimir Putin has declared that Russia cannot take measures against regime of Bashar al-Assad until there are results of independent international investigations proving the guilt of the regime. Russia disapproves of the US strike on Syria, considering it a dangerous move to further destabilisation of the region and the world.

Tillerson's acknowledgement of the fact that the trust between the two countries is on  low level and that "the world's two foremost nuclear powers cannot have this kind of relationships" is a promising sign, giving more or less positive perspective for the ties normalisation, or at least stabilisation. Another promising thing for the world's stability, is establishment of a bilateral working group, that is to "examine" the so-called "irritants" in relations between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, Russia is ready to come back to the bilateral air safety memorandum in Syria, thus somehow the sides have retreated  to the point before the "tomahawks" attack.

Russia and the US apparently have  very similar interests in many areas of the global agenda, as fight on terrorism, however in case of some of them they have totally different approaches to how to achieve the desired result. Even in case of Syria, both sides are eager to put an end to the brutal conflict, to see united and stable Syria, but they see the conflict settlement in different ways, if not to say opposite ones. Assad's family reign coming to an end is a clear fact for the US side and its allies, while Russia's side sees other scenarios. And to respond to Tillerson's appeal to sever ties with Assad and to work with the United States on different initiatives in the Middle East in a positive way, would mean for Russia a grave failure, geopolitical defeat of its six years conflict involvement and its policy. Russians either win or die but never give up – another important trait of Russian mentality coming from the depths of history. However Mr. Tillerson does not like historical excursus, though in case of Russia it is very useful to look deep into history books. Even being exposed by regime of Assad for many times during the six years of the bloody years, Russia will continue its general line, taken from the very beginning, as it is a matter of honor. Russia is sure that overthrow of Assad would bring to far more bloody and dangerous turbulences than his temporary remaining into power. And on this issue Washington and Moscow would hardly find a common ground unless the Syrians finally agree upon the launch of political transition and take the fate of their own country in their own hands.

Trump apparently was happy with the way how the visit of the US Secretary of State has passed. After having brusquely changed his views upon NATO to diametrically opposite ones, he claimed during his press-conference with Stoltenberg that "it would be a fantastic thing" if the US, Nato and Russia got along better. However at the same time he assumed that "it may be just the opposite".

So it is white, but can be black – it seems that it is characteristic feature of the current administration which have no clear understanding of not only what is exactly going on, but even lack understanding of what it actually wants. There is no strategy, and tactics is predetermined by momentary gusts, influenced by whoever. And it has such a scale, that the allies camp should be grateful for the US strike of Syria to a mother of three, Ivanka Trump, who was shocked by the photos of dead children.

In such circumstances it is practically impossible to predict how situation will develop both on bilateral and international tracks, as long as administration is absolutely unpredictable itself. Thus Russia following the Secretary of State visit will host trilateral meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Iran, Syria and of its own, apparently forging their alliance stronger. Nothing makes Russia more stubborn and firm on its positions than abruptness of the US administration.

Published in Tribune

The 28th Arab League Summit in Jordan which will be held in the Dead Sea area on March 29th, 2017 with the participation of Arab leaders, United National Secretary General Antonio Guterres and representatives from Russia, the USA, the EU and the Africa Union would be the last chance for Arab countries before getting into further chaos. This summit is the second to be held in Jordan since 2000, with expectation to push the Arab joint work forward at all levels, presenting a glimmer of hope to tackle most of today’s challenges facing the Middle East, offering opportunities to restart an Arab strategy regarding critical and significant matters as the future of the Arab League and Arab countries is at stake.

Amidst expectations of another wave of Arab Spring amongst the youth in the Arab world, especially after some political, economic and social reforms have yield to zero changes in people’s lives, many started to rethink of stage sit-ins to ask for further consideration of citizens demands in many Arab countries including the oil rich countries which have suffered from a decline in oil and gas prices and huge losses of return accordingly

The summit is a wakeup call to all Arabs that unless constructive measures are adopted by the leaders to solve the stumbling blocks in the Arab cooperation and coordination path things would aggravate as the youth will be losing faith in their governments.

The summit which is presided over by his Majesty King Abdullah II is very important for many in terms of its time and place. Time is critical as the whole Arab nation is passing through hardships whether politically or economically. The venue of the summit in the Dead Sea resorts will give the Israelis that Arabs are stuck to their Peace Initiative for a comprehensive and sustainable peace between Arabs and Israelis based on a two-state solution.

It is said that if the Syrian president Bashar Al Assad is not attending the summit, a representative will be attending and this could be from another country who Al Assad entrusts. What confirms this is the statement issued March 19th by the Jordanian foreign ministry that Syria will not be attending to Arab League Summit in Amman in compliance with Arab League resolutions. 

This summit is the most important in the life span of the Arab League at all as it either solves the pending issues, lead to rapprochement and end up rift among Arabs themselves to counter terrorism and the looming political and economic threats or many youngsters will consider joining radical and terrorism factions against governments.

The summit, according to internal sources, would send a message to the international community that there is a dire need to solve regional issues through a unified Arab stand that help narrow the gaps and rifts among Arab countries.

On the agenda so far are the conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq as well as the Palestinian cause. The visits by two Arab leaders to Washington in January and in March and their outcomes will be also on the table to give Arab leaders an idea how the new American administration is thinking and how the Arab leaders should deal with US President Donald Trump.

Russian participation in the Summit not symbolic

It is said that the Russian participation in the Arab League Summit will not be symbolic but rather it will be very effective due to the Russian key role in the war against terrorism in the Middle East which started with Russian military intervention in Syria.

Russian participation is viewed by some analysts as very important as it will be representing Syria as well expressing their views and perspectives with regard to means to counter extremism and terrorism at the international level. Some analysts said that Russia, Egypt and Jordan strived to invite the Syrian president to attend the summit and to reconcile both Al Assad and Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz. Kuwait and the UAE like to see Syria back to the Arab League once again to give a boost to the joint Arab effort at the international arenas and to open a new page in the inter-Arab relations for the betterment of the Arab nation.

The summit will stress the need for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, condemning the flagrant Israeli arrogance and disrespect of international legitimacy based on the two-state solution. The summit which Jordan eyes is one that renders to turn it into a platform to launch “institutional and effective pan-Arab action”. Jordan pins high hopes that it will be able to achieve this goal and that Arab states would have the will to make a difference to the status quo and the hard conditions the whole region is undergoing through collective understanding and cooperation to remove all barriers that would hinder the solution of Arab differences. The kingdom is giving due momentum to the issue of peace between Palestinians and Israelis which is considered as the main reason for the deteriorating economic, military and political conditions in many Arab states.

Shehab al-Makahleh is a co-founder of Geostrategic Media, senior political and economic analyst and senior media adviser, IMESClub member

 

 

 

 

Published in Tribune

Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East in recent decades was based on a harmonious approach that helped maintain good ties with all the players in the region without getting involved in political and sectarian wrangles.Russia’s involvement in Syria made this balance very difficult to maintain, since the Syrian conflict showed the sectarian and geopolitical fault lines of the regional powers.A main reason for the skewed balance now is Iran’s interference in Iraq and its multidimensional support for the Damascus regime, also given through groupings such as Hezbollah or other Shiite militias originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Iranian involvement becomes more alarming as the conflict progresses. Tehran’s involvement in Syria and Iraq is clearly not limited to the “noble” causes of fighting terrorists, helping Syrian minorities or supporting and defending the “democratically elected president” against “terrorists.”Iran has always had far-reaching plans, primarily to counter major Sunni countries in the Gulf, chiefly Saudi Arabia, and change the regional balance of power.Iran is also pursuing its goal of exporting the revolution, which means, according to Hamid Reza Moghaddam Far, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deputy commander of cultural affairs, “not sending advocates and preachers to other countries, but rather exporting the ideology.”This dubious export will go well beyond the Mediterranean.This ideology is brought in Iraq and Syria by gangs like Afghan Fatemiyoun Division, a Shiite militia fighting in Syria on the side of Assad regime.According to Tasnim News Agency, this division will stay involved in Syria for as long as Islam, read, in this case, Iran’s geopolitical ambitions, does not know borders; it “will always stand by Khomeini’s divine goals.”Iran is using Shiite Muslims as an instrument in its dirty game of expanding its influence and destabilizing Sunni neighbors.Saudi Arabia and its regional allies do not have any illusions about the troubles the Iranian expansion will bring them.Thus, by tragic coincidence, Syria has become a battlefield of rising sectarian regional tensions.The attempts to ease this sectarian conflict and careful messages of peace and detente coming from the western side of the Gulf are unheard, muffled by a roar of accusations coming from the Gulf’s eastern side.

It is not that Russia cannot cope with having Iran as a rival, particularly taking into account the latter’s difficulties on the global stage. By aligning with Tehran, Moscow seems to be on the wrong side of history.

Maria Dubovikova

Despite declarations of a balanced policy that keeps it friendly with everyone and does not allow it to build alliances, Russia is actually failing to maintain this policy in Syria, even despite its will, because it is being squeezed between the players there. The success of the Astana talks and the relative success of the new Geneva round only strengthened the Iranian position, especially after Iran was recently recognized as a guarantor of the cease-fire in Syria, leaving out GCC countries. True, the GCC countries were invited to take part in talks, but Saudi Arabia cannot accept the role of spectator and the other GCC countries will not get involved without this key Gulf power. UN Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura has been urging all foreign players in Syria to not turn the Syrian sides into pawns of their own game. Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington signals the re-emergence of Saudi-US partnership. Moreover, it seems that in Syria, the two major players will try to overplay the until now successful trio. But is this a reasonable step? Due to certain circumstances, Russia appears to be on the same side with Iran in the Syrian game, even though it tries to stay relatively “impartial.” There is significant cooperation between Russia and Iran in many areas, boosted after Russia’s spat with Europe. Then, after all, Iran is a neighbor. It is also a dangerous rival and an absolutely unreliable friend. And between the two, Russia is choosing “an unreliable friend.” Yet it is not that Russia could not cope with having Iran as a rival, particularly taking into account the latter’s difficulties on the global stage.

Russia seems to be on the wrong side of history in this case, but it has few choices under the current shaky circumstances. The success of Astana and Geneva talks is greatly dependent on the relative friendship between Moscow and Tehran. And for Russia, it is a matter of honor to have the Syrian conflict solved through a political process. What should be clearly understood about the Russia-Iran cooperation is that there is no illusions about Iran in Moscow. Iran wishes to cooperate with the West more than with anybody else. Cooperation with Russia is not based on common values and long-term interests. There is a full pack of difficult to resolve issues between them. Iran poses an imminent threat to Russia’s interests. In Iran, there is a high level of discontent with Russia, especially its policy in Syria (that seems insufficient in Tehran’s eyes) and in all its policy toward Iran (which seems to Tehran not friendly enough: The nuclear plant is not build as fast as it was promised, the delivery of the notorious S-300s had been postponed for a long time, etc.) Currently, Russia’s answer to the question asked by Saudi Arabia — “Are you with us or with Iran?” — seems to be “with Iran.”

And expecting such an answer, the GCC is reinforcing the US presence and alliance in the region to counter Iran’s and its allies’ imminent threat. For Russia, as always, cooperation with Iran does not exclude an in-depth partnership with GCC, but Russia is interested in cooperating with the Gulf. With some GCC countries, like Qatar and Bahrain, relations are progressing well, while with other, they seem stuck or hostile, adding to the climate of mistrust. Russia is clearly making a grave mistake by getting bogged down deep in the sectarian mess and losing its impartial status, but it can hardly avoid it. But certain countries are making an even bigger mistake by expecting to overplay the existing trio, as deepening the geopolitical misunderstanding over Syria will plunge the region in an endless mess that costs dearly the civil population and the global stability. A great role Saudi Arabia could play, as a leading and powerful GCC state, would be to not urge the US to oppose the Russia-Turkey tandem, with an adjunct Iran, but to make Russia, Turkey and the US work together on resolving serious issues in Syria and Iraq, as well as to fight terrorism and minimize Iranian influence and role by actively taking part in all activities itself. That would be a worthy gambit, hardly expected, but benefiting the whole world.

 

Published in Tribune

Russia's relationship with the Gulf countries is complex, and it responds to internal political transformations on both sides of the relationship, as well as to external developments in world politics.

Despite differences over Syria and the Iranian nuclear deal, contemporary GCC-Russian relations are arguably at an apex, both in terms of shared interests and mutual understanding. Russia believes that the GCC has becom=e a real power center, exerting influence within and beyond the Middle East.

Historical Relations

GCC-Russian relations predate the inception of the Gulf bloc. The USSR was one of the first states to recognize, and establish diplomatic relations with, the Saudi Kingdom in 1932. The Soviets viewed the momentum towards integration on the Arabian Peninsula positively, especially against the backdrop of the West’s colonial policies, which were characterized by dividing and plundering the Arab states. Saudi Arabia appreciates that in those difficult initial years, Moscow provided Riyadh with critical oil products, bizarre as such an import may sound today.

Thereafter, internal issues within the USSR led to a recall of the Russian Ambassador, freezing bilateral relations for a protracted period. During the Cold War, looking through a bipolar lens, the USSR viewed the Gulf states as US satellites, in contrast to the Arab countries that had so called socialist leanings.

Russian-Saudi relations remained complicated during the 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a Muslim country. In the 1990s, mutual diplomatic representation was re-established, but was overshadowed by a pro-Muslim stance by Saudi Arabia on Chechnya and Kosovar independence, and a Russian position that emphasized territorial integrity and external non-interference. At the same time, Russia’s decision to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy meant that GCC relations were subsumed within a broader engagement of the West that emphasized Middle Eastern security.

In the early 2000s, Russia began to reformulate its relationship with its Arab partners, including the GCC states, with an emphasis on pragmatic policies, such as encouraging political dialogue and building economic ties. At the same time, the GCC states were developing and systematizing their own internal strategic priorities. Five rounds of talks between the GCC and Russian foreign ministers were held, covering topics such as international terrorism, political solutions to the crises in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and Russia’s ties to Iran, in light of the GCC states’ designation of Iran as the main regional threat, especially following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In addition to its military might, the GCC states expressed concern toward Iran’s ability to influence their Shiite communities.

The Arab Spring and Beyond

The Arab Spring has rendered drafting a Gulf security apparatus a much more complex issue, as previously key players, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, have been impaired by internal strife, sometimes between groups close to Saudi Arabia or Iran. Turkey’s growing domestic and external problems have taken the lustre away from its model of Islamic democracy.

Compared to the more substantial reforms enacted by Jordan and Morocco, Saudi Arabia underwent gradual economic and political reforms, as it tried to balance the threats posed by terrorism and by Iran, which is considered in the Gulf as a hegemonic state, (though most Western and Russian experts regard Saudi perceptions about the threat posed by Iran to be exaggerated).

Certainly, Iran gained significant influence in Iraq after the US invasion, while it maintains close ties to the Assad regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Together with the increased activity of Shia opposition in Bahrain and the Houthis in Yemen (the latter of which have a debatable relationship with Iran), these developments across the Arabian Peninsula have caused Saudi Arabia to adopt a new, comprehensive strategy as a countermeasure, accelerated by changes at the top of the Saudi power structure.

Saudi-US relations have also changed notably. Riyadh has come to view the US as sometimes being an unreliable ally, as reflected in its failure to back Hosni Mubarak, and as appearing duplicitous, via its flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood, and its support for policies that have empowered Iran at Saudi Arabia’s expense, such as the US’ stance regarding Syria, and its spearheading the Iranian nuclear deal.

Diminishing confidence in the US’ willingness to be the regional security guarantor has caused the GCC states to reach out to Russia, both as a diversification strategy, and with the hope that Russia might play a moderating role with respect to Iran. This fitted in well with Russia’s efforts to develop ties with all Arab states from the early 2000s, in the pursuit of its political and economic interests.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has been a controversial issue. US and GCC opponents of the plan believe that it is unlikely to check Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, and that it is likely to embolden Iran regionally, as it frees up funds for pro-Iranian regional militia activities, possibly even igniting a nuclear arms race.

Its supporters argue that Iranian moderates will be strengthened within the Iranian power structure, especially the elements that favor more responsible regional policies, pushing Iran into a more constructive relationship with the GCC states. Many JCOPA proponents also believe that the US remains as committed as ever to the security of the GCC states.

GCC-Russian relations have maintained their positive trajectory and pragmatic nature in spite of the JCPOA, setting aside the disagreements over Syria. The region’s complexities have thus far prevented any major breakthroughs, the economic cooperation has continued to develop, as well as an understanding that the two sides’ shared interests exceed the areas of disagreement, and that sustained dialogue is the best way of addressing differences of opinion. Both the GCC and Russia regard regional security, the Middle East peace process, the promotion of a dialogue among civilizations, and the fights against terrorism, piracy, and the drug trade as areas where they have shared visions on effective policies.

Among the six GCC members, a notable, multi-faceted relationship has developed between Russia and Bahrain, covering politics, economics, science, culture, and other spheres. It represents the fruits of four visits by HM King Hamad to President Putin.

A major theme of Russia’s engagement with the Arab world has been international cooperation against ISIL and other Islamist terrorist organizations which pursue political agendas. The complexity of counterterrorism has predictably generated some misunderstandings regarding Russia’s regional strategy, especially in the eyes of various GCC stakeholders.

In particular, there is a perception that Russia prioritizes its relationship with Iran over any relationship with the GCC states. During a recent GCC-Russia dialogue in Moscow, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed these concerns by explaining that a country’s right to expand its regional influence has to be exercised in accordance with international law, in good faith, and without interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Russia has also sought to counter rhetoric that enflames intra-Islamic sectarian tensions, calling for unity among Muslims.

Admittedly, due to its relative geographic proximity to Russia, Iran is a natural partner for Russia on a variety of issues, including trade, energy, and security, and is keen for it to enter the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a political alliance comprising non-Western states, which was founded by China and Russia. Accordingly, expecting Russia to dispense with Iran in favor of a stronger relationship with the GCC is unrealistic and illogical.

Yet by the same token, Iran and Russia disagree on various foreign policy issues, such as Russia’s insistence that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, or the long-term vision for the future of Syria, where Russia favors it as a territorially integrated multi-ethnic, multi-confessional civil state that has good relations with Russia, neither of which is essentially dependent upon the retention of either Assad personally, or of the Alawite ruling minority. In the case of Yemen, Russia’s stance has been neutrality, compared to Iran’s unequivocal support for Ali Abdulla Salih and the Houthis. Moreover, due to Russia’s security cooperation with Israel, it views Iran’s reliance upon Hezbollah with suspicion. Many Iranian politicians also oppose the formation of an alliance with Russia, favoring no more than continued partnership [1].

Conclusion

Synthesizing the above, it is critical to emphasize that Russia does not support the policy of regional hegemony in world affairs and particularly in the Gulf region. Given these considerations, it is not realistic to confront Russia with an «either-or choice»: either Iran or the GCC. And though Russia and Iran have many common interests and their cooperation looks promising, their relationship is not without challenges. Moscow's and Tehran's foreign policy objectives coincide in some areas, but diverge in others, depending on the concrete circumstances. Russia recognizes Iran as a major player in the Middle East, yet like the Arab states does not want Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons. And the Iranian regime understands perfectly well that Russia cannot build relations with Iran to the detriment of the GCC states' security.

While both Moscow and Tehran seek to prevent the victory of Islamist extremists, their long-term goals and visions for a post-Assad Syria differ substantially. Russia values its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the GCC greatly, but it has found advancing these ties challenging in light of the importance that it places on its relationship with its southern neighbor, Iran. As regional conflict has reached unacceptably high levels, Russia has been alarmed by Riyadh’s decision to contain Iran by force.

In an effort to break the cycle of violence, Russia is promoting a new regional security order. The Arab states agree in principle, but they are presently refusing to integrate Iran until Tehran starts to pursue a policy of good-neighbourliness and non-interference. However, the initiative’s viability depends upon Iran’s involvement, and so Russian efforts have now focused on encouraging a GCC-Iran dialogue.

The GCC states should also appreciate the evolving nature of Russian-US relations, and the dynamic nature of regional alliances. Today, the US' allies in the region are not necessarily Russia's enemies, in the same way that Moscow's friends are not necessarily Washington's foes. All their disagreements about Syria notwithstanding, a further escalation in the Gulf – a region of utmost importance for the world economy and global financial systems – is not in the interest of either power. In the search for what would be a historical reconciliation in the Gulf, the common terrorist threat posed by ISIL and Al Qaeda could be a critical uniting factor between all parties. GCC and Iran both have ambitious plans for economic development, and the best way to realize those plans will be to contribute to forging a favorable external environment.

 

Published in Tribune
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