Sisi won the presidential election in Egypt with remarkable results that demonstrate a high level of national confidence in the former general. While head of the Egyptian army, he played a key role in ousting the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammad Mursi in July 2013, following mass protests against the Islamist president and his government. Widely criticized by the West, he has gained incredible popularity and support in Egyptian society even amid his brutal reprisals against the Brotherhood.

After making his appearance on the Egyptian political scene as well as in the global arena, al-Sisi has been compared more often than not with Gamal Abdel Nasser. Many experts and journalists debate the possibility and reasonability of such a comparison, while al-Sisi, now president elect, has avowed himself that he wishes he were Nasser.

Putting aside all the arguments on whether the comparison is possible, it should be noted that the two have enough in common: won power due to a military coup, fought the Muslim Brotherhood, demonstrate patriotism, nationalism, charisma, Western-skepticism and are leadership-driven.

Moreover, and forming the framework of al-Sisi’s election, the current international tensions between Russia and the West and broad geopolitical games are reminiscent of the Cold War era. Even the apparent convergence with Russia seems to be a rebirth of the bilateral ties between Egypt and the Soviet Union during Nasser’s rule.

Despite the similarities, the key differences are evident. Russia will never be the former Soviet Union again, the bipolar world and old-styled Cold War between rival blocs are over, today’s international system is much more complicated and, for sure, Egypt itself is not the same Egypt it once was. And al-Sisi is much weaker then Nasser was.

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Read more: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/06/08/Egypt-key-to-Russia-s-resurgence-in-Middle-East.html

Relations between Russia and Turkey today remain stable and friendly, despite being severely tested by the Syrian crisis and the deterioration of Russia's ties with the West due to the events in Ukraine.

According to Russian Turkey experts Natalia Ulchenko and Pavel Shlykov, "in the current format, relations between Moscow and Ankara have reached their ‘growth limits’: The current model of mainly economic cooperation has largely exhausted itself, while the potential for collaboration on political issues remains untapped." Thus, the situation around Syria has taken "the trust deficit to a whole new level." So, can Moscow keep up the momentum in its dealings with Ankara, or will existing differences cause significant damage?

One of the main issues on the agenda for the talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, held during the latter’s visit to Moscow in late May (just after the presidential elections in Ukraine), was Crimea. Although Turkey has not recognized the legality of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Turkish foreign minister has pointed to the positive side of this move. Turkey, where nearly 5 million descendants of the Crimean Tatars live, is not indifferent to the fate of their kinsmen in Crimea. As was reported, Davutoglu intended to speak in favor of the fact that they "should benefit from rights of autonomy like when they were under Ukrainian administration." It was still unclear, however, to which rights of autonomy the Turkish foreign minister was referring.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/russia-turkey-davutoglu-syria-crisis-ukraine-tatar.html#ixzz33nDkv1Er

The sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the United States has not prevented them from continuing their cooperation on issues such as the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria, the holding of the P5+1 (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) negotiations with Iran or the preservation of stability in Afghanistan. Disagreements over the Syrian crisis, however, are clearly showing signs of worsening. Russian analysts fear that, once the process of removal of the Syrian chemical arsenal is concluded, the United States — which has not renounced the idea of overthrowing the regime in Syria — may revert to the plan of a military strike against the country, 

It's precisely this plan that Moscow has seen in the recent UN Security Council draft resolution, which it vetoed, together with China. Speaking on May 23 at the conference on international security — held in Moscow by Russia’s Ministry of Defense and in which I participated as part of a group of Russian and foreign experts — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, "Just yesterday, our Western partners in the UN Security Council put to the vote a draft resolution that, with reference to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, suggested that the whole situation come under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In fact, this would be the first step to justify external intervention: there is no doubt about that. Knowing full well how fraught with danger that is, Russia and China vetoed the resolution, which didn’t pass."

The main topics of discussion at the conference were the spreading of the "color revolutions," the consequences of the Arab Spring and the prospects of preserving stability in Afghanistan.

Reed more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/moscow-strengthens-damascus-ties.html#ixzz33nDPWKIj

Over the past few weeks, Russia has taken steps to develop its trade and economic ties with Tehran, which plunged to a record low of $1.59 billion last year. In 2013, according to Russian Minister of Energy Alexander Novak, this amounted to a reduction of 31.5%, a consequence of the unilateral US and EU sanctions imposed in mid-2012, which forced companies such as Lukoil and Gazprom Neft to leave the Iranian market.

The situation should have changed with the agreement reached between Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, during the SCO Summit in Bishkek in September 2013, which caused a stir and under the terms of which 500,000 barrels per day of Iranian oil would be delivered in exchange for Russian goods and equipment. By rough estimates, that is 12% of the oil extractable daily in Iran.

Nothing was known, however, about concrete steps to put this agreement into practice until Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit last December to Tehran, during which ways to implement it were discussed. One of the items on the table appears to have been the price of the oil, given Moscow’s request for a discount. It was clear that, with the sanctions still standing, the problem would also likely be who would purchase the oil and make the payments and how, considering the threat of US sanctions. According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, one of the possible options initially suggested was that Rosneft buy the oil. But at the beginning of April the Ministry of Energy decided to choose an authorized trading company which, as the newspaper source explained, “will be a company registered in Russia that — contrary to Rosneft —does not trade on the world market and is thus immune from pressure.” 

While it was undeniable that the Iranian side was interested in breaking the trade embargo and obtaining the goods it needed, analysts had to ponder the reasons guiding the Russian side. It was evident that Moscow was not moved by an urgent need to obtain energy carriers from its Middle Eastern partner. During one of the talk shows on the Russian TV channel RBC, participants were even asked the question: “Why should Russia buy Iranian oil?” Actually, back in February, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanai suggested that, in the negotiations on the supply of Iranian oil in exchange for Russian goods, Moscow and Tehran might agree to invest in the construction of a second unit at the nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

Many Russian analysts were convinced that Russia, predicting the possibility of, if not a full, then at least a partial normalization of Iran's relations with the West and seeing a sharp increase in interest in Iran in Western business circles, set as a first priority the task to “stake out” a place for itself in the Iranian market. While the range of Russian products to be delivered to Tehran in exchange for oil is generally known, though not precisely defined (e.g., metallurgical products, machinery, power equipment and other goods), the basic parameters of the Iranian oil deliveries to Russia have not yet been revealed. It is unknown whether the sides have managed by now to resolve all the issues linked to this deal and come to a final agreement on its implementation.

Read the whole article: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/iran-russia-oil-exchange-goods-cooperation.html#ixzz31cymuXI6

The article was published by Al Monitor 

It seems that the tendency toward a needless exacerbation of US-Russian relations, which started with the crisis in Ukraine, has now begun to spread to the Near East as well. This time the area of confrontation has become Syria. The Russian-US “honeymoon,” more precisely the time allotted for eliminating the Syrian chemical arsenal, will soon be over and all signs indicate that the plan will be fulfilled as agreed. But proposed Geneva III talks have clearly lost traction. Fierce fighting among the members of the Syrian opposition has severely hurt their potential and the chances of even a minimal agreement between those who are generally considered to be the moderate opposition (although the assessments of Moscow and Washington differ here in some respects). According to Yezid Sayigh, “The National Coalition’s reprieve during the Geneva talks also momentarily masked the extent of its incapacitation by renewed Saudi-Qatari competition for influence over the Syrian opposition.” Meanwhile, the designation by Riyadh of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization dealt a serious blow to this organization’s standing in Syria, where it plays a major role in both the National Coalition and the Syrian National Council, that is to say, the very organizations that most of the world community regards as moderate.

Leaders of the diverse organizations forming the Syrian opposition have long asked the West for supply of modern antitank and anti-aircraft weapons to turn the tide in the war against President Bashar al-Assad. In the course of a series of recent meetings in Moscow with officials (such as Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov), experts and journalists, a group of Syrian oppositionists presented their “charter for democratic reform,” which in one way or another came down to discussing the need to arm the rebel groups with modern weapons to resolve the crisis. Moscow, as is known, is against this method of resolving the crisis. For the time being, Western governments, above all the United States, have withstood intensive lobbying by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to arm the rebels with such dangerous weapons systems, primarily out of fear that the arms may end up in the wrong hands. The experience of Afghanistan — where the mujahedeen turned the weapons they received against the very people who had given them — had not been forgotten.

Recently, however, Washington has changed its position. On April 18, The Wall Street Journal (in an article by Ellen Knickmeyer, Maria Abi-Habib and Adam Entous) confirmed previous reports by Agence France-Presse that “the US and Saudi Arabia have supplied Syrian rebel groups with a small number of advanced American antitank missiles.” The Russian media (for example, ITAR-Tass on April 20) states that more than 20 BGM-21 TOW (wire-guided) portable antitank systems had been sent in early March through Turkey and Jordan to Syria to the opposition group Harakat Hazm (part of the Free Syrian Army), and that these fighters have already undergone training in the use of such weapons. RIA Novosti, citing the fact that these deliveries are described as a “pilot project,” posits that in the future the supply of the state-of-the-art modern weapons to the rebels will be expanded. Most likely, the next step in the weapons deliveries will be surface-to-air missiles.

This information came as no surprise to Moscow, which as Russian sources say, was already aware of deliveries of antitank weaponry. According to them, an expansion of deliveries was discussed during President Barack Obama's visit to Riyadh on March 28. At the same time, a senior administration official at the press briefing on the president’s bilateral meeting with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz said that “our approach on that issue hasn’t changed” and confirmed “concerns about certain types of weapons systems that could be part of a proliferation that would not serve our interest.” 

Moscow analysts believe that the following circumstances played a role in changing the course of the US administration.

First of these is the worsening in Russian-US relations due to the reunification of Russia and Crimea, alongside the strengthened role of neoconservative elements in the Washington bureaucracy, who are anxious to spite Russia wherever they can, and to hinder normalization of US-Iranian relations. These are the very same people who worked behind the scenes during the coup in Kiev. As Robert Merry recently wrote, referring to William Pfaff, Victoria Nuland “even identified the man who should replace Yanukovych after his ouster,” and “the United States spent some $5 billion in fostering 'democratic institutions' in Ukraine designed to nudge the country away from Russian sway.” He said that only “saner heads would have understood how dangerous this kind of activity can be.”

Second is America’s desire to support its Saudi partners, whose Syrian policy has evoked a serious internal crisis in the Saudi Arabian monarchy, the leaders of which blame the United States for all of their problems.

Third is the fear that the antigovernment forces in Syria could fall, which would turn the mantra of “Assad must go” into merely wishful thinking.

Most Russian experts believe that the supply of modern arms to the Syrian rebels:

• ¥Will not guarantee victory for the detachments that receive them; moreover, the suppliers will hardly be able to ensure that these weapons will not be seized by competing groups of fighters, including international terrorists.
• ¥Will exacerbate the rivalry between the rebel groups, rather than promote their unification.
• ¥Will impel government forces and their supporters to take harsher actions and will intensify the armed confrontation, costing even more civilian lives.
• ¥Will increase the flow of refugees.
• ¥Will force the pro-Damascus regional powers to mobilize even more personnel and material resources to fight the rebels.
• ¥Will harm international cooperative efforts at finding a political-diplomatic solution to the problem.

Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has stated that the supply of modern effective antitank weaponry to the fragmented antigovernment forces will seriously destabilize the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and will not promote a political-diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Does this mean that the United States and Russia have entered a new round of political confrontation, only this time not in Ukraine, but in the Near East?

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/russia-america-crisis-relations-middle-east.html##ixzz30N4LwrYA

After three years of bloody war in Syria, Washingtonclosed the Syrian embassy, as Assad’s regime “has no legitimacy” and Washington considers the Syrian embassy in the U.S. an insult. The U.S. then freezes the diplomatic relations with Syria. This breaking news hits the headlines of the world’s news agencies. But is this news really breaking, or just long overdue?

The Syrian conflict, as it was mentioned, started three years ago and the death toll already amounts to more than 140,000 people, while some argue that the real number remains unknown. We could endlessly discuss who is to blame for this bloodshed as there is not “right” answer, a common trend of all civil wars.

However, the current state of play is that the Syrian opposition is absolutely fragmented; that Islamists and jihadists from abroad fight on the side of the Free Syrian Army, that Syrian territory has been completely invaded by numerous brigades of the al-Qaeda backed terrorist groups that represent a threat to regional and world stability. In this case, other questions over the conflict should be raised - not who is to blame, but how to stop it.

To read the whole article please visit the Al Arabia English web-site: 

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/world/2014/03/19/U-S-vs-Russia-on-the-giant-chess-board-that-is-Syria.html

The recent rapprochement between Iran and the United States, regardless of how fragile it is, has driven a number of analysts and politicians in Russia and abroad to speculate about the possible negative consequences for Russia’s relations with Iran of Tehran’s “pivot to America.” I find such speculation and fear of the possible decline of Iran-Russia ties baseless. Russia is interested in the normalization of the Iran-US relationship, and can clearly benefit from it.

First from the Russian perspective, Moscow is no less interested than the West in clearing up suspicions about the Iranian nuclear program, which is the main condition for normalization, and excluding the possibility of Iran's nuclear weaponization. Second, the lifting of sanctions would allow Russian companies access to the Iranian market. The Russian companies believe that they can compete with others successfully, particularly in the spheres where they have already acquired expertise and where they are able to offer better projects on better conditions. The geographical proximity of Russia and Iran can also ease the development of new projects, including the possible construction of new nuclear plants.

There was a leak from well-informed circles to the Russian media that the Iranians were negotiating with the Russian company Atomstroyexport on the construction of two new units in the Bushehr plant that would produce 1,000 megawatts each. Third, it will remove all barriers to Russian-Iranian military and technical cooperation (let us remember in this regard the failed delivery of the C-300 missile systems, met with outrage by Tehran). Fourth, as Moscow sees it, even in the case of full normalization with the West, Tehran will need diversification and counterbalances. Constructive diplomatic cooperation between Russia and Iran on the Syrian crisis and Russia’s recognition of Tehran’s regional role would support this.

During my visit to Tehran, just before Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s visit to Russia, almost all my interlocutors, including several high-level officials, asserted that President Hassan Rouhani is determined to foster ties with Russia exactly now, when he is feeling an urgent need for that. During Zarif’s visit, a lot of issues were discussed, including a trade deal between Russia and Iran for the purchase of up to 500 barrels per day of crude Iranian oil in exchange of Russian goods worth of $18 billion annually.

The idea of this oil-for-goods deal was proposed for the first time to President Vladimir Putin by Rouhani in Bishkek, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in September 2013. This was, the Iranian diplomats said, followed up by them in the course of two telephone conversations, as well as during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Tehran Dec. 13, 2013. By the way, the Iranian side sees in Putin’s two calls to Rouhani a sign of a real breakthrough in Moscow’s approach toward cooperation with Iran at a time when the level of trade and economic exchanges dropped last year to an extremely low level of less that $2 billion. Iranians remember that during his visit to Tehran, Lavrov said that the volume of trade between the two states should be at the level of $30 billion.

The US administration expressed its serious concern about the Russia-Iran trade deal, and even considers it “inconsistent with the terms of the P5+1 agreement with Iran,” as Caitlin Hayden, spokesperson for the White House National Security Council, told Reuters. She warned that it “could potentially trigger US sanctions.” But Putin insisted in response that it was Russia’s right to buy oil from Iran, because it had never subscribed to any unilateral sanctions on Iran either by the United States or the European Union, and did not have any obligations related to them.

I don’t share the view of some analysts who think that the main incentive for accepting the Iranian proposal for Russia was of a political nature, though a political message can be also found in it. My guess is that in reality, the Russian leadership believes that the determination of Rouhani to solve the nuclear crisis by the means of concessions is genuine, and Iranians can be trusted. Projecting such a scenario, one can easily assume that pretty soon, lots of companies will rush to make deals with Iran. So far, even in the worst-case scenario, in which the sides are not able to immediately start working on the oil-for-food scheme, it is still practical to reserve a place to Russia for the future. Such a project is economically feasible and profitable for both sides. The experience of the Russian LUKOIL company's deal with Iraq under sanctions was also considered impractical by many experts, and after the fall of the regime it looked like Russia was going to lose Iraq, given its disapproval of the invasion. Now, I don’t know who exactly is losing Iraq — the worst thing that can happen is that all of us together lose it — and anyway, LUKOIL is already working there. The recently signed Russian contract with the Syrians on a Mediterranean shelf gas field stands in the same group of projects.

As of now, we don’t exactly know what goods will be delivered to Iran, or how. Russian experts say that it needs black metals, machinery and other equipment, vegetable oil and wheat. Anyway, this is not a purely barter deal, and there definitely should be financial transactions. We can presume that the purchased oil will be forwarded not to Russia but to its customers, probably in Asia. There is some speculation that the Syrian interests might have been somehow involved here, but that’s just a guess.

We’ll see how the events around this deal are going to unfold and to what extent it can really boost Russian-Iranian economic cooperation, which has always faced obstacles. Those are, for instance, a feeling of mistrust toward Russia deeply embedded in the Iranian mentality based on historic grievances and the feelings of vulnerability, fear, isolation and suspicion. I often hear from my Iranian colleagues complaints about not only the non-delivery of the C-300s, but even the conquest of the southern Caucasus in the 19th century (already three independent states) and the failure to submit to Tehran the original copies of the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828). There is also very strong pro-Western sentiment in the Iranian public.

As I was told some time ago, Iranian negotiators with the United States and other Western partners have been instructed by the supreme leader of Iran, given the priority of lifting sanctions, to concentrate entirely on the nuclear issue and to avoid negotiating all other topics. I can mention in this regard to one of the questions I recently got from an audience in the United States, about the possibility of striking a deal with Tehran on changing its position toward the Syrian crisis, Israel or the situation in Lebanon. One of the Iranian analysts I talked with suggested that new issues can be brought onto the negotiating table if the Americans demonstrate a “real desire” to make a deal with Iran on the nuclear issue. According to a senior diplomat, their complaints can be summarized into two issues: that the Americans begin bargaining after they have already signed documents, and that they are delaying the process. But the Iranians themselves will surely be interested in discussing the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are important for the Americans. By the way, I heard from the same source that Tehran is not very afraid of the scenario of the Taliban coming to power in Kabul because “They have learned lessons from the past and are not the same Taliban as they used to be before 2001.”

Moscow is also interested in expanding security cooperation with Tehran on Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US forces on two main tracks: deterring the threat coming from international terrorist groups, especially with a significant Central Asian component, and confronting the flow of narcotics into their territory. Last year, areas under the cultivation of poppy in Afghanistan grew by more than 30% because many Afghans started losing their jobs with American withdrawal and turned back to their old business.

Yet earlier this week, when I met former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, now the head of the Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research and an advisor the the supreme leader, he highlighted above all Iran-Russia cooperation toward the Syrian conflict, expressing his confidence in a political solution and “conditional” optimism about the future of Syria.

Original publication is available here. 

This publication opens series of "IMESClub Interviews". Discussion took place on the 28th of August in Moscow. Professor Vitaliy Naumkin answered several thorny questions posed by IMESClub Pesident Maria Dubovikova . 

Maria Dubovikova: I would like to start this conversation with a question that sums up the whole decade. How would you characterize this decade for the Middle East? Which mistakes were made by the intra- and outer-regional players, by the international community?

Vitaly Naumkin: Well, I would prefer not to talk in terms of  “mistakes”, it’s much better to talk about the positive and negative trends.  Speaking about the positive trends that took place in these last ten years, a good economic growth in most countries of the Middle East could be mentioned in particular. After all, we're not just talking about the Arab world, but about the whole Middle East, right?

M.D.: – Yes!

V.N.:  For example a considerable economic success of Turkey can be specially noted. Moreover many Arab countries have experienced economic growth, modernization, and development of modern financial and economic institutions. Somewhere this process was fast, even including some countries that have experienced the "Arab Spring," somewhere rather slow. Good results of economic development were shown, for example, by Egypt. Therefore, we can talk about different trends and shifts that were positive, not negative. Among them there are the process of shaping of the civil society which is however rather limited; spreading, not everywhere of course, of high technologies, especially information technologies. A number of countries are establishing cell-phone networks. The growth of the Internet use. Increasing number of educated youth who are getting education not only in their native countries but also abroad. There are many other trends that can be characterized as concrete steps towards a modernization, modern development and general integration into the basic matrix of global development.

Among the negative trends it is possible to mention stagnation, mainly in the political life, and a number of other processes that especially led to the “Arab Spring”. It is an absence of means of vertical social mobility for people, monopolization of all the levers of state control including financial and governmental resources by the bureaucratic elites. And, of course, high level of unemployment in some countries, poverty, etc.

The Middle East is corroded by the inner conflicts. It is the growth of interconfessional, ethnic, interstate and intraconfessional contradictions, which are often very severe. Also there are many unregulated old conflicts, primarily the Arab-Israeli.

Back to the question about the mistakes, it is possible to name the growth of religious fundamentalism, extremism, inability of the regimes to deal with the terrorism among them. All that leads to the serious deterioration of the image of people living in the region beyond its borders: in Europe, in the West in general. The intrusion of the Allied Forces to Iraq in 2003 can be undoubtedly considered as a mistake. As a result the interventionists failed to provide security, first of all – for the country’s people. In a decade more than 200 thousand people died, several millions became refugees or were displaced within the country, only 400 thousand of 1400 thousand Christians left. There was a mass exodus of Christians from Iraq. The minorities, mainly Christians are discriminated, there are non-stop terrorist acts and the hostility between the Sunni and the Shiah is periodically getting worse. Of course, the situation has partially stabilized – it has ameliorated. But generally it is possible to say that the plans of our US partners to quickly establish a modern democratic state, eliminate the internal conflicts and unite the nation have failed. I believe that Bush's interventionalism was the main mistake and it was replaced by Obama's administration milder attitude to the region and to the interventions. However, Bush's heritage still lives and it will take very long to remove its traces. That is why the interventionalism and the attempts to project their own model of liberal democracy face a severe resistance of the elites and the people. This continues to deteriorate the security in the region and to impede the mutual understanding between the Middle Eastern countries and external players.

M.D.: Speaking about the Gulf countries having the particular influence on the development of the Middle East, how would you estimate their influence? Which effect would the current policy of the two power centers – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have on the development of Middle East, positive or negative?

V.N.: Regarding the Gulf countries, they largely represent a successful model of development, primarily because they poses huge financial resources. They can easily switch between these resources from one field to another and easily manipulate them in order to neutralize grievances and solve social problems if necessary. But at the same time, these countries do not have any immunity to the existing protest sentiments - while other countries deal with the more severe forms of such sentiments. Take the issue of Bahrain, where there was a very powerful protest movement. Although it was neutralized, the discontent of the two thirds of the population belonging to the Shia and consider themselves disadvantaged remains. There is a difficult internal situation in Saudi Arabia, which also has a grain of conflict.

It is impossible to ignore the intense rivalry between the different states of the Persian Gulf, including one in the religious and ideological sphere. Take a rather intense rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Qatar relied on the support of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the Saudis - on the Salafis, and as we can see by the recent Egyptian events, they supported the military coup in Egypt. While previously these countries acted together as supporters of the Islamic protest movement, and was considered that they are leading all new Islamic forces to the power, today their views diverged. Saudi Arabia, before oriented on supporting the Salafist parties, plays well with the new secular forces today, including those representing the old regimes, such as the Egyptian military. Qatar also remains committed to the "Muslim Brotherhood" which has lost ground in Egypt, and together with Turkey acts in their support.

So I am not inclined to consider all the countries of the Gulf as a single entity. For example, the United Arab Emirates sharply opposed the "Muslim Brotherhood" from the outset, limited their activities in the country and subjected their representatives to repression.

The Gulf States are playing a double role in the region. They contribute to the financing of a number of projects in the Arab countries, assist in resolving their economic problems at no charge. But at the same time, impudent aggressiveness with which these countries are trying by force to resolve the internal conflict in Syria, only exacerbates the situation in the region and does not lead the Middle East to peace and stability.

M.D.: In a way, my next question concerns the Syrian problem. As the latest trend shows, Russia has began to play a more significant role in the Middle East and in many respects its interests are in conflict with the US policy. Do you think that the Middle East is able once again to become a field of confrontation of two powers as it was during the Cold War?

V.N.: I do not think it can. Firstly, because Russia does not enter an intense rivalry with the Americans for the area of influence. And the Russian influence in the region, to be honest, is very limited. Russia's main partners are still not the Arab states. This is, for example, Turkey. Although Turkey is a NATO member and wants to be admitted to the European Union, relations with Russia are very active, and developed very well in recent years. Turkey - one of the most important economic partners of our country, and Russia does not also have any sufficient political disagreements with it. The main stumbling stone in Russian - Turkish relations is the divergence of positions on the Syrian conflict. But this difference does not prevent the two countries from moving forward in increasing the volume of trade and economic cooperation, in the implementation of new projects, etc. I'm not talking about humanitarian relationships, the number of Russian tourists in Turkey, a flurry of activity on the business, etc. During the zero-sum game Turkey would be seen as a rival, as it is an ally of the potential enemy - the United States. Today is it impossible to pose a question this way. Moreover, today Russia has sufficient understanding with the Americans in the region. Russia and the U.S. are working together within the framework of the Quartet of international mediators in the settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict. Our positions on the settlement differ only slightly. Russia, for example, does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization and works with this movement. Russia is more critical than the United States towards the Israel's plans for the development of territories, build settlements, but, nevertheless, the overall positions of Russia and the U.S. to the resolution are very similar, there is a close cooperation. Even on the issue of Iran, where there are serious differences, Russia and the United States will still cooperate acting in the format of the dialogue between Iran and the 5+1. Our country has repeatedly voted for the resolutions related to the response to the opacity of the Iranian nuclear program in UN Security Council. Iranian node in the context of non-proliferation is one of the main areas of cooperation with the United States. The same can be said about Afghanistan, even though it probably refers to Central Asia, but the Afghan issue is impossible to ignore because it is important for the entire Islamic world. As you know, Russia is also actively cooperating with America, without getting into the conflict and the American actions in Afghanistan, it is helping to build the Afghan state, helping the Americans to resolve supply issues of their contingent and ensure its safe withdrawal, acting fairly consistent, regardless of those difficulties that arise in Russian- American relations. Therefore, I see no reason for the rivalry between Russia and the U.S. in the region. Differences will persist. But even in the most tense case - with the Syrian conflict, where Russian and the United States assessments, policy plans and mode of conduct differ radically, there are still common interests. They consist in that firstly neither party wants to allow chaos in this country. At least, I see the interests of the United that way. Another thing is that some Russian politicians today have reason to blame Washington that it wants to create a controlled chaos out there. But still, it is in the American interest, in my opinion, to establish order and stability in the country. Secondly, talking about the coincidence of interests - we do not want to have a state of the Islamic radicals who would cut his throat to everyone who does not think like them there. There are also a common interest is to halt the bloodshed, civil war, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But their views significantly diverge on how to do it and how to respond to what is going on. But look, despite the radical opposition between Russia and the U.S., they still have managed to agree on joint steps for the Geneva-2, the second international conference on Syria. And the chances are not completely lost yet.

M.D.: Let's go back a little bit back, to the Arab-Israeli conflict, you mentioned, and to the role of Russia and the United States, and then return to Syria. Under present conditions, when the region is absolutely losing its stability, what are the real prospects of efficient and effective conflict resolution? Do they disappear or are they still real enough?

V.N.: It is hard to be optimistic about the Arab-Israeli peace process, although there was a shift. The peace process has been resumed a term of nine months has been set to reach a final status agreement. I honestly do not think that it is possible to do it in nine months. There are several problems, among which it is possible to mention two most painful ones - the issue of Jerusalem and the refugee problem. If it is still possible to anticipate some possibility of compromise on Jerusalem, the problem of refugees today has very aggravated, as the Palestinian self-awareness has strongly increased and it is impossible to deny the right of refugees to return. But for Israel accepting this demand means causing the condemnation by the majority of population, for which such a decision would be a tragedy. For them, the return of Palestinians, let's say, in Haifa, located in what is now Israel, which Palestinians left in 1948, is unacceptable. How can this issue be resolved? In general, it can be solved, but it requires negotiation. Some reasonable Israeli politics offer the Palestinians the option of returning the refugees only to the territory of a future Palestinian state. In this case, the Palestinians will have the right either to return to their lost homes, or the right to compensation. However, these solutions do not suit all the Palestinians. And it is very difficult to suppose that it will be possible to overcome these grave differences in nine months.

Some Israeli partners have an idea to still return to the issue of an interim solution of the problem. To sign an agreement, say, with the exception of these two items, which will be deferred to a later period. Palestinians were always against the interim agreement before. In my opinion, in order to make them do it, they should get some serious concessions from the Israeli side, say, on the territorial issue. Would it be possible to implement it?

The border issue is also not easy, but there can still be an agreement because there is already a preliminary agreement, which can be taken. The idea of swaps, the territorial exchange, is acceptable for the moderate Palestinian elite, and, I believe, it has a potential to be realized.

The question arises whether it is possible to extend the deadline for reaching a final status from a nine-month to something else. Postpone it for a year, say. But in this case, there are legitimate concerns that the period may be extended to infinity, which will bury any hopes of a full settlement.

Today, Obama needs a success. He even wants to achieve something in the Middle East. At the moment, America loses a lot. There is a growing discontent in almost all corners of the Arab world against it. Look at what happened in Egypt! The Americans committed the same mistake twice, first they supported Mubarak, and they still reproached for betting on dictators. Then they quickly passed him and displeased those who hoped that they would support him. The U.S. has long worked with the "Muslim Brotherhood", enthusiastically talked about their democratic aspirations, their moderation, then the same Egyptian masses have allowed the military to remove the «Brothers» from power – now both "Brothers" and the new authorities are dissatisfied with the Americans. Yes, they were, in fact, always dissatisfied, because the United States, in their view, are entirely on the side of Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians. Now the new government of Egypt, the military and the civilian, including even liberal organizations, accuse the Americans of their support for the "Muslim Brotherhood". As a result the image of the United States has suffered greatly, their influence waned, their ability to manage processes occurring in the region declined. In Iraq, too, not everything is going well. In Afghanistan - the same thing. Libya is in a complete breakdown, chaos. Therefore, Obama must achieve at least something. We are not gloating about it, saying that America has lost two wars, that its policy towards the "Arab Spring" has failed. Who knows what will be the outcome of the US threats to launch an air-missile attack on Syria. If they choose a military intervention, it will not lead to the implementation of their goals and will cause huge damage to the region. We are totally against it. And, I think, Russia will support Obama's desire to resolve the Middle East conflict in all circumstances.

M.D.: Returning to the question of Syria. The other day, the Arab League after its meeting has condemned the chemical attack near Damascus, but refused to take part in any operation of the West, which was the completely different reaction compared to the case of Libya. What is the reason of such a sharp turn? Failure in Libya? Or this is some different understanding of the conflict?

V.N.: I believe this is both another understanding of the conflict and the "Libyan syndrome". There is no unity among the Arab countries. But if the Arab sponsors of intervention could push through the support of U.S. intervention, it still would (and it will if they manage) lead only to more bloodshed and to the hatred of more Muslims against the United States, and the people who will do it, will be responsible for it. They will look like American's puppets willing to dump stable regimes for their own selfish purposes. Will have to answer for it. The other day, an American colonel, who participated in the operation in Kosovo, McGregor, very well mentioned for this occasion that there are no bad guys and good guys in civil wars, there are only winners and losers, and one does not need to intervene. Civil wars were everywhere. During the American Civil War more people were killed than today in Syria.  We shall not speak about the casualties during the  civil war in Russia. And we still do not know who were the bad guys and the good guys. Kappel and Kolchak forces were the most brutal punishers. Today, many consider Kolchak a hero. In the civil war there is no right or wrong. So today, if the West wants to intervene in the war and make others win with their help - it will be a disaster. It is not for the West with his limited understanding of Middle Eastern societies to judge who is right and wrong. Not to mention the fact that the Americans will actually be standing shoulder to shoulder with those who hate Americans and their main ally - Israel, with those, who tomorrow, as it has happened in history, will turn their weapons against them, I think it would be a tragic error. I'm sure Obama understands this.

M.D.: To conclude our discussion, I suggest drawing interim results of the "Arab spring": who at the moment is among the losers, and who - among the winners?

V.N.: I do not know, who is who now.

M.D.: Even in case of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt?

V.N.: Well, we see very contradictory results. On the one hand, the Arab peoples have won, because they have shown that they are legitimate citizens of their countries, they can decide their own fate. On the other hand, it turned out that they are losers the same time. Because interest groups, various elites who mainly do not express the interests of the majority of the population, pursuing their own selfish goals, took advantage of the fruits of the mass protest movements. What did, for example, "Muslim Brotherhood" do in Egypt? Taking suddenly unexpected steps towards Islamization and the monopolization of power, they repeated the mistakes of Mubarak and caused resentment among those who voted for them.

Russian brilliant experts on the Middle East, IMESClub Members Andrei Fedorchenko and Alexander Krilov issued in December 2012 a very attractive and interesting report entitled "The Transformations in the Middle East and North Africa and Russia’s national interests". For the moment report is available in Russian only.

This is the first and long-awaited issue of The MidEast World journal, official journal of the IMESClub. This issue is composed of papers and articles, prepared for the VII Russian International Studies Association (RISA) Convention, Section «The Arab Spring». That Section was held on the 29th of September 2012 in Moscow (Russia) at MGIMO and appeared to be the constituent meeting of the Club, as the decision to found it was pronounced and supported by all the participants.
This issue presents texts on the «Arab Spring» with a special focus on the consequences for the Middle East Peace Process.
This issue is partly in Russian and partly in English. The upcoming issues of The MidEast World will be in English only and will be issued in printed and cyber editions.
We wish you a pleasant reading and time to spend with IMESClub experts through their papers.

This issue is composed of articles* by:

• Sema Kalaycioglu
• Andrey Fedorchenko
• Ayman Salama
• Alexander Aksenenok
• Walid Salem and Nabil Shalabi
• Tatiana Nosenko

With best regards,
IMESClub Directorate

*Please, pay attention to the dates of receipt on the front pages of each article.