I suppose there are several interesting aspects of the elections in Tunisia that took place last Sunday and the results of which are already known.
The first aspect to be mentioned concerns the turnout. The electoral body in Tunisia is over 8 million people and a bit more than 5 million were registered as voters. This is 900 thousand more than in 2011 and, from my opinion, that witnesses the growth of the election committee’s (ISIE) professionalism, which did a great job this summer. At the same time the declared turnout of 61,8%, which is often praised as a very high, in reality includes only registered electors and is about 3 million people. In 2011 the number of people who attended the elections did not differ much from the registered electors lists. I believe it means that during the past three years the society got disillusioned about the institute of elections itself, in the institute of the political parties. Regardless of the composition of the parliament and of attitude towards the results of the elections, the parliament will have rather low electoral legitimacy – about 20-25% of the population. The main issue of the next several years for the parties is to gain the votes of 3-4 million people, who have not attended the polling stations. There will be a struggle for them. They will have to be attracted. It was the first important aspect.
The second one is that Ennahda has got 27,79% of the votes, i.e. 800 thousand people voted for the Islamists. 800 thousand of votes are the electorate of this Islamist party as we – me, and many of my Tunisian colleagues, estimated it. I would say that those, who voted for Ennahda now are the same people who voted for it in 2011, as they wanted the Islamists to come into power, to be elected, not because of the fact that the Islamists are those poor guys who had been severely suffering during Ben Ali rule. These 800,000 people will always vote for Ennahda. They form its loyal and stable electorate. It should be specially noted that having obtained these votes Ennahda has performed greatly as it was conducting the campaign in generally disadvantageous conditions. It is true that it had three years and that it has not shown its worth during the governments of Hamadi Jebali and Ali Larayedh. No doubt, that it has repulsed a part of electorate in 2011-2013. And during the last several months we witnessed an active Anti-Islamist campaign. The technocratic government did not support Ennahda, and the party was blamed for the deterioration of the security situation in the country.
The party, having taken the second place, will have an important say in the parliament on the one hand, and it can get much more on the future elections on the other. But in order to get more votes during the next elections, it should move from general slogans, enough populist, and talk about values to the talk about the real problems of the society: salaries, unemployment, etc. There is no problem of Islamic values either within the social-economic space of the country, or in its political space. Or, at least, the importance of this problem is much exaggerated.
We do not speak about any other Arab country in terms of the complexity of parliament and the possibilities for coalitions. At long last there is an Arab country that, I hope, will be developing in conformity with democratic laws provided that everything goes well.
In general, I am glad that Ennahda has got 27,79%. It would be a catastrophe if it had got 10%. Because it would mean the Egyptian scenario and the falsification of the elections. The Arab society has a stable electorate who will always vote for Islamists.
At the same time I would be very disappointed if the party had gained 50% on the elections, though it was possible. Ennahda will always have a more disciplined electorate than the other parties. And let’s imagine that all Ennahda’s electorate comes to vote and the turnout is 30%. This would have meant an Islamist parliament. This would have also been a catastrophe. It was avoided here. But there is nothing to be excited about; the situation is very fragile and complex. The loss of Islamists is not only a loss of Ennahda – it is a result of a global situation in the region. Ennahda is an Islamist party. And its reputation is suffering of what is happening in the other countries of the region. During the last year what is happening is very disappointing. First of all this is an ominous shadow of Islamic State. Whatever is the attitude of the Ennahda memebers towards the Islamic State, and this attitude may be negative as well, they will still have to suffer the reputational costs.
Now about the Nidaa Tunès party, which took the first place. The leaders of this party had been speaking about their future victory since January. However, not only the party’s leaders had been predicting its victory, but also the analysts favorable for this party. In the result the party got 37,58%, which corresponds to approximately 1.2 million people. It is 300 thousand less than the Islamist received in 2011. At the same time, within this 1.2 million there are those who voted for this party only because it is not an Islamist one, but a kind of liberal alternative. But there is also a part of electorate who voted for this party because it is associated with Bourguiba, with the refusal from revolutionary rapid changes.
I do not agree with the pompous words that characterize the elections as a victory of the revolution. We can call whatever we like “a victory of a revolution”. But there is a considerable part of people who voted for Nidaa Tunès as for an instrument to return to the prerevolutionary stability. So, essentially, this part of Nidaa Tunès electorate sees in Nidaa Tunès a kind of collective analog of Egyptian As-Sisi. It is very hard to how many in these 37,5% those who share this aspirations and those with liberal aspirations. But it is quiet clear that if Ennahda has succeeded in structuring and consolidating its electorate, in the case of Nidaa Tunès the electorate is very heterogeneous. In general, Nidaa Tunès confront with difficulties connected with the internal friability of the party, with the multidirectional nature of different fractions within the party’s governing body – all this is still present, though. I would even say, that there is a possibility that Nidaa Tunès may not participate in the next elections despite its present victory.
The third important aspect, which should become a very alarming sign for all the smaller parties, is that CPR and Ettakatol have received the minimal number of votes. These parties were Ennahda’s allies in the power-sharing Troika. They took second and third places on the last elections. Their failure and their de facto collapse that had been happening during these three years show that no one should become a junior partner in a coalition during such difficult periods. The junior coalition partner is always to loose. This shows that it is dangerous to create the coalitions in the current Tunisian conditions. These parties have suffered from the loss of Ennahda, from the dismissal of two governments, etc. even more than the Islamists themselves.
The 3.64% percent got by the Popular Front is also typical. This is an extreme left party, communists. 3.64% they got belong to them. It is exactly those voters who share their ideology.
The situation is just the opposite in case of the Free Patriotic Union. I would say this party took place once held by al-Aridha in 2011. This place is of a populist party with a strong leader whose personality and whose media and financial resources are a major key to the success of the party. The UPL’s leader – Slim Riahi – is the owner of the super-popular Tunisian football team Club Africain.
Furthermore, the distribution of the votes in the regions is noteworthy either, showing that the Islamist ideas are popular in the poor, poorly modernized regions of the country (South), in the central regions the parity between the Islamists and secular forces is maintained between them and in the coastal zone and on the North the secular ideology of Nidaa Tunès is having a commanding lead.
It is also very important that, if Ennahda got 69 seats in parliament and others Nudaa Tunès got 85 seats, then the difference between them is only 16 deputy seats. It is not so much. This means that nobody will have a decisive set of voices in the parliament. And this means that the smaller parties have a chance to gain a particular importance.
Well, this will be a complex parliament.
But the main conclusion to make is that to a certain extent we can talk about the victory of democracy.
We do not speak about any other Arab country in terms of the complexity of parliament and the possibilities for coalitions. At long last there is an Arab country that, I hope, will be developing in conformity with democratic laws provided that everything goes well. And if all goes well, the next elections will be attended by 5 millions voters instead of three. That will greatly increase the legitimacy of power.
