Interviews

Interviews (24)

M.D.: Israel and Palestine are being tossed around: from escalations to more or less successful negotiations. What do you think will be the result of the latest negotiations breakdown and aggravation of situation between Israel and Palestine? 

Irina Zviagelskaya: You know, that the kidnapping of there Israeli teenagers caused this situation. As the security services failed to locate them, Israel resorted to the military actions and arrested dozens of Palestinians who were already released according to the previous agreements. Now there is an ongoing tightening of Israeli position. Israel has accused Hamas of the abduction. But many experts believe, it was not necessarily Hamas to kidnap them. There are many other organizations that act among Palestinians and practically uncontrolled, so they could do it deliberately in order to turn Israeli’s anger against Hamas. Moreover, many people in Israel are disturbed by the creation of Palestinian government of the national unity, though it is a technical one. There are many reasons that have caused the regular escalation of the situation and they are unlikely to be eliminated. In any case, I am very pessimistic concerning the peace talks. As we know, the promises of State Secretary Kerry that the Americans would swiftly achieve a breakthrough turned out to be unrealistic.  The issues to resolve in order to achieve peace are far too complicated.  Moreover, I believe that violent and bloody processes taking place in the region are completely unlikely to encourage compromise in Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

 

M.D.: How do you think the US overtures with Iran and its potential exit from isolation will influence on the situation in the Middle East and on Arab-Israeli conflict in particular?

I.Z. : As far as the US policy towards Iran is concerned it can hardly be called overtures.  The question is to make Iran renounce its nuclear program. And this corresponds to the interests of everybody; Russia is among the members of the negotiations. Another issue is whether Iran is interested itself to exit the isolation, dispose of all sanctions and reintegrate into the world politics and economy. Not surprisingly, Mr Rouhani, well known for his balanced view, has become President of Iran. Meantime, several experts have voiced their fears that Washington will get the increase of oil production and decrease of oil prices as a result of removal of sanctions and US-Iranian approach. I find this logic doubtful, and taking into consideration the situation in Iraq, oil prices decline is just impossible.

The exit of Iran from isolation can be very positive.  Iran could especially take active part in the settlement in Syria, were it plays a significant role, as we all know. The second moment is of course the situation in Iraq, where Iran has its own interests and where its role is very important.

The current situation in Iraq is very dangerous. There is a crisis of US policy of state transformation by military interventions. As soon as the Americans left in the end of 2011, everything collapsed. It has collapsed because they had created a confessional regime. Relying on Shia majority they have dismissed the army, where the majority was Sunni, they managed to close BAAS party, which was also mainly supported by Sunni. And thus they have not only created a huge resentful mass of Sunni, but also have set a course towards the creation of regime excluding different ethnic and confessional groups.

We now see the results of what has happened. The struggle against extremist Sunni groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and Levant is top priority now. If they manage to gain a number of military victories and shift the balance of power to their side, that will mean the most grave crisis in the Middle East.

 

M.D. I just wanted to ask about Iraq in particular. Now Washington officially states that the US has no responsibility of the crisis in Iraq. And actually it implies that it is not going to intervene in the crisis. How much should the situation heat to make the politicians take real actions, as Bagdad demands now?

I.Z. : Well, firstly, besides the official statements there are enough expert estimations that directly show, that the US has invested too much in Iraq in due time. We can say that the current administration is not to blame. Of course, it is not Obama’s administration that launched military actions in 2003. It was Bush’es Jr administration. And for sure it is not the administration to be responsible for the regime building in Iraq and the kind of help that was offered to Iraq. However 4,5 thousand US soldiers have died. The military operation and attempts to reform Iraq have cost great money. And everybody knows about it. What has happened in Iraq just indicates the impossibility to transform a society, which is not ready for it by the means of external intervention. This is a crisis of American strategy in the Middle East as well.

Will the US intervene? I had opportunity to read the declarations of the American President who said, “I do not exclude anything”. In general, everything depends on the future course of actions. If the extremists are allowed to win, it will create a great danger not only for Iraq, but for the whole Middle East. Violence and extremist ideas easily overcome the borders. I believe it is very dangerous for Russia, which has its own Islamic extremists, where we face terrorist, where there are examples of Russian soldiers of fortune who fight for the opposition Syria, quite possibly among the insurgents twisted in the same way. Crisis in Iraq should be taken with all the seriousness.

 

M.D.:  Is it possible that the US are just interested in strengthening of ISIS, as once powerful, it could give a final blow to Bashar Assad’s forces, after which the US can strike the Islamists?

I.Z. : It is impossible to predict who will these people strike. The paradox is that Bashar Assad, unacceptable for the US, is currently carrying tasks, which correspond to their interests. He fights the ISIS and other extremists.

Russia is actively returning to the Middle East now. A new, particular era of relations with Saudi Arabia has begun; we are developing the relations with the UAE. The relations with Egypt, with president Al Sisi, are promising. But I would not agree that Russia expels the US from there. Somewhere Russia and the USA keep competing. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian crisis has increased our rivalry including in the Middle East. But in the meantime we have very important field for cooperation there. It is the Syrian crisis settlement, struggle against terrorism and extremism; it is the desire not to let Iran possess nuclear weapons.

 

M.D.: Maybe my question was not completely correct. Is it possible to say, that the Middle East countries have a growing interest to the relations with Russia themselves?

I.Z.: Yes, it is true. Speaking about the social level, the Arabs are generally tired of the Americans. They were enthusiastic about the inclusion of Crimea and Sevastopol into Russia. Because, from their point of view, it has shown the US that not everybody is ready to play by its rules. Furthermore,  many countries in the region always wished to have Russia as a counterbalance in the Middle East.

 

Interviewed by Maria Dubovikova

Many countries condemn HAMAS as a terrorist organization. How will the accord between HAMAS and FATAH influence the attitude of international community towards Palestine? What are the potential outcomes of the union for the Palestinians themselves?

HAMAS is in fact is widely considered as a terrorist organization. Moreover, the Egyptian government has prohibited the HAMAS activity after the “Muslim Brotherhood”. However, the peace process between the Islamists and FATAH, which took many years without any result, is close to the conclusion. Let’s hope that it will not reverse. It is an important achievement for Palestinians to overcome severe territorial (Gaza – West Bank), ideological and political divides. A united government allows to carry more responsible international policy and to adopt decisions, which will not be canceled, as they will be backed by a consolidated position. The achieved unity strengthens the Palestinian positions in negotiations with Israel. One should not forget that it is an asymmetric conflict between a powerful regional state and a national movement, the Palestinian administration. The international community is not unanimous at the interpretation of the agreement between HAMAS and FATAH. There are already concerns that the Palestinian positions will get harder and that the HAMAS will impose the more radical line on the whole Palestinian government. It is evident that Mahmoud Abbas has made his first sharp statement-condemning Holocaust to chase away such concerns, to show that they are not justified.

The talks between Abbas and Israel ate to end today, 29 April. The decision about the truce with HAMAS and the union of the two parts of the country was taken just before this long awaited event. How is it possible to interpret such turn of events? Does it mean for example that the Palestinians were not willing to the truce with Israel?

As I have already said, firstly, this reflects the desire of Palestinians to strengthen their positions on the negotiations. They are the ones mostly interested in the fair reconcilement, but the movement towards peace becomes very difficult due to the approach to the discussion of principle and most painful questions of utmost importance for both parties – Jerusalem, territories and refugees. On the one hand, the current Israeli government does not have a great desire to make important compromises. On the other hand, it is more and more difficult to content with another set of interim measures – there is a growing criticism in the Palestinian society, mainly among the youth who do not see any prospects. In such context the agreement with HAMAS will alleviate pressure on the administration. The accord with HAMAS does not only reflect momentary issues, but it shows an evolution of Palestinian Islamists towards the political pragmatism. Having arrived at power in Gaza in 2006, they had to gradually acquire the management experience, take responsibility for the survival of the population in the conditions of blockade.  This normally has a sobering influence on those who has got used to rely mainly on the methods of force. The movement was conducting a social work among the population, but had to increase its scale in the new circumstances. HAMAS has not renounced the ideological principles crucial for it: it does not recognize Israel and the Oslo process agreements and it does not condemn terrorism. This allows Israel to refuse from the negotiations with HAMAS, but not the contacts with them. It is enough to recall the efforts that have led to release of the captured Corporal Gilad Shalid. HAMAS has made a certain path and its further evolution will be faster in the context of collaboration with Palestinian leaders skilled in politics. The creation of national unity government will mean an agreement with the principle “two peoples – two states”, which in fact means both recognition of Israel and readiness to negotiate with it.

How grave for Palestine is the Israeli announcement that it will cease transferring money (about 100 million USD) gathered as taxes on behalf of the West Bank government?

Such kind of sanctions will be painful for Palestinians, they will leave employees without salary; deteriorate the general situation on the West Bank, which does not have a big budget anyway. Unfortunately, it is not the first time when Israel resorts to such measures.

 

Inteviewed by A, Zavadskiy. 
Previously published on the MGIMO web-site in Russian.

How would you evaluate the past decade for the Middle East? (Traditional question for our first round of interviews)

This question demands a very broad answer, but briefly: living conditions and societal relations are deteriorating despite a number of political transformations in several Arab countries as a result of social protests, coups and revolutions. In my view, in addition to numerous internal factors, the geopolitical games of the “great powers,” often acting on the principle of divide and conquer, have continued to exert a strong influence. Under Obama’s administration, however, US foreign policy has undergone some changes: if previously, the Americans pursued a unilateral policy of protecting the interests of allies Israel and Saudi Arabia, then during the past few years an awareness seems to have appeared in Washington that this support has been too one-sided. US policy towards Iran has also clearly changed. In my opinion, the significance of the “Arab Spring” for Arab societies is very debatable. Despite the blood spilt and numerous victims, the expected benefits have largely failed to materialize. But again, it is impossible to answer this difficult question briefly and succinctly.

 

Ahmadinejad’s Iran and Rouhani’s Iran? Two different Irans? Or the same Iran, but with a new face?

Yes, this is a very good question. More likely a new Iran. The electoral campaign and the voting results in the 2013 presidential elections have changed the distribution of power in the internal political arena. After the 2009 campaign, reformers were practically considered rebels, forces aligned with foreign countries seeking to overthrow the regime and change the political system in the country. During the previous eight years, the conservative-radical line dominated domestic and foreign policy while the liberal-leaning end of the spectrum was kept from all three branches of power; but Rouhani’s electoral victory created divisions within the conservative camp, changing the playing field. We should remember that Rouhani campaigned as an independent, but shifted toward reformist policies after his win. It is impossible to liken the current president with the former. Ahmadinejad did Iran a disservice in terms of foreign policy. In both word and deed, he set the international community against Iran. But now the country is undergoing serious changes, even if the results in terms of domestic policy have not yet come to fruition. A new cabinet has been formed which, in contrast to the previous one, can be called a cabinet of national reconciliation. New governors have been appointed who will support the president’s line. Crucially, a civil rights code has been published. Rouhani campaigned with the slogan: “We must implement and guarantee civil rights and do this in all spheres: freedom of speech and the press… for men and for women, for ethnic minorities.” Seventy political prisoners have been granted amnesty. I just returned from Iran, and people there were talking about how the situation within the country has improved. Many people I spoke with said that the former sense of tension has given way to a more relaxed atmosphere, meaning freer. The constant pressure on the people has been eased, and one can feel more leeway in media and websites. This new atmosphere has entered the universities, where I gave a series of lectures. Rouhani’s speech at Teheran University in the beginning of the academic year ushered in a process of reestablishing student unions. “We must remove the security forces and pressure from the universities and relax the atmosphere there,” he said. There is an ongoing process of reinstatement of students and professors expelled after the events of 2009 and of those prematurely pensioned due to their political convictions. This year, dozens of majors, such as sociology and Western literature, formerly prohibited by the Islamization of the humanities, have been returned to the university curricula. Students now have more opportunity freely to express their opinions on different political issues, and they are seizing these opportunities. Great attention is being paid to culture. Within the Supreme Security Council, a special office has been established to manage cultural and economic programs on the reasoning that security involves not only military defense but protecting the country’s cultural values and, of course, its economy. There are certain changes occurring in the cultural sphere, above all, changes and limitations in the way the government interacts with culture. The new Minister of Culture is meeting with cultural figures, theater personalities, and musicians. Other special programs are in development: for example, just after Rouhani’s election he prepared a nine point national program in order to draft legislation to realize fully the potential of the Iranian Constitution, mainly articles 3, 12, 15, 19 and 22. The main goal is to promote a government by meritocracy (regardless of language and religion, e.g. government functionaries selected according to their talents and skills, instead of connections and family clans) and the appointment of competent local officers all over the country.

 

How does the exclusion of Iran from Geneva-2 negotiations affect the international initiative on the Syrian crisis?

The exclusion of Iran from Geneva-2 negotiations seriously reduces the effectiveness of these meetings. Why? Because both Iran and Saudi Arabia play a powerful role in the internal situation in Syria. These are two of the most active foreign participants in the civil war in Syria. Saudi Arabia not only sponsors different opposition groups in Syria but employs special units in direct combat there. On the other hand, Iran supports Bashar Assad’s regime economically, financially and militarily as well as preparing Lebanese “Hezbollah” combat units in Syria, which have become a crucial player in the civil war and provide great support for the government. It’s worth mentioning that Syria is the only country Iran has signed a treaty of mutual defense with in case of aggression. So it is virtually impossible to resolve the Syrian issue without Iran and Saudi Arabia. The proposal by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold negotiations between Russia, the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran would have very good prospects, though be rather difficult to implement. The Syrian parties – both Bashar Assad’s regime and the opposition – are unable to come to any substantial agreement. It is the external powers engaged in Syria, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, who must provide the foundation for any agreement. US representatives previously supported the Russian proposal as well, so maybe it has a future. A breakthrough would be difficult even with the presence of all the interested parties: Bashar Assad’s regime, the opposition, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the US and the UN; but without Iran, impossible. I fear the situation may be here to stay for the long term, because a certain balance of power has emerged in Syria. Neither can Assad crush opposition, nor can the opposition can overthrow Assad.

 

What is the future of Russo-Iranian relations? What is Iran for Russia? And Russia for Iran?

Major changes in relations with Russia are unlikely, and for the most part Iran continues to see our country as an ally. That is not to say that there are not reservations. The failure to deliver the S-300 defense system under Western pressure played into the hands of Iranian skeptics about Russia as a partner. With the West now discussing possible sanctions against Russia, some analysts have gone so far as to suggest that sanctions on Iran might be lifted to allow Europe to go without Russian natural resource exports. This of course, would test the Russian-Iranian relationship, but is a very extreme case scenario. More likely is that Rouhani’s tentative rapprochement with the West will not detrimentally affect Iranian relations with Russia. In many spheres, Russia and Iran have similar geopolitical interests, such as security in Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, which require the maintenance of good ties.

 

What are the chances, if any, that Iran can be recognized as a fully fledged member of the international community while at the same time maintaining its doggedly independent course?

Much depends on the international situation, political developments around Iran: events in Syria, for example, or the outcome of the presidential elections in the US (Who will take office after Obama and what policies will he or she promote?). It will also depend on the internal situation in Iran. Just before the elections to the previous Majlis of 2011, right-leaning radicals formed a coalition called “The Front of Fidelity to the Islamic Revolution,” or “Paydari,” with Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi as their spiritual leader. The radicals and their candidate Jalili lost the elections and accepted the results but have been asserting their will to regain power ever since. Now they have a rather powerful fraction in Majlis and are challenging Rouhani’s government on international and, to some extent, domestic policy. They will continue to oppose the current government on many things. Radicals are trying to join forces and creating pressure groups against the new administration, and their representatives still have offices in governmental structures, namely in several ministries. It is worth mentioning that the radicals are launching preparations for the new elections to the Majlis (though they will take place only in two-and-a-half years). But Iran has great chances now.

 

Is the Majlis supporting the new President?

Just after the elections, it seemed the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) would vigorously support Rouhani, and speaker Ali Larijani voiced as much. Despite the apparent readiness to cooperate, however, the Majlis then dragged its feet in confirming newly appointed ministers when the new administration was being formed. And three ministers had to win a Majlis vote of confidence twice, and the last confirmation, the Minister of Education and Sports, was not even appointed until several days before the end of the first 100 days of Rouhani’s administration (moreover, they confirmed only the third candidate). Clearly, the Majlis does not unconditionally support Rouhani’s government. Differences between the Majlis and the administration are manifesting themselves in debates over a new bill called in Persian: “Eslahe modiriyat dar bakhshe omumiye keshvar” (Bill on Changing the Mode of General Governance of the Country), one of whose articles is devoted to regulating cooperation between the Majlis and government. It should be pointed out, however, that one does not see major opposition to Rouhani personally in the Majlis. And though moderate conservatives control the Majlis, Iranian political analysts currently estimate Rouhani’s support there as 50/50.

 

How do you see future negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program developing?

Let’s hope positively. Iran is tired of sanctions. It is ready for the concessions needed to drop the sanctions, from which ordinary people are suffering most. Unfortunately, there are interests and politicians who want to keep Iran in the “axis of evil.” If the ongoing negotiations in Vienna that began in Geneva fail, Iran will face more severe sanctions. Any broad-based agreement between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany would be a solid success, as both Iran and the US have many internal opponents to fruitful negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Still, there is a more palpable willingness to resolve this issue now. Iran has made several concessions on the nuclear program: the joint action plan of November 24 (in effect from January 20 until June 20) is a serious breakthrough. They are trying to hammer out a final agreement, but it goes without saying that much difficult negotiating remains to be done.

 

Available in Russian in one click:

The first question is a traditional one for these series: How would you characterize the past decade for the Middle East?

In the past decade, the Middle East has clearly gone through many phases that have shaped the current geopolitical and sociopolitical situation in the Middle East. The most important and significant factor that brought change was of course the Arab Spring. As a result, the whole prism through which the Middle East was viewed has been altered. No longer do the "conventional" political structures remain confident, since the public's voice has gained massive influence. With that change, also comes different state-to-state relations in the region, and how strategies have been formulated. In short, while the Middle East a decade ago was a more rigid framework of politics, today's wave of change has on one hand given it more instability but on the other hand enough space to bring forth sociopolitical progress and security for the entire region.

 

What are the prospects of Arab-Israeli conflict in the current circumstances?

How has the Arab Spring influenced the conflict? It might have been the case that Israel felt isolated from the rest of the region for the obvious reasons, but with the eruption of the Arab Spring, Israel has felt itself closer to the region than it perhaps wants to. First off, the negative consequences of the Arab Spring have been felt in Israel, especially with the civil war in Syria and the political unrest of Egypt.Yet regardless of the situation, the Arab world was able to hold two Arab summits (in one of which the new Libyan government gave their support to the API). Moreover, the API Follow Up Committee headed by Kuwait has met with Kerry at least 5 times. And in this new framework of state interactions, Israel and the world has become aware that the Arab-Israeli conflict needs a solution that is complimented by a regional envelope. This is why we see the current Kerry Initiative having a layer of "regionality" with the Arab League playing a supportive role to the negotiations.

What is a role of civil society in the conflict regulation? Does its role and influence rise or decline?

There is a wide perception that civil society's role ends when there is an agreement. However that is quite incorrect, since civil society must not only work for an agreement but also double its efforts after an agreement is signed, since then it will be the real test to maintain and expand the promise of mutual understanding and cooperation between societies/communities/ and polities. For now, as the negotiations go on, the civil socities on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides have been working hard to spread and sow the seeds of positive peace among the peoples of both societies. This also includes frequent meetings with decision-makers to exchange ideas of how to proceed with peace talks.

What are the three key trends from your point of view that will dominate the international relations in the Middle East this 2014 year?

A. It is safe to say that the international community has understood that the "seperate" problems of any Middle East country must not been seen in an individual manner but in a collective regional approach. And so, the international community will further adopt this regional approach when it interacts with the Middle East.

B. The Israeli-Palestinian will still have a significant attention of the world, as recent remarks by the EU and Secretary John Kerry have indicated the negative ramifications a failure of talks will have not only to Palestine's struggle for nationhood but also to Israel's relations with the world. To contain any failure and its implications will be considered heavily by the international community.

C. The war in Syria and the instability in Egypt will not go missed by the international community's interaction with the Middle East. In order to have a stable region that can be approached comprehensively, the international community will certainly make attempts to limit the negative consequences of Syria and Egypt not to spillover into the rest of the region.

Friday, 24 January 2014 17:39

INTERVIEW WITH MARC HECKER [in Fr]

Written by

Comment qualifieriez-vous la décennie écoulée au Moyen-Orient ? Quelles erreurs ont été commises ? Quelles leçons peut-on tirer de ces erreurs ?

Les années 2003 – 2013 ont été une décennie de bouleversements au Moyen-Orient. Lorsqu’on pense à la première date, une image vient immédiatement à l’esprit : celle de la statue de Saddam Hussein, renversée par un blindé américain à Bagdad. Dix ans plus tard, les Américains ont quitté l’Irak mais ce pays est loin d’être stabilisé. Au contraire, les tensions entre chiites et sunnites sont très fortes et les attentats se multiplient. Une première leçon, pour les occidentaux, est que la puissance militaire ne permet pas de résoudre tous les problèmes : l’armée américaine a facilement gagné la première phase de la guerre face à l’armée irakienne mais s’est ensuite empêtrée dans une guerre asymétrique.

En 2013, c’est un pays voisin de l’Irak, la Syrie qui a fait la « une » de l’actualité. La révolution qui s’y est déclenchée en 2011 s’est transformée en guerre civile dans laquelle des puissances régionales comme l’Iran, la Turquie, l’Arabie saoudite et le Qatar cherchent à placer leurs pions. A la suite de l’attaque chimique du 21 août 2013, une action militaire occidentale a failli avoir lieu mais celle-ci n’a finalement pas été déclenchée. Les occidentaux hésitent : s’ils condamnent clairement le régime de Bashar el-Assad, ils se rendent bien compte qu’au fil des mois, les jihadistes étrangers sont venus gonfler les rangs de l’opposition syrienne. Une deuxième leçon est que si l’on souhaite intervenir dans une crise, il vaut mieux le faire relativement tôt, ou alors beaucoup plus tard, quand les belligérants se sont épuisés.

La révolution syrienne n’a pas plus été anticipée par les experts occidentaux que les soulèvements en Tunisie, en Egypte, en Libye, à Bahreïn ou au Yémen. Cet enchaînement révolutionnaire – qui a été qualifié un peu rapidement de « printemps arabe » – laisse aujourd’hui un goût amer : aucun des pays concernés n’a connu de transition démocratique sans accrocs et certains ont sombré dans une situation chaotique. Des experts réputés avaient parlé de « révolution post-islamiste » en 2011. En réalité, on a assisté à une poussée spectaculaire de l’islamisme dont les différentes composantes sont loin de former un mouvement unifié. La troisième leçon est que la prévision n’est pas une science exacte et que même les meilleurs spécialistes peuvent se tromper.

A l’heure actuelle, on constate un recul de l’influence occidentale au Moyen-Orient. Les Etats-Unis ont clairement annoncé leur intention de se réorienter vers l’Asie. Quant à l’Europe, usée par la crise économique, elle a partiellement perdu sa capacité  de projection et attire moins que par le passé. La Turquie semble par exemple s’être considérablement éloignée de l’Union européenne. Les puissances régionales ont profité de ce recul occidental pour placer leurs pions. Un « grand jeu » se joue ainsi entre l’Arabie saoudite – défenseur d’une vision rigoriste du sunnisme –, le Qatar – supporter des Frères musulmans – et l’Iran, chantre du chiisme.

 

Les soulèvements arabes : qui sont les vainqueurs et qui sont les perdants ?

Si cette question avait été posée à la fin 2012, la réponse aurait été : les islamistes ont été les grands vainqueurs des soulèvements de 2011. Il faut dire que les révolutions avaient non seulement permis aux islamistes de bénéficier d’une liberté dont ils ne jouissaient pas auparavant mais, de surcroît, de prendre le pouvoir. Les résultats aux premières élections législatives de l’ère post-Moubarak  étaient à cet égard saisissants : les Frères musulmans ont obtenu près de la moitié des sièges et les salafistes, arrivés en deuxième position, en ont raflé plus de 20%. Toutefois, des changements importants sont intervenus depuis lors : en Egypte, Mohammed Morsi a été renversé et le général al-Sissi a pris le pouvoir. Cette situation a provoqué d’importantes manifestations et la répression des autorités : plusieurs centaines de militants islamistes ont été tués tandis que leurs dirigeants ont été emprisonnés. En Tunisie, au terme d’une longue crise politique, le Premier ministre Ali Larayedh, issu des rangs d’Ennahda, a quitté le pouvoir au début de l’année 2014. Les libéraux qui avaient manifesté en nombre en 2011 et qui se sont sentis dépossédés de « leur » révolution demeurent toutefois très circonspects quant à l’avenir de la Tunisie.

 

Quels sont les problèmes de sécurité du Moyen-Orient après le printemps arabe ? Y a-t-il de nouvelles menaces susceptibles d’affecter la sécurité mondiale ? Ou les problèmes sont-ils demeurés les mêmes ?

 Avant le printemps arabe, le Moyen-Orient était déjà une zone instable, source de tensions internationales. Il suffit, pour s’en convaincre, de penser à la guerre en Irak, au conflit israélo-palestinien ou encore au dossier du nucléaire iranien. Rappelons aussi que la plupart des pirates de l’air du 11 septembre 2001 étaient saoudiens.

L’évolution de la situation post-révolutions de 2011 a compliqué l’équation. La guerre en Libye a eu, entre autres conséquences, de déstabiliser le Sahel, où la France a dû intervenir militairement pour endiguer le développement d’AQMI. Aujourd’hui, le sud-ouest et le nord-est de la Libye apparaissent comme des centres importants du jihadisme. La Syrie en est un autre et cela concerne directement les occidentaux puisque des centaines de jeunes Européens se rendent sur place pour combattre. Al Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique (AQPA) demeure également une menace.

L’onde de choc des révolutions arabes n’en a pas fini de secouer la région : certains pays, comme le Liban et dans une moindre mesure la Jordanie, sont affectés par les conséquences de la guerre civile en Syrie.

 

Quelles mesures les pays européens pourraient-ils prendre pour prévenir la montée de l’extrémisme et de l’instabilité au Moyen-Orient ?

 L’Europe traverse une double crise : économique et politique. Ces deux aspects limitent la possibilité d’une action militaire européenne. La crise économique se traduit sur le plan militaire par une baisse des budgets de défense de plusieurs grands Etats européens. Certains pays sacrifient des pans entiers de leur armée sur l’autel de l’austérité. La crise politique a trait aux divergences profondes qui s’expriment régulièrement entre les différents Etats de l’Union européenne et qui empêchent une action militaire commune. En 2003, les Européens n’étaient pas unis au moment de la guerre en Irak. Ils ne l’étaient pas non plus en 2011 au moment d’attaquer les troupes du colonel Kadhafi. L’absence de consensus n’interdit pas l’action : les Etats ont toujours la possibilité d’agir seuls ou sous la forme d’une coalition ad hoc. Dans le cas de la Syrie, on a vu en 2013 que la France n’envisageait une opération militaire qu’en soutien aux Etats-Unis. Quand Washington a reculé, Paris a fait de même.

Outre l’option militaire, d’autres moyens d’action existent. La diplomatie est active. Des programmes d’aide (aide technique, aide au développement, soutien à la société civile, etc.) et d’échange sont mis en œuvre dans différents Etats de la région. Des initiatives sont prises pour relancer les relations commerciales. Des projets d’échanges culturels sont  développés. Toutes ces actions visent non seulement à établir des ponts entre les rives de la Méditerranée mais aussi à faire converger le monde arabe vers le modèle de la démocratie libérale. Toutefois, là encore, les moyens européens sont limités. La solution aux problèmes du Moyen-Orient ne se trouve pas à Bruxelles.

 

Comment peut-évoluer le conflit israélo-palestinien ?

Au cours de la décennie écoulée, Israël a mené pas moins de 4 guerres ou opérations militaires importantes : la deuxième Intifada, la guerre au Liban en 2006 (qui comprenait aussi un front à Gaza), l’opération « Plomb durci » en 2008-2009 et l’opération « Pilier de défense » en 2012. A la fin de l’année 2012, les perspectives paraissaient très sombres : le gouvernement israélien était inflexible sur la question de la colonisation et le Hamas, soutenu par les Frères musulmans égyptiens, était fort malgré sa rupture avec la Syrie de Bachar el Assad. La possibilité de l’éruption d’une troisième Intifada faisait alors débat parmi les experts.

Depuis lors, l’horizon s’est quelque peu éclairci. Du côté israélien, des élections ont eu lieu. Un nouveau gouvernement, penchant davantage vers le centre droit, a été constitué. Du côté palestinien, le Hamas a pâti du renversement du président Morsi. Mahmoud Abbas jouit d’une plus grande marge de manœuvre même s’il reste relativement faible. C’est dans ce climat que les négociations de paix ont repris. John Kerry multiplie les voyages au Proche-Orient pour tenter de faire bouger les lignes. La question est de savoir si la solution à deux Etats est encore viable. Les plus optimistes estiment qu’elle reste d’actualité et qu’elle peut être obtenue en procédant à un échange minime de territoires. Ceci étant, même dans l’hypothèse la plus optimiste, plusieurs dizaines de milliers de colons devraient être déplacés vers l’ouest de la future frontière. En somme, la route vers la paix est semée d’embuches et la probabilité d’un échec des négociations est grande.

 

 

Maria Dubovikova: I would like to start our conversation with the question we ask all the IMESClub experts: How would you characterize this decade for the Middle East?

Irina Zviagelskaya: Decade? If you tell me at what time the countdown begins?.. 

M.D. From 2003!

I.Z.: From 2003... Basically, it depends on what we are talking about. There is a number of problems, which, unfortunately, have remained unsolved, and have turned into a kind of Middle Eastern routine. I mean, first of all, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unfortunately this conflict has not undergone any major positive changes. And we still say that it is necessary for the Palestinians to make a deal with Israel, for Israel  - to be more attentive to the Arab Peace Initiative, and for the members of the "Quartet" - to be more active in this direction. But what happens... From time to time, as we know, the Israelis and the Palestinians gather and talk, and even now there are ongoing negotiations. But, unfortunately, the result is very negative, just as expected. And I fear that the conflict will continue for some time. 

As far as the overall situation in the Middle East is concerned, I believe that the changes are rather serious. First of all, they are connected with the change of regimes. These regimes were leaving for different reasons and on different occasions. In  2003, the U.S. and the allied forces invaded Iraq and the dictator Saddam Hussein was overthrown, which, unfortunately, has not led to a complete stabilization of the situation in Iraq, but to the radical  change of  interconfessional ratio in the political system. And I must say that general Saddam Hussein’s leave has marked the beginning of the leave of other leaders who had spent a long time at their places, and to whom we have accustomed. If Saddam Hussein’s leave was due to the external factor, other leaders, as we know, began leaving under the influence of the internal factors. Although I do not rule out the external pressure, which also took place. The update of the political face of the Arab world is quite a significant result of this decade.

 

M.D.: The Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar are beginning to play one of the key roles in the Middle East now. Due to huge financial resources they have potential influence and ability to push certain initiatives that will be in their geopolitical interests. From your point of view, is their influence on the development of the Middle East positive or negative?

I.Z.: Well, I would not put the question this way, as, if you say that they have a certain influence, pursuing their own interests, then it means that there may be some tactical changes in their position, because the interests are also changing, as well as the idea of what is required in the very moment, and what will be required in the future. But I would like to focus on another issue. First of all, this concerns Qatar. Saudi Arabia has been playing a rather important role in the region for a long time. But Qatar would like to be perceived as a new powerful player, especially in the context of the Arab awakening. A country that has vast financial resources, was able to increase its influence not only using traditional methods, such as arms shipments, aid to the forces solving the problems important for Qatar, and the direct military actions, as it was in Libya, but also by the means of a huge media resource. It is an amazing thing. Because a small Qatar has managed to create such media resource, that puts it in line with the most advanced nations of the world. And I believe that this is an achievement. And I want to focus attention on this. The leverage is changing. And that is very important. Even a small country that we all considered quite a traditional state from a purely formal point of view, basing on its political system, is able to use such instruments. This very traditional state easily manipulates and uses modern methods to influence the minds.

 

M.D.: Let's go a bit back to the beginning of our interview. You have already mentioned the Arab-Israeli conflict. How has the current situation in the region influenced it? How much have the Arab Spring, the Syrian problem affected the opportunity to resolve the conflict?

I.Z.: There is an opinion, and it is essentially possible to agree with, that as a result of all those violent processes taking place in the Middle East and the Arab world, the Arab-Israeli and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, has faded into the insignificance. It is not insistent anymore. The world community has focused its attention entirely on other countries and processes. But while acknowledging the validity of this conclusion, I still believe that we cannot say that what is happening in the Arab world has just finally put an end to the possibility of a settlement. It was always something not too certain, and it did not change. I would not dramatize the situation too much in this case. It is bad in itself. But you can look at it in a different way. On the one hand, of course, in the current circumstances Israel is not particularly interested in returning the territories, in taking some steps, quite painful for the country, that are, moreover, difficult to explain to a large part of the Israeli population. But on the other hand, in the face of large-scale uncertainty that rules over the whole region, any kind of certainty in its relations with Palestine would be to its advantage. So I'm not sure that everything is lost. But I am not optimistic. I think that a lot of effort will be required to solve this problem.

 

M.D.: And how does the changes in the US policy, in the US attitude to the conflict, to Israel and current establishing of bridges with Iran, with the new president Rouhani, influence the process of conflict resolution?

I.Z.: The U.S. attempts to enter into a real dialogue with Rouhani respond primarily to American interests. And I'm not sure if it leads to deterioration in US-Israeli relations. Of course, Israel can perceive it rather negatively. But it seems to me that, however, this will not have any effect on Israel. It all depends on what will be the outcome of these negotiations. At the same time, there is a slight possibility that Iran will completely renounce its nuclear program. I do not believe in it, there are too many objects that will obviously continue to work. So, since there is uncertainty, the desire of Israel to consider Iran as an existential threat will remain. Even if the United States conduct negotiations with Iran, this threat will persist, because Israel is looking at Iran from its own point of view. There is a red line for Israel about which it is constantly talking. Actually this red line was first mentioned in the General Assembly by Netanyahu. Israel will consider the possibility of its own unilateral action. Clearly this shows the desire to chill the US willingness to establish a dialogue with Iran. We'll see what happens. In general, while there are changes, some things in the Middle East remain constant. I am not sure whether it is fortunate or not. And in particular, I am not sure that the arrival of a new president can radically change Iranian policy in the region and make it give up the nuclear program.

 

M.D. From your point of view, will the Syrian civil war play a positive or a negative role in the relations between Russia and the United States, particularly in regard to all the Middle East problems?

I.Z.: I have always been thinking that, unfortunately, Syria has recently become a rather sharp issue dividing Russia and the United States due to a number of circumstances. And this is a dangerous trend. In the end, it's clear that our relations with the U.S. are very important as any relations between two great powers, influencing the development of world. It causes real anxiety when such a question as Syrian, which, despite its significance is still not ranked first in the United States and Russia priorities, becomes a bone of contention, and contributes to the deterioration of relations not only in the Middle East, but also beyond its boundaries. I consider positive what happened as a result of the initiative to destroy the Syrian chemical weapons. And not only because our diplomacy has shown its professionalism in this case. I think that the main positive part is just the fact that it was a compromise situation. That both the U.S. and Russia were able to find common ground on this issue, were able to feel how important this question is for the future joint steps for a political settlement of the situation. In this case, it's clear that the destruction of chemical weapons does not affect the civil war and the opposition parties per se. But this reveals a very important point. The fact is that in current situation Assad becomes a partner in certain activities and negotiations. In these circumstances it is not possible to ignore him. Anyway, his willingness to destroy weapons and to participate in this process enhances his legitimacy. Therefore, in my opinion, all the useless suggestions that “he should go away first, and then we'll talk”, become irrelevant. There are various ways to treat Al Assad. But the fact remains certain. The agreement on the national reconciliation will be impossible without his participation. He may not personally take part in negotiations, but it will still involve people that are part of his entourage, who are from his government. In my opinion this is the starting point. The opposition requirements are unrealistic. But this just affirms that the US and Russia should act together. Although I believe their ability to influence the rivals is still limited, however, given the United States and its allies, and given the position of Russia, we can hope that eventually, maybe not now, we will still be able to induce the parties to sit down at the negotiating table.

 

M.D. Do you think Geneva-2 will eventually take place? Chances that it won’t take place are still rather strong. And if it never takes place, what are the consequences of such a failure for states, both regional and extra-regional, in particular, such as the U.S., Russia, say, France?

I.Z.: Well, I can say that, of course, there is very little hope that it will be held in the near future. And this is connected, first of all, as we all know, with a very fragmented opposition. Various organizations within the opposition hold different opinions, always the hard ones. The director of our institute Vitaly Naumkin even said that it is better not to try to create a single delegation of the opposition, but to let them form three or four delegations, and make each put its own signature. This option is also theoretically possible. It is extremely difficult to imagine how they can be gathered under one roof, though some attempts have already been made. Lets suppose, that despite all the efforts the Geneva-2 will not take place. I think it will bode ill. Firstly, it will show an absolute weakness of the international community. Its inability to solve such problem as a termination of a bloody conflict, civil war in a relatively small Middle Eastern country. Secondly, I believe, it will show a very low level of interaction between the global and regional international actors, which is also a very negative factor. And basically, I think, if no political decisions are taken, no one knows for how long people will continue to suffer and die in Syria. We must do everything to stop this process.

Tuesday, 05 November 2013 21:15

INTERVIEW WITH SEMA KALAYCIOGLU

Written by

AROUND THE MIDDLE EAST

WITH

SEMA KALAYCIOGLU  

 

Having her BA in Economics at Istanbul University (1973); MA in Economics at University of Iowa (1977); PhD in Economics at Istanbul University (1982), Sema Kalaycioglu became an assistant professor in 1982, an associate professor in 1986 and a full professor in 1992. She worked at Yildiz Technical University (1982-2003), Isik University (2003-2008) and Dogus University (2008-2010), where she served as the chairperson, the graduate dean and the dean. For the last 2 years she has been actively involved in the academic councils, activities and seminars of Turkish Asia Strategic Research Center (TASAM) and the Marmara Group Foundation. 

IMESClub: How would you characterize the past decade for the Middle East? 

Pr. Sema Kalaycioglu: I would definitely call the past decade of the Middle East as another lost decade for countries of the region with the exception of the Gulf and perhaps for Algeria and Morocco to certain extend. Human resources, wealth, opportunities and hopes have been wasted over promises of reforms, corrupt practices, futile political squabbles, civil strives, tensions, border disputes conflicts, foreign occupations or interventions, tribal and sectarian warfare. The pportunity cost of not investing resources in the physical infrastructure, education, health, housing and industrial (and all other sectors of production) upgrading has been too high to compensate the potentials the well- being of future decades.

 The first decade of the 21st century actually witnessed the slow process of the demise of national identities in many countries of the region from Iraq to Libya only to be replaced by sectarian(religious), ethnic or tribal identities. With the lid of national identity lifted the perils of all divisive elements broke loose or in the process of breaking loose. That is the situation we have been witnessing in Iraq; what is likely to grow deeper in Syria and definitely what further threatens Egypt because of the increasing polarization between the secular and the mild and ultra-religious segments of the Egyptian society, as well as between different religious groups.    


IMESClub: Which mistakes were committed by intra-regional and outer-regional players? 


Pr. Sema Kalaycioglu: Intra-regionally different kinds of mistakes can be classified as follows:

i. The classical political rivalry between countries play an important and destabilizing role in the Middle East turmoil. Each country or groups within intra-regional countries take advantage of  civil strives in other countries by taking sectarian sides, hosting opposition groups to the point of assisting them in choosing their leaders or governments in exile, sending arms or actually volunteer fighters (militia) to support who they consider close to their ideological preferences(eg. Iraqi and Iranian Shiites fighting along the Syrian National Army against the Syrian opposition, while Sunni groups of all spectrum from the Al Qaida to the Chechen volunteers fighting alongside with the Free Syrian Army). Porous borders, when no proper control exists or in the absence of control allow and/or facilitates these actions, which mass up the political situation further.

ii. Some intra-regional (as well as extra-regional) countries with high ambitions of regional power practice over other regional countries ideologically support, finance or host divisive movements in targeted countries with or without declared agenda.

iii. Inability, inaction or lack of interest of intra-regional institutions (The Arab League) in confidence building, peace- making and conflict resolution also make the situation difficult to find alternative solutions to existing or potential problems at regional levels, which opens door to foreign intervention especially in countries where foreign interest is intensified for one reason or another (energy concerns, oil or natural gas interests)

iv. Refugees going beyond borders to adjacent countries to problem spots constitute major sources of problems even though they are the consequence of the civil wars per se. Although it is mandatory to accept refugees at times of urgent request, allowing factions, armed groups and politically moved parties under the groups of refugees with no proper control nourishes the ongoing problems and deepen them further.

v. Allowing the Palestinian-Israeli problem continue for so long with refugee problems of its own kind attached to it has been a major obstacle against the Middle East peace process for a long time.

vi. Iran and Israel have also been sources of divisive problems for idiosyncratic reasons of their own. Iran as an exporter of radical ideologies also constitutes an actual and a potential threat not only against Israel but also to its immediate neighbors surrounding the Arab(Persian) Gulf, which make these countries either seek extra-regional supporters, or try to play some sort of a destabilizing regional power game to counter Iran’s alleged regional ambitions or actually to weaken the parties, which seem to support Iran to guarantee its reciprocity by means of Hezbollah(in Lebanon and Syria) or Hamas in Palestine. 


IMESClub: The Arab uprisings: Who are the losers and the winners in the East and in the West?

Pr. Sema Kalaycioglu: The process which is called as the Arab Spring has not ended yet. The countries, which were hoped to make a transition to democracy has not given any sign of such transition from taking place and they are not going to do so for a long time as it seems. Therefore, it is merely impossible to talk about any winners in the MENA, in terms of regained political stability (with the exception of Tunisia), increasing prospects for economic growth and job creation, alleviated poverty, increasing life standards, guaranteed human rights in general and rights for women in particular and establishment of law and order. If political stability returns with democratization in the process; if economic growth picks up to ensure secure jobs, if productivity over takes inertia then gains can be talked about.

Intra-regional actors Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are among the countries, which did not particularly gain from the Arab uprisings. On the contrary, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar lost a lot of prestige on the way, Turkey risked its role as an honest broker in the Middle East Peace process, while losing its impartiality at the same time and overtook the burden of providing housing, lodging, food, security, education and health services to almost half a million Syrian refugees around its Southern border and deep into its cities. Nevertheless, Turkey’s not getting involved in a military action against Syria, in other words moving and deploying troops in Syria can be considered as an important gain from a potential  loss and an important economic and social cost. The only potential gain Turkey can talk about is with the intensifying civil uprisings surrounding its Southern border, it decisively concentrated to cure its domestic Kurdish problem.

Internationally the USA, which has lost an important leverage over the region because of the Iraqi mission of 2003, can hardly claim any gains in the Middle East at least in the short and the medium run. But it continues to ensure the well-being of the Israeli state and continues to orchestrate possible peace process.

The soft power EU could not remedy any regional ill so far. For that matter, aside from Germany, which from the very on start distanced itself from all Middle East squabbles, France still tries to recover from its Libya mission in the MENA, which did not particularly contribute to the political gains of Mr. Sarkozy, who lost the elections of 2012 to Mr. Holland. The only positive side of the non-involvement of the EU in the MENA problems is that it did not choose to act aggressively in the search of a remedy for its economic ills, especially when it came to Syria.   

Many more years we will be talking about the problems of the Middle East. For we if we talk about any gains of the dire circumstances in the region we can only make reference to the prestige gain of the Russian Federation because of its staunch persistence on the non-military, but political solution thesis for Syria over all countries and the UN.  Russia might have transformed its prestige gains into material gains if it were able to keep its natural gas prices at desired levels because of unrealized Gulf pipeline project and if its arms sales have increased to the Middle East after the Arab Spring in general, and after the Syria civil war in particular.

The same argument might be true to a certain extend for China, and Iran. The latter will prove to have a real gain if sanctions are alleviated because of the initiation of the new Iran and the P5+1 talks over the country’s nuclear enrichment project. I sincerely believe that the mild political change through democratic elections in Iran from the previous administration to the era of the newly elected Rouhani is also due to the electorate sensitivity with respect to the Arab Spring and what Rouhani administration offers as reforms is also due to the very same cause. 

 

IMESClub: What are the Turkey's regional aspirations in the MENA? 

Sema Kalaycioglu: Through economic, diplomatic, cultural, demographic presence and somewhat military involvements Turkey had been trying to exert decisive influence on the region at large with a special emphasis on religious ideology in the form of constructing an area of Muslim solidarity before the Arab Spring. 

There is certainly an element of strong religiosity in the Turkey’s political mission to the MENA.  With a more religious outlook and the discourse of the AKP governments, Turkey on the surface has been discovering a more hospitable environment in the MENA and even in the Sub-Saharan Africa.  As an attempt of mild form of political cooperation, Turkey has been discreetly following a new political approach, which is often interpreted as “neo Ottomanism”.6 

Since after the 2008 elections Turkey has seemed to adopt a newly defined policy approach of “zero problems with neighbours”. Although it contained elements of make-belief in a region with multiple problems this new definition did not conflict the traditional foreign diplomacy line of Turkey, which based upon the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world”. 

Proud of its success of overcoming a major financial crisis in 2001, achieving high economic and industrial growth in successive years and finding itself among the “enlarged group” of top 20 economies as the 16th top one encouraged Turkey develop new aspirations regarding the geography, which it once had imperial relations until the end of the first World War. If among top global powers, why not practice regional power? If this cannot be done in the EU why not concentrates on the Arab MENA? Turkey not only became economically very active wanted to be at least equally active in regional politics. 

To play this new and mostly self-propelled role of regional power7 Turkey had first started to identify itself with the region more so then ever before. It continued to exert influence by associating itself with the existing religious ideological streams; tried to raise its voice to set the political, security and even the military agenda of the region, and showed willingness to integrate itself with the MENA more by trade, business, investment and foreign aid. Frequent high level state visits, mutual exchange of friendship and brotherhood messages helped secure the new trend in relations. 

 Indeed every single treaty for more liberalised relations with its immediate MENA neighbours beyond the relations of the EU prescribed ones8 at the beginning had been taken as an initiative to reestablish the once integrated system of trade and commerce in the area primarily until Turkey started to react to existing problems of the MENA with political and ideological interest of power practice. Turkey first volunteered for mediation on one of the most complicated issues of the MENA namely the Middle East Peace Process. 

Initiating and pursuing shuttle diplomacies to help conflict resolution between Israel-Palestine (and Syria) had limits from the very beginning. It primarily lacked one essential doze of reality: The recognition of the fact that those conflicts had existed long before Turkey launched the policy shift and many peace initiatives and road maps had been sacrificed or lost on the way long before Turkey decided to design the policy of “zero problems with neighbors”. 

The tragic consequences for the flotilla incident of 2010 did not effectively relax the continental blockade Israel applied against Gaza. Turkey rightfully reacted to the violation of human rights. But the dose of reaction was exaggerated and its proactive approach was not appropriate. For the sake of power practice over intensified relations with its Arab neighbours, Turkey showed too much and too obvious preference for ideological solidarity. 

Turkey failed to be an honest broker, when it lost impartiality, neutrality and tranquility with the notion of being the protector and the voice of the oppressed by siding especially overtly with Hamas. At the end Turkey’s ambition to increase its role as a regional actor on the Middle East Peace Process ceased to be functional at the expense of freezing its relations with Israel. Israel has been aliened to the point of establishing new coalitions in the East Mediterranean on natural gas exploration missions with Cyprus and making joint military manoeuvres with Greece.  Turkey’s effort of reacting or being proactive proved to be unrealistic, when it came to Israel-Palestine conflict.

When it came to Syria, at the beginning being “unaware” of all previous regime conducts in Syria Turkey intensified its relations with it to promote friendly and brotherly contact with Assad and his government9. There too while showing overt preference for the Syrian opposition later it oversaw the role of external actors like China and Russia and a regional actor Iran without analyzing the consequences. 

Almost for every regional conflict in the MENA there had already been other extra-regional and regional actors identifying the same problems before Turkey took its part in the scene.  Turkey at the beginning underestimated the role other regional actors like Egypt and Iran always aspired to play. 

There have also been new actors from the region like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with which Turkey formed a tacit coalition on ideological grounds.   Turkey also acted the same manner towards Iraq, and helped Northern Iraq prosper beyond its relation with the Iraqi central authority to the point of antagonising the Iraqi central authority.      

For more on the issue we highly recommend to read the article by Professor Kalaycioglu: "Changes the Arab Uprisings Promise for the MENA and Turkey". 

Click on it: (available in PDF):

 

IMESClub: Comment pourriez-vous caractériser la décennie passée pour le Moyen Orient?

Mansouria Mokhefi: La décennie de l’impasse du soi-disant processus de paix.

La décennie de la croissance lente mais déterminée de colère et de désespoir parmi la jeunesse arabe.

Une décennie où les femmes ont connu une émancipation et une augmentation de leur rôle considérables à la suite de la croissance de l'éducation des femmes.

La décennie de polarisation entre les islamistes et non-islamistes, les extrémistes et les modérés..

La décennie qui vient de s’écouler a vu l’idée de démocratie faire son chemin même si elle n’a pas réussi à trouver sa voie. La démocratisation de l’enseignement, l’accès aux nouvelles technologies, la chute de la natalité et le recul de l’âge du mariage ont favorisé l’émancipation des femmes et leur accès à des professions qui se sont d’ailleurs largement féminisées.

Sur le plan politique, la désaffection à l’égard des chefs d’Etat accrochés au pouvoir, l’ampleur de la corruption et l’installation du népotisme ont accentué la manque de confiance des populations à l’égard de leurs  dirigeants et institutions créant ce qui fut considéré comme un véritable divorce entre le peuple et le Pouvoir.

L’absence de perspectives, la médiocrité de la formation ainsi que le chômage  ont  acculé la plus grande partie de la population de ces pays, notamment la jeunesse, à un désespoir qui a pris différentes formes. Il s`agit de laradicalisation et de l`extrémisme, de la survie dans l’illégalité (l’économie informelle a connu un énorme développement ces dernières années) et de l`émigration, quel qu’en soit le moyen.

La décennie qui vient de s’écouler a confirmé l’échec politique et économique des pays du Moyen Orient, un échec qui ne pouvait déboucher que sur l’explosion.

 

IMESCLub: Quelles fautes ont été commises par acteurs intérieurs, ainsi que par les acteurs extérieursq au niveau régional?

Mansouria Mokhefi: Le déficit démocratique, la recherche de la croissance sans le développement, aussi bien que la montée des radicalismes religieux sont les produits de la mauvaise gouvernance qui a trop longtemps régné dans ces pays. Les alignements sur les politiques occidentales (économie, énergies, immigrations, luttes contre le terrorisme) n’ont pas eu raison du profond anti américanisme  qui parcourt ces sociétés et qui s’est considérablement étendu ces dernières années, suite aux guerres menées par les Etats-Unis dans la région. La recherche de la paix avec Israël ou du maintien du statu quo n’ont pas été accompagnés par la lutte contre des sentiments et contre des discours antisémites. Pourtant, il s`agit des sentiments et des discours antisémites dans des sociétés qui, même si elles sont de plus en plus concernées prioritairement par leurs conditions sociales et leurs problèmes intérieurs, continuent néanmoins de considérer Israël comme étant á l’origine de tous les malheurs du monde arabe.

Par leur politique pro-israélienne (soutien militaire, économique et financier ; acceptation de l’expansion des  colonies) , par les guerres qui ont été menées en Irak et en Afghanistan, ainsi que par  leurs promesses non tenues ( démocratie, liberté, état palestinien),  les Etats-Unis ont fini par être perçus comme les ennemis des Arabes et des Musulmans.  Ce n’est pas une erreur, mais une suite d’erreurs tragiques de la part des Etats-Unis qui explique la faiblesse de leur voix, de leur crédibilité etde leur influence aujourd’hui.

Au niveau de la résolution du conflit israélo-palestinien, l’intransigeance d’Israël d’un coté et l’impuissance des Palestiniens ( divisés, manquant de soutien populaire) de l’autre  ont gelé toutes les discussions/ négociations possibles sans toutefois geler la poursuite des colonisations .

 

Quel est le rôle des pays du Golfe dans la stabilisation et dans le développement de la région après le Printemps arabe et après les bouleversements ? Est-ce ce rôle positif ou négatif?

Mansouria Mokhefi : Les pays du Golfe, l`Arabie Saoudite y compris, sont obsédés par leur sécurité et la stabilité dans la région du Golfe d’abord. Toute leur politique régionale est dictée par ce besoin de sécurité et de stabilité, que ce soit en s’opposant á l’Iran perçu comme une très grave menace, en facilitant l’arrivée au pouvoir de mouvements islamistes susceptibles de favoriser la mise en place du plus grand espace sunnite et de les préserver de toute contestation á l’intérieur, en offrant l`accueil et l`hébergement aux bases militaires américaines, la protection américaine demeurant l’ultime garantie de cette stabilité. 

Mais aucune stabilisation de la région ne sera garantie ni par les Américains, ni par toute autre puissance occidentale (la France a signé des accords de défense avec le Qatar)  tant que le rôle de l’Iran comme puissance régionale ne sera pas admis et reconnu de tous.

Le printemps arabe a divisé dans un premier temps les pays du Golfe (le Qatar et l`Arabie Saoudite notamment) mais ils se sont tous retrouvés unis pour soutenir Bahreïn dans la répression du soulèvement de la majorité chiite du royaume, stabilité oblige, suprématie du sunnisme dans la région oblige !  Les pays du Golfe n’ont peut-être pas introduit la division entre shiites et sunnites  mais ils ont créé et ont nourri une guerre entre le chiisme et le sunnisme n’a pas fini de ravager la région

 L’Arabie saoudite  qui s’est toujours montrée hostile aux mouvements du Printemps arabe a finalement été en mesure de siffler la fin de la partie en Egypte en ouvrant á la chute de Morsi et au retour de « l’état profond ».Cela est cependant loin d ‘assurer le retour au calme et á la stabilité dans la région surtout quand, par ailleurs et dans le même temps, dans le cadre de son opposition á  l’Iran, elle soutient en armes et finances l’opposition au régime de Damas - une opposition qui, aggraverait le chaos de la région, si elle parvenait au pouvoir.

En bref, le rôle des pays du Golf,  loin de constituer une garantie de la stabilité de la région, risque de prolonger et aggraver les risques d`instabilité dans toute la région.

 

IMESClub: Les révoltes arabes: Qui sont les perdants et les gagnants à l'Est et à l'Ouest?

Mansouria Mokhefi: D’abord  à l’intérieur des sociétés qui ont connu le Printemps arabe, les perdants sont incontestablement et en premier lieu les jeunes. Cette jeunesse qui est descendue dans les rues pour réclamer une meilleure gouvernance et plus de droits, s’est retrouvée, dans le cadre d’économies qui se sont effondrées,  avec un chômage accru, et des problèmes d’éducation et de formation non résolus. Représentant la plus grande partie de la population, elle est néanmoins exclue des nouvelles institutions, des instances du pouvoir qui sont encore entre les mains de « vieux ». Les Jeunes sont donc les premiers perdants de ces révolutions.

Ensuite viennent les femmes : elles sont descendues dans les rues  pour exiger une meilleure reconnaissance de leurs droits et  un plus grand accès a la liberté.  Aujourd’hui non seulement le degré de représentativité n’a guère évolué, mais les femmes, du fait de la préséance de l’islamisme, ont toutes les raisons de penser que leurs droits ne constituent guère une priorité pour les nouveaux gouvernements, que les islamistes ne leur reconnaissent aucune autre place dans la société que celle qui les confine à la maison.

De plus la violence qui s’exprime de diverses façons  (politique avec l’assassinat en Tunisie de deux leaders de gauche ; confessionnelle avec les attentats contre des chrétiens et les incendies d’églises, religieuse et sectaire avec la destruction de mausolées et autres marabouts- Tunisie, Mauritanie, Mali-  et la lapidation de Chiites – Egypte) s’est aussi exprimée contre les femmes : depuis l’exigence de porter le voile, jusqu'à la recrudescence des viols .

A l’extérieur des pays concernés, les gagnants du Printemps arabe  sont pour le moment la Turquie qui a su profiter de son aura (le modèle turc) et de sa politique étrangère pro arabe ( soutien palestinien) pour se positionner en faveur du printemps arabe.  Même si les dérives autoritaires sont dénoncées en occident, elles ne remettent pas en cause le statut de la Turquie qui continue d’apparaître aux pays arabes comme le seul pays musulman ayant pu concilier développement économique, éducation, et démocratie et libertés.   Apres la Turquie, on peut dire que l’autre pays gagnant c`est la Russie : retour sur la scène moyen orientale, affirmation d une posture solide et intraitable, retour au tête á tête avec les Etats-Unis etc….’

L’autre gagnant  est Israël : d’abord complètement surpris puis débordé par les changements dans la région , Israël ne peut que se féliciter de voir la situation en Egypte revenir aux mains de l’armée. Israël peut aussi d’ores et déjà se féliciter de l’isolement du Hamas (le grand perdant dans cette nouvelles configuration régionale) et espère dans  la chute du régime de Assad, l’affaiblissement de l`Iran et la fin du Hizbollah. 

Outre le Hamas, les grands perdants sont incontestablement les pays européens qui n’ont eu ni compréhension de la situation, ni vison ou stratégie commune en réponse aux divers bouleversements.

 

IMESCLub: Quelles sont les perspectives de l'intensification des interdépendances entre le continent africain et le Moyen-Orient (l'Afrique du Nord, en particulier) à travers les filets et les réseaux islamiques? Quelles conséquences apporte-t-elle, cette intensification, au système régional et à la sécurité mondiale.

Mansouria Mokhefi: Il n’y a pas de système régional efficace et performant, capable de lutter contre les risques de déstabilisation qui demeurent très élevés malgré l’intervention de la France au Mali.

 Aujourd’hui, face à la recrudescence des trafics, de la violence et des extrémismes, une réponse maghrébine commune (tous les pays maghrébins sont concernés, même le Maroc qui a longtemps cru constituer une exception) s’impose plus que jamais  même si les moyens des uns et des autres diffèrent grandement.

Au cœur d`une réponse maghrébine, la stratégie et les moyens de l’Algérie seront déterminants car seule l’Algérie a une armée puissante et  l’expérience de la lutte anti- terroriste. L’Algérie qui, avant le chaos, engendré par l’effondrement de la Libye avait contribué au développement des groupes terroristes dans la région en repoussant vers le Sud (en facilitant les « couloirs ») les terroristes qui se trouvaient sur le territoire algérien. Si elle a pu fermer les yeux sur ce qui se passait au delà de ses frontières, le Sahel étant devenu une région poreuse et dangereuse, l’attaque contre le site gazier en janvier prouvant que  les frontières n’avaient pas le même sens pour les uns et les autres, l’Algérie ne peut plus ignorer ce qui se passe au delà de ses frontières. Sa coopération (soutien, encadrement) avec l armée tunisienne dans l’incapacité de rétablir et garantir l’ordre à la frontière algéro-tunisienne montre que le rôle de l’Algérie est incontournable au niveau régional et fondamental dans la lutte contre tous ces fléaux. Les deux régions Afrique et Maghreb qui se sont longtemps ignorés sont plus que jamais liés aujourd’hui  face á des menaces identiques. 

 

Question #1: How could you characterize the past decade for the Middle East? Which mistakes were committed by intra-regional and outer-regional players?  

Tatiana NOSENKO: From the beginning, I would like to precise that my discourse is based on the assumption that that the mass manifestation in the Arab countries which had various political consequences are caused strictly by the internal social-economic, political reasons, but not by some external plot.

The Arab countries are now in the period of the political rearrangement. The political systems created during the postcolonial era are facing a crisis. The new generations influenced by the processes of globalization, IT revolution are coming to the arena and voicing their demands on the transformation of political and social life. It is also important that on the wave of  Anti-Western sentiments and rejection of the foreign ideologies (socialism, communism) the traditionalist masses return to Islam as a single universal ideology to solve political and social problems in the Arab world. 

However, it was erroneous, mainly by the USA, to count that the mass manifestation against long living dictatorships would immediately democratize the political systems. The democratic opposition to the authoritarian regimes is not consistent. From the structural point of view the Soviet opposition forces are not to be compared to the Islamic organizations and parties. The Islamists are those who win the dominating positions during the open elections. Thus, they legitimize their right to rebuild social and political life according to the religious canons while the secular principles suffer.

The secular opposition turned out to be helpless in such conditions in Egypt even though it had its representatives in the Parliament. But hopes that the problems could be solved by the return of an authoritarian junta are also untenable.

It seems that the societies with strong traditionalist values and religious principles on the one hand, and with already shaped social layers, based mainly on the secular benchmarks borrowed from the West, have to live through a long way to find the modes of coexistence and dialogue of these inconsistent forces. According to this point of view the repressions and persecutions against the Islamist leaders, e.g. in Egypt, as well as against opposition represented by the military and liberals, like in Turkey, turn out to be erroneous and futile.

As far as the situation in Syria is concerned, it was a big mistake both of the governmental and the opposition forces not to use the possibilities to find a political compromise before the beginning of the full-scale civil war.

The actions of Saudi Arabia, Qatar on the one hand ond of Iran on another who heat the inner conflicts in the Arab countries and use them in the Sunni-Shiah struggle for the regional hegemony are counterproductive and dangerous. The international community actively condemns Iran on this cause, but it is far less determined on which is concerning the Gulf monarchies. 

The stake on the military means to overthrow authoritarian and dictatorship regimes made mainly by the USA seems to have failed. Neither in Iraq, nor in Libya the Western military invasion has not stabilized the situation. However the position “let them fight till the last soldier” is also erroneous. Facing the situation similar to the Syrian with a global humanitarian catastrophe, with one of the key Middle Eastern countries being destroyed causing threat to the peace and stability in the whole region, the international community is unable to act in time and does not have any means to stop the bloodshed. This makes us think anout the efficiency and the effectiveness of the norms of modern international law, about the UN level of adaptation to resolve modern issues.

 

Question #2: Does the Middle East risk to become a battlefield of interests of the USA and Russia as it was during the Cold War once again?

T.N. The current situation can not be compared to the confrontation during the Cold War. Then, each power claimed the dominance in the Middle East; the countries in the region were divided into the “clients” of the USA or the USSR. The anti-American sentiments are very strong in the Arab countries and this undermines the US positions. The conflict between Russia and the USA emerges now from the different vision on the world order after the Cold War. During the last two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union the US became determined in its exclusive role as a protector of democracy, liberty, human rights all over the world and in its right to use any means to do it, including the military ones. Russia, proceeding from the principles of the international law, regards the intervention into the internal affairs of the states unacceptable and considers the military operations to overthrow any regimes, even authoritarian and antidemocratic, unlawful. Moreover, the West often uses double standards defining such regimes.

 

Question #3: What are the prospects of the Middle East Peace Process in the current circumstances?

T.N. Unlike, for example the Oslo process, the ongoing Palestine-Israeli negotiations have begun thanks to the strongest US pressure. The US is extremely interested in their effectiveness. In past several years the American image on the Middle East has suffered greatly due to the number of reasons. The Americans are being reproached for not having protected H. Mubarak regime that was its devoted ally during many decades. Obama decreases military presence in Iraq, where the Iranian influence is growing. He has suspended the military variant of response to the Iranian nuclear program so far, which causes big questions for Israel concerning the reliability of their overseas ally, etc. In current situation the consensus between the Israeli and the Palestinians is called upon to compensate the US losses. Moreover, it will remove the Palestinian problem from the agenda, which is a subject of speculation for all kinds of Islamic radicals.

As far as the sides of the negotiations themselves are concerned, their positive conclusion could be important for Israeli Prime Minister B. Netanyahu in his struggle for political survival. His chances to be reelected are decreasing taking into account the drop of his influence within his own Likud party. But if there is a breakthrough during the negotiations, he might get the support of the electorate. For the Palestinians the status quo and the territorial growth of the settlements means the decrease of chances to establish their own viable state. They need the agreements with Israel to avoid total discredit and collapse of Palestinian Administration.

These factors could work to achieve the agreement.

 

Question #4: The Arab uprisings: who are the winners and losers in the East and in the West?

T.N. I believe that it is early to speak about the losers and the winners in the Arab awakening. They say “You can see the big things from the distance”. It is only possible to say that the destructive forces always profit from chaos and war, so the main aim of both intraregional players and the international community is to 

This publication opens series of "IMESClub Interviews". Discussion took place on the 28th of August in Moscow. Professor Vitaliy Naumkin answered several thorny questions posed by IMESClub Pesident Maria Dubovikova . 

 

Maria Dubovikova: I would like to start this conversation with a question that sums up the whole decade. How would you characterize this decade for the Middle East? Which mistakes were made by the intra- and outer-regional players, by the international community?

Vitaly Naumkin: Well, I would prefer not to talk in terms of  “mistakes”, it’s much better to talk about the positive and negative trends.  Speaking about the positive trends that took place in these last ten years, a good economic growth in most countries of the Middle East could be mentioned in particular. After all, we're not just talking about the Arab world, but about the whole Middle East, right?

M.D.: – Yes!

V.N.:  For example a considerable economic success of Turkey can be specially noted. Moreover many Arab countries have experienced economic growth, modernization, and development of modern financial and economic institutions. Somewhere this process was fast, even including some countries that have experienced the "Arab Spring," somewhere rather slow. Good results of economic development were shown, for example, by Egypt. Therefore, we can talk about different trends and shifts that were positive, not negative. Among them there are the process of shaping of the civil society which is however rather limited; spreading, not everywhere of course, of high technologies, especially information technologies. A number of countries are establishing cell-phone networks. The growth of the Internet use. Increasing number of educated youth who are getting education not only in their native countries but also abroad. There are many other trends that can be characterized as concrete steps towards a modernization, modern development and general integration into the basic matrix of global development.

Among the negative trends it is possible to mention stagnation, mainly in the political life, and a number of other processes that especially led to the “Arab Spring”. It is an absence of means of vertical social mobility for people, monopolization of all the levers of state control including financial and governmental resources by the bureaucratic elites. And, of course, high level of unemployment in some countries, poverty, etc.

The Middle East is corroded by the inner conflicts. It is the growth of interconfessional, ethnic, interstate and intraconfessional contradictions, which are often very severe. Also there are many unregulated old conflicts, primarily the Arab-Israeli.

Back to the question about the mistakes, it is possible to name the growth of religious fundamentalism, extremism, inability of the regimes to deal with the terrorism among them. All that leads to the serious deterioration of the image of people living in the region beyond its borders: in Europe, in the West in general. The intrusion of the Allied Forces to Iraq in 2003 can be undoubtedly considered as a mistake. As a result the interventionists failed to provide security, first of all – for the country’s people. In a decade more than 200 thousand people died, several millions became refugees or were displaced within the country, only 400 thousand of 1400 thousand Christians left. There was a mass exodus of Christians from Iraq. The minorities, mainly Christians are discriminated, there are non-stop terrorist acts and the hostility between the Sunni and the Shiah is periodically getting worse. Of course, the situation has partially stabilized – it has ameliorated. But generally it is possible to say that the plans of our US partners to quickly establish a modern democratic state, eliminate the internal conflicts and unite the nation have failed. I believe that Bush's interventionalism was the main mistake and it was replaced by Obama's administration milder attitude to the region and to the interventions. However, Bush's heritage still lives and it will take very long to remove its traces. That is why the interventionalism and the attempts to project their own model of liberal democracy face a severe resistance of the elites and the people. This continues to deteriorate the security in the region and to impede the mutual understanding between the Middle Eastern countries and external players.

M.D.: Speaking about the Gulf countries having the particular influence on the development of the Middle East, how would you estimate their influence? Which effect would the current policy of the two power centers – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have on the development of Middle East, positive or negative?

V.N.: Regarding the Gulf countries, they largely represent a successful model of development, primarily because they poses huge financial resources. They can easily switch between these resources from one field to another and easily manipulate them in order to neutralize grievances and solve social problems if necessary. But at the same time, these countries do not have any immunity to the existing protest sentiments - while other countries deal with the more severe forms of such sentiments. Take the issue of Bahrain, where there was a very powerful protest movement. Although it was neutralized, the discontent of the two thirds of the population belonging to the Shia and consider themselves disadvantaged remains. There is a difficult internal situation in Saudi Arabia, which also has a grain of conflict.

It is impossible to ignore the intense rivalry between the different states of the Persian Gulf, including one in the religious and ideological sphere. Take a rather intense rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Qatar relied on the support of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the Saudis - on the Salafis, and as we can see by the recent Egyptian events, they supported the military coup in Egypt. While previously these countries acted together as supporters of the Islamic protest movement, and was considered that they are leading all new Islamic forces to the power, today their views diverged. Saudi Arabia, before oriented on supporting the Salafist parties, plays well with the new secular forces today, including those representing the old regimes, such as the Egyptian military. Qatar also remains committed to the "Muslim Brotherhood" which has lost ground in Egypt, and together with Turkey acts in their support.

So I am not inclined to consider all the countries of the Gulf as a single entity. For example, the United Arab Emirates sharply opposed the "Muslim Brotherhood" from the outset, limited their activities in the country and subjected their representatives to repression.

The Gulf States are playing a double role in the region. They contribute to the financing of a number of projects in the Arab countries, assist in resolving their economic problems at no charge. But at the same time, impudent aggressiveness with which these countries are trying by force to resolve the internal conflict in Syria, only exacerbates the situation in the region and does not lead the Middle East to peace and stability.

M.D.: In a way, my next question concerns the Syrian problem. As the latest trend shows, Russia has began to play a more significant role in the Middle East and in many respects its interests are in conflict with the US policy. Do you think that the Middle East is able once again to become a field of confrontation of two powers as it was during the Cold War?

V.N.: I do not think it can. Firstly, because Russia does not enter an intense rivalry with the Americans for the area of influence. And the Russian influence in the region, to be honest, is very limited. Russia's main partners are still not the Arab states. This is, for example, Turkey. Although Turkey is a NATO member and wants to be admitted to the European Union, relations with Russia are very active, and developed very well in recent years. Turkey - one of the most important economic partners of our country, and Russia does not also have any sufficient political disagreements with it. The main stumbling stone in Russian - Turkish relations is the divergence of positions on the Syrian conflict. But this difference does not prevent the two countries from moving forward in increasing the volume of trade and economic cooperation, in the implementation of new projects, etc. I'm not talking about humanitarian relationships, the number of Russian tourists in Turkey, a flurry of activity on the business, etc. During the zero-sum game Turkey would be seen as a rival, as it is an ally of the potential enemy - the United States. Today is it impossible to pose a question this way. Moreover, today Russia has sufficient understanding with the Americans in the region. Russia and the U.S. are working together within the framework of the Quartet of international mediators in the settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict. Our positions on the settlement differ only slightly. Russia, for example, does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization and works with this movement. Russia is more critical than the United States towards the Israel's plans for the development of territories, build settlements, but, nevertheless, the overall positions of Russia and the U.S. to the resolution are very similar, there is a close cooperation. Even on the issue of Iran, where there are serious differences, Russia and the United States will still cooperate acting in the format of the dialogue between Iran and the 5+1. Our country has repeatedly voted for the resolutions related to the response to the opacity of the Iranian nuclear program in UN Security Council. Iranian node in the context of non-proliferation is one of the main areas of cooperation with the United States. The same can be said about Afghanistan, even though it probably refers to Central Asia, but the Afghan issue is impossible to ignore because it is important for the entire Islamic world. As you know, Russia is also actively cooperating with America, without getting into the conflict and the American actions in Afghanistan, it is helping to build the Afghan state, helping the Americans to resolve supply issues of their contingent and ensure its safe withdrawal, acting fairly consistent, regardless of those difficulties that arise in Russian- American relations. Therefore, I see no reason for the rivalry between Russia and the U.S. in the region. Differences will persist. But even in the most tense case - with the Syrian conflict, where Russian and the United States assessments, policy plans and mode of conduct differ radically, there are still common interests. They consist in that firstly neither party wants to allow chaos in this country. At least, I see the interests of the United that way. Another thing is that some Russian politicians today have reason to blame Washington that it wants to create a controlled chaos out there. But still, it is in the American interest, in my opinion, to establish order and stability in the country. Secondly, talking about the coincidence of interests - we do not want to have a state of the Islamic radicals who would cut his throat to everyone who does not think like them there. There are also a common interest is to halt the bloodshed, civil war, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But their views significantly diverge on how to do it and how to respond to what is going on. But look, despite the radical opposition between Russia and the U.S., they still have managed to agree on joint steps for the Geneva-2, the second international conference on Syria. And the chances are not completely lost yet.

M.D.: Let's go back a little bit back, to the Arab-Israeli conflict, you mentioned, and to the role of Russia and the United States, and then return to Syria. Under present conditions, when the region is absolutely losing its stability, what are the real prospects of efficient and effective conflict resolution? Do they disappear or are they still real enough?

V.N.: It is hard to be optimistic about the Arab-Israeli peace process, although there was a shift. The peace process has been resumed a term of nine months has been set to reach a final status agreement. I honestly do not think that it is possible to do it in nine months. There are several problems, among which it is possible to mention two most painful ones - the issue of Jerusalem and the refugee problem. If it is still possible to anticipate some possibility of compromise on Jerusalem, the problem of refugees today has very aggravated, as the Palestinian self-awareness has strongly increased and it is impossible to deny the right of refugees to return. But for Israel accepting this demand means causing the condemnation by the majority of population, for which such a decision would be a tragedy. For them, the return of Palestinians, let's say, in Haifa, located in what is now Israel, which Palestinians left in 1948, is unacceptable. How can this issue be resolved? In general, it can be solved, but it requires negotiation. Some reasonable Israeli politics offer the Palestinians the option of returning the refugees only to the territory of a future Palestinian state. In this case, the Palestinians will have the right either to return to their lost homes, or the right to compensation. However, these solutions do not suit all the Palestinians. And it is very difficult to suppose that it will be possible to overcome these grave differences in nine months.

Some Israeli partners have an idea to still return to the issue of an interim solution of the problem. To sign an agreement, say, with the exception of these two items, which will be deferred to a later period. Palestinians were always against the interim agreement before. In my opinion, in order to make them do it, they should get some serious concessions from the Israeli side, say, on the territorial issue. Would it be possible to implement it?

The border issue is also not easy, but there can still be an agreement because there is already a preliminary agreement, which can be taken. The idea of swaps, the territorial exchange, is acceptable for the moderate Palestinian elite, and, I believe, it has a potential to be realized.

The question arises whether it is possible to extend the deadline for reaching a final status from a nine-month to something else. Postpone it for a year, say. But in this case, there are legitimate concerns that the period may be extended to infinity, which will bury any hopes of a full settlement.

Today, Obama needs a success. He even wants to achieve something in the Middle East. At the moment, America loses a lot. There is a growing discontent in almost all corners of the Arab world against it. Look at what happened in Egypt! The Americans committed the same mistake twice, first they supported Mubarak, and they still reproached for betting on dictators. Then they quickly passed him and displeased those who hoped that they would support him. The U.S. has long worked with the "Muslim Brotherhood", enthusiastically talked about their democratic aspirations, their moderation, then the same Egyptian masses have allowed the military to remove the «Brothers» from power – now both "Brothers" and the new authorities are dissatisfied with the Americans. Yes, they were, in fact, always dissatisfied, because the United States, in their view, are entirely on the side of Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians. Now the new government of Egypt, the military and the civilian, including even liberal organizations, accuse the Americans of their support for the "Muslim Brotherhood". As a result the image of the United States has suffered greatly, their influence waned, their ability to manage processes occurring in the region declined. In Iraq, too, not everything is going well. In Afghanistan - the same thing. Libya is in a complete breakdown, chaos. Therefore, Obama must achieve at least something. We are not gloating about it, saying that America has lost two wars, that its policy towards the "Arab Spring" has failed. Who knows what will be the outcome of the US threats to launch an air-missile attack on Syria. If they choose a military intervention, it will not lead to the implementation of their goals and will cause huge damage to the region. We are totally against it. And, I think, Russia will support Obama's desire to resolve the Middle East conflict in all circumstances.

M.D.: Returning to the question of Syria. The other day, the Arab League after its meeting has condemned the chemical attack near Damascus, but refused to take part in any operation of the West, which was the completely different reaction compared to the case of Libya. What is the reason of such a sharp turn? Failure in Libya? Or this is some different understanding of the conflict?

V.N.: I believe this is both another understanding of the conflict and the "Libyan syndrome". There is no unity among the Arab countries. But if the Arab sponsors of intervention could push through the support of U.S. intervention, it still would (and it will if they manage) lead only to more bloodshed and to the hatred of more Muslims against the United States, and the people who will do it, will be responsible for it. They will look like American's puppets willing to dump stable regimes for their own selfish purposes. Will have to answer for it. The other day, an American colonel, who participated in the operation in Kosovo, McGregor, very well mentioned for this occasion that there are no bad guys and good guys in civil wars, there are only winners and losers, and one does not need to intervene. Civil wars were everywhere. During the American Civil War more people were killed than today in Syria.  We shall not speak about the casualties during the  civil war in Russia. And we still do not know who were the bad guys and the good guys. Kappel and Kolchak forces were the most brutal punishers. Today, many consider Kolchak a hero. In the civil war there is no right or wrong. So today, if the West wants to intervene in the war and make others win with their help - it will be a disaster. It is not for the West with his limited understanding of Middle Eastern societies to judge who is right and wrong. Not to mention the fact that the Americans will actually be standing shoulder to shoulder with those who hate Americans and their main ally - Israel, with those, who tomorrow, as it has happened in history, will turn their weapons against them, I think it would be a tragic error. I'm sure Obama understands this.

M.D.: To conclude our discussion, I suggest drawing interim results of the "Arab spring": who at the moment is among the losers, and who - among the winners?

V.N.: I do not know, who is who now.

M.D.: Even in case of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt?

V.N.: Well, we see very contradictory results. On the one hand, the Arab peoples have won, because they have shown that they are legitimate citizens of their countries, they can decide their own fate. On the other hand, it turned out that they are losers the same time. Because interest groups, various elites who mainly do not express the interests of the majority of the population, pursuing their own selfish goals, took advantage of the fruits of the mass protest movements. What did, for example, "Muslim Brotherhood" do in Egypt? Taking suddenly unexpected steps towards Islamization and the monopolization of power, they repeated the mistakes of Mubarak and caused resentment among those who voted for them.

 

Page 2 of 2