Tuesday, 07 March 2017 00:04

What is Russia’s thinking on Libya?

The head of Libya’s United Nations-backed government, Fayez al-Sarraj, undertook an official visit to Moscow to meet with top Russian diplomats and officials March 2-3. Russia has been stepping up efforts in Libya, which seems baffling outside the wide regional context. There is a popular opinion that Russian foreign policy, including planning in the Middle East, may sometimes be tactically impeccable but lacks strategic thinking. Some believe that unpredictability has been a hallmark of the Kremlin's foreign policy.

Russia’s revived interest in the Middle East goes back to Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term (2004-2008), and for a long while the authorities have focused on economic development and the need for most diversified economic ties. Their attitude has been typified by blunt pragmatism.

The well-known discord in 2011 between Dmitry Medvedev, who was then president, and Putin, who was then prime minister, over UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya may also be illustrative of Russia's pragmatic stance. Russia then abstained from the vote in the Security Council, thus avoiding the image of being the dictator's benefactor and of being engaged in the conflict. At the same time, Putin called the Western policy "a new crusade" while referring to US damage inflicted on Iraq, which was consistent with the assessments that pervaded Russian society.

Neither the Kremlin reshuffle nor the Arab Spring drove Russia to refrain from its reserved pragmatism. Even the 2012-13 rule in Egypt of Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization declared extremist in Russia, did not stand in the way of stronger bilateral ties, even at the top level.

Following the notorious events in Ukraine, which led to a further escalation of tensions with the West, politics and security began to prevail over the economy for Moscow. Still, it failed to devise any clear foreign policy strategy except its own “pivot to the East.” Even the start of the military operation in Syria in September 2015 did not clarify whether Moscow aspires to replace the United States as a new “Middle East hegemon” or just uses the region in its contest with Washington. It was a head-scratcher.

The missing strategy seems to be a conscious choice of the ruling political elite rather than a sign of its confusion. Postmodernity is characterized by the absence of a reliable strategy. The United States and Europe's numerous failures in the Middle East testify to the fact, while the ill-fated, futile and disastrous Libyan venture in 2011 is its graphic illustration.

Therefore, the abolition of strategic objectives requires a new analysis of the values and principles of world politics and Russia's place in the world.

Since the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Russian political establishment has strongly distrusted the West, as the latter has been manipulating human values to its advantage. The mistrust along with the elite's idiosyncrasy to any ideology that was bred in the late Soviet era has conjured up an image of a profoundly cynical capitalist world.

However, the ensuing confrontation with the West, whose leaders turned their back on Russia, and the need to identify Russia as an alternative project rather than part of the West have led to deliberations over world politics premised on Russian historical experience. The approach of these deliberations seems to be based on seven principles: Security prevails over development; only stability can provide both security and development as revolutions are always destructive; stability is based on strong state institutions; institutions cannot be imposed from outside, socio-political engineering is inefficient; only a strong sovereign state can deliver security and development; unilateral steps on the world stage are destructive; and international law is the only means of creating a sustainable world order.

Looked at in this light, Russia is largely pursuing national security interests in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the events in 2015-17 showed that steps driven by the need to ensure security could produce new interests, with a new stable regional system of international relations being the major one.

This allows for an understanding of both the causes of Russia’s stepped-up efforts to deal with Libya and Moscow’s approaches to settling the country’s conflict. 

Even though Russia’s existential interests are not at stake in Libya, one can emphasize four contexts providing rationales for its moves.

First, the list includes Moscow’s general line aimed at stabilizing the region. Not only does the policy contribute to Russia’s security, but it also throws into sharp relief its effective and attractive methods.

Second, add to the mixture Russian-Egyptian relations, which require specific measures to transform mutual affinity into a solid alliance, with Egypt’s regional position being strengthened. A weak Egypt, Moscow argues, will further destabilize the Middle East, as historical, geographical and demographic forces have predetermined the country’s key role. Assisting Egypt in handling Libya constitutes a means of bolstering Cairo’s regime.

Third, the agenda encompasses Russia’s Mediterranean policy and the country’s ties with European Union member states. According to an informed source, Europe has but once given signals to the Kremlin that the refugee-affected countries are seeking Russia’s active involvement in Libya’s affairs, which in the long run could improve relations between Moscow and Brussels.

At the same time, a friendly or loyal regime in Libya could emerge as part of the Russia-dominated axis of Damascus, Cairo and Tripoli. 

Fourth, economic interests of Russian businesses striving to gain a foothold in new markets must also be considered.

All these factors may account for Moscow’s interest in Libya rather than its marked bias in favor of Gen. Khalifa Hifter. Given the particular episodes in the commander’s biography, which should instill mistrust among Russia’s policymakers, their sympathetic attitude toward Hifter is especially awkward.

Yury Barmin, an analyst of Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East, suggests the Kremlin perceives Hifter as a new Col. Moammar Gadhafi. Although Barmin may have a point, the two leaders and the surrounding contexts are strikingly different. Gadhafi has never had to forcibly unite the country, with his political system originally resting upon the then most popular ideology in the Arab world. Gadhafi, along with his young supporters, articulated the interests of the most modernized groups of generally traditional society. (Now it is much more modernized.) This does not play into Hifter’s hands.

Nevertheless, the Libyan marshal may have been chosen as an ally by Cairo rather than Moscow. In this view, it is the dialogue with the former that represents the latter’s paramount interest. Hifter’s and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s ideological affinity, which concentrates on confronting the Muslim Brotherhood, makes them even more attractive to Moscow.

Finally, the Kremlin’s willingness to act as appropriate, thus refusing to impose its own will, gives another explanation for its focus on Hifter. Indeed, the marshal has objectively proved to be Libya’s most powerful figure. Amid the chaos, his personified power makes him more appealing, with individual groups being unreliable and weak. Fierce opposition to Hifter and prioritizing the Government of National Accord mean standing in the way of natural processes and fueling the ongoing war. It is the West’s ideologically driven policies and its reluctance to recognize the imperfect world that cause Moscow’s considerable irritation.

However, this does not imply that Russia intends to ignore other Libyan actors. Amid the lack of developed institutions and overmilitarized society, the establishment of a resilient system entails a necessary broad consensus. Given the Syrian experience and Moscow’s general approaches, one can assume that as a mediator in Libya, the Kremlin will follow a regional track of the conflict resolution involving Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria as the key players. 



Initially published by Al Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/russia-libya-sarraj-foreign-policy-putin-hifter.html#ixzz4aa9Ts6qf

Published in Tribune

The major political slogan of the Bolshevik Party leading up to the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution and the uprising itself, “All Power to the Soviets!” is now relevant to Syria. 

Russia has come to realize that some opponents of the Syrian regime are actually moderates rather than terrorists and that a move to empower local governments could help resolve the conflict. 

The long-lasting civil war in Syria killed centralized government stone dead and caused a de facto territorial fragmentation. Although international players are currently voicing “commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity,” it also is a fact that alternative forms of civic self-government, namely local councils, have held sway in rebel-controlled districts for some time now.

According to Al-Monitor’s sources close to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, the country’s local councils numbered 404 after the fall of eastern Aleppo to the forces of President Bashar al-Assad. Self-government is in the offing in Turkey’s buffer zone in northern Aleppo. Thus, one can argue that the self-organizing revolutionary movement suggested by Syrian activist Omar Aziz at the onset of the uprising in 2011 has materialized. 

Until recently, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge the civil war in Syria, portraying the conflict only as Damascus’ fight against “terrorists.” Such a policy prevented Russian officials from objectively assessing local councils’ performance. Moreover, the issue is a real blind spot among many Russian politicians and pundits. 

Indeed, on Nov. 8, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova labeled councils in eastern Aleppo “self-proclaimed authorities” doing “what their external sponsors or backers told them” and playing into the hands of “the most radical illegal armed groups.” Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov said Dec. 13 that what eastern Aleppo had experienced was “indiscriminate terror,” rather than an opposition movement and local councils. Though Russia described self-government in formerly rebel-held areas of eastern Aleppo with broad strokes, one should note that despite “random terror,” Russia’s Defense Ministry was able to evacuate virtually all besieged fighters and their families to Idlib. At the same time, it is clear that notorious jihadists should have been detained and vetted.

However, the recapture of eastern Aleppo and the Defense Ministry's subsequent recognition of Syria’s moderate opposition appear to have reset Moscow’s attitude toward both rebels and “local power brokers.” In the end, Article 15 regarding the separation of power between local councils and central government was incorporated into Syria’s much-talked-about draft constitution produced by Russian experts and presented to the armed opposition at negotiations last month in Astana, Kazakhstan.

On one hand, such a step signals Moscow’s willingness to make concessions and to consent to Syria’s division into zones of influence within its existing boundaries. On the other hand, the move once again signifies the Kremlin’s inconsistency — characterized by the pretense of stability, the absence of a long-term Syria strategy and the influence of domestic policies on foreign ones. 

Moscow’s analysts are united in stating that the draft constitution, including such controversial points as Kurdish autonomy and a seven-year presidential term, is merely an attempt to promote dialogue between all the parties concerned. Yet it is evident that a focus on “legalization” of local councils and their integration into the political conflict settlement represents an appropriate way to do that.

“Wholesale reforms” require much time and effort. The time vacuum and lack of visible achievements play into the hands of hard-line and terrorist groups. In this respect, supporting local government is the most effective and pragmatic way to restore peace for the locals, to address social needs and to create jobs after a lasting truce.

However, problems also arise. On one hand, the councils are trying to distance themselves from any armed groups. On the other hand, they need the assistance of outer forces. Ma'arrat al-Numan, a city in Idlib province, illustrates successful coordination between the local council, local coordination committees and the Free Syrian Army's Division 13, which is closely affiliated with the local administration. They jointly managed to force Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) to withdraw from the region. Commanders of the armed groups and activists of local councils are quite close and the distinction between them is somewhat symbolic, even though the latter is charged with addressing pressing social issues rather than sustaining control over the areas.

Given this, an important question logically arises: How will Damascus take Moscow’s suggestion to decentralize power? As of now, the reaction is still unclear, as no one has publicly commented on the situation on the ground. However, the pro-government Syrian media tend to be quite skeptical about the performance of local councils. They stress that the councils fail to meet even the basic needs of the population, despite the assistance of nongovernmental organizations and funding provided by the West and the Persian Gulf states.

Meanwhile, the regime has long been playing its own game with local councils. Damascus maintains leverage in opposition-held areas, first and foremost, by demonstrating its sustained, indispensable role in providing essential public services — paying wages to teachers and money to pensioners who have not been reported as involved in opposition. At the same time, the regime has openly opposed any challenge to its monopolized areas such as providing public services and an alternative educational and health care system. Damascus launched deliberate airstrikes in the cities where local councils had been most successful and thereby had posed a substantial challenge to the regime. That was the case, for example, in Ma'arrat al-Numan, Douma and Darayya. However, in some areas, the administration has sought reconciliation with local councils for its own benefit — as it did, for instance, in Quneitra and Daraa provinces.

At the same time, since the emergence of the first local councils five years ago, the opposition has failed to agree on a model of local administration and self-government, or to vest them with political functions. As a result, with the rare exceptions of the Kabbun and Ma'arrat al-Numan assemblies, councils provide only some public services, and they do not have any administrative duties or executive or administrative powers. The idea of holding elections to provincial councils that represent various administrative layers, interact with the United Nations and other bodies and can directly conduct political reform in the long run has not been fully implemented. As of now, only eight councils of the kind have been formed in Syria.

Local councils can possibly initiate cooperation with the regime and with the Russian officers at the Center for National Reconciliation, based at the Khmeimim military base. Some sources on the ground told Al-Monitor that there are Christians in the groups who cooperate directly with the councils and among activists. After some “indoctrination,” it may prove valuable to have local councils recognized by the regime as civil structures.

Remarkably, Syrian Kurdistan’s positive experience with local councils may well be studied and used across Syria. The Kurdish Democratic Society Movement headed by the nationalist Democratic Union Party is of particular interest to those who want to establish fully autonomous, civil-military self-government structures; consider the Manbij Military Council, for example. To streamline the work of local councils and understand their role in the transition to peace, it is important to make good use of the experience being gained during the civil war.

 

Initially published by Al Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/russia-syria-value-local-councils-shift-damascus.html#ixzz4ZLdLvOqR

Published in Tribune
Tuesday, 14 February 2017 21:59

Deciphering Trump’s Opaque Foreign Policy

President Trump has set loose several competing – and contradictory – strands of foreign policy with the big question now whether he can avoid tripping himself up, writes ex-British diplomat Alastair Crooke.

It is now a commonplace to note that President Trump is advocating a mercantilist “America First” foreign policy, at odds with the prevailing globalist view of a cosmopolitan, super-culture; that he is intent on dismantling this globalist zeitgeist that he believes imposes moral and cultural norms which have weakened America’s mercantile “animal spirits” and whose embrace of the politics of diversity has sapped the strength from America’s moral and cultural sinews.

 

In practice, the policy that emerges will not be so black and white, or so easily categorized. “Team Trump,” in fact, embraces three distinct approaches: the “benevolent American hegemon” traditionalists, the Christian warriors pitted against an Islamic “hostile” ethos – and, of course, Trump’s own “America First” mercantilism. Each of these trends distrusts the other, yet must ally with one or the other in order to balance the third or at least avoid having it act as spoiler.

This inter-connectivity makes it especially hard to read the runes – the Trump administration’s marks of mysterious significance – of likely U.S. policy given the jostling and elbowing ahead between three distinct world views. And it is made even harder given President Trump’s and strategic adviser Steve Bannon’s deliberate embrace of a politics of feint and distraction, to throw opponents off-balance.

Trump’s style of mercantilist politics – though novel in our era – is not new. It has occurred before, and in its earlier setting led to profound geo-political consequences. It led then to war and ultimately to the emergence of a new geo-political order.

That is not necessarily to say that the same will occur today, but on Sept. 17, 1656, Oliver Cromwell, a Protestant puritan who had fought a civil war in England against its Establishment and its élite and who had deposed and then executed the reigning king, addressed his revolutionary parliamentarians in Westminster by posing the question: Who are our enemies? There was, he answered to the gathered parliamentarians, an alignment of “wicked men” in the world led by a powerful state – Catholic Spain with the Pope at its head. The “enmity” that Cromwell’s countrymen faced was, at its root, the evil of a religion – Catholicism – that “refused the Englishman’s desire for simple liberties … that put men under restraint … [and] under which there was no freedom.”

Since Cromwell’s day, the mainly English-speaking (Protestant) world has demonized its “enemies” as opponents of “God’s will” through their clinging to the failings of a static and backward religious ethic (as the Puritans characterized Catholicism). And, as for the complaint of “restraint” and “lack of liberty”? At its crux lay English frustration at the impediments faced by its traders and merchants. The Puritans of that time saw in Catholicism an ethos that was not welcoming to individual enterprise, to profit or to trade.

English “hawks” – usually Puritans and merchants – wanted an aggressive anti-Spanish policy that would open new markets to burgeoning English trade. Catholicism was not an ethos, the Cromwellians fervently and dogmatically asserted, in which the nascent capitalism of the time could thrive.

Cromwell’s address to Parliament in 1656 was an early articulation of the Protestant ethic: one that has contributed hugely to shaping American entrepreneurial capitalism, and in taking America to its position of power (Steve Bannon does in fact acknowledge the parallel: “I am Thomas Cromwell in the court of the Tudors,” he once said to a reporter).

A Religious War

Today, for one significant Trump constituency (the Tea Party base), Iran is today’s Spain, and it is Islam (vice Catholicism) that is frustrating “God’s will,” by embracing an ethos that hates the Christian “ethic.” And, it is secular globalization that has sapped America’s mercantile animal spirits, imposed restrictions on trade (i.e. NAFTA), and whose cultural and “value” norms are sapping America’s moral and spiritual muscularity.

Why should this Cromwell analogy matter today? In one sense, Trump had little choice. In opposing the (“restrictive”) globalist, foreign policy – with its spinal cord of a U.S.-led global defense sphere – the President needed to stand up some alternative foreign policy to the embedded totem of “America as the gyroscope of the global order.”

Pure mercantilism – in the style of businessman negotiator-ism – is not really, of itself, a foreign policy. The power of the “benign U.S. hegemon” meme would require something more powerful to be set up, over, and against it, to balance it out. Trump has opted for the “Christianity in peril” narrative. It is one that touches on deeply buried cultural veins of Protestant imagery within the President’s Tea Party constituency.

Retired General Michael Flynn, now Trump’s National Security Advisor, perhaps best represents this religiously based, pro-Christian Republican foreign policy, while retired General James Mattis, now U.S. Defense Secretary, perhaps has a foot in both Republican camps — as Martin Wright from Brookings explains:

“Republican foreign policy since 9/11 has had two basic strands, which sometimes contradict each other. The first is that the United States is in an existential fight against radical Islam. The second is that America’s global interests involve the maintenance of U.S. leadership in Europe and East Asia — interests, in other words, that extend far beyond combating radical Islam. The Republican establishment has always toed the line on the first, but it has increasingly focused much more on the second. The global war on terror has, of late, taken second place to balancing China and containing Russia.

“But a group within the Republican tent never made this shift. These are the people who believe the United States is engaged in a war against radical Islam that is equivalent to World War II or the Cold War. They believe it is a struggle rooted in religion to which all else should be subservient — that America’s overwhelming focus must be on radical Islam instead of revisionist powers in Europe or Asia. They also generally favor moving away from a values-based foreign policy to harsh methods to wage a major war.

“For the most part, the leaders of this school of thought have been dismissed as cranks or ideologues. But their views were widely shared in the Republican electorate, who were increasingly alarmed by the Islamic State. And they found an ally in Trump.” (emphasis added)

In short, we should expect the Administration’s policy to oscillate between these two poles of Republican foreign policy, as Trump plays off one against another, in order to insert his own (“non – foreign policy”) of radical mercantilism. The Cromwellian meme of making Iran the “number one” terrorist state and radical Islam the “hostile ethos” does fit well for the U.S. President to embrace the businessman-negotiator modus operandi  under the cover of belligerency towards the Islamic “ethos.”

A Popular ‘Enemy’

Belligerency towards Iran is, of course, popular and in this way Trump’s policy translates well or at least understandably to the mores of the Washington Beltway. This “hostile Islam” meme also provides the rationale (defeating Islamic terror) for détente with Russia. I have suggested earlier that détente with Russia is key to Trump’s dismantling of Washington’s “benign hegemon” global defense sphere. Trump argues that the “blanket” U.S. defense sphere precisely limits the possibilities for the U.S. to negotiate advantageous trade terms with its allies on a case-by-case bilateral basis.

In effect, under the cover of fighting a hostile Islamic “ethos,” Trump can pursue détente with Russia – and then toughly “businessman-negotiate” with allied states (now stripped of the Russian “threat” elevating them to a status as America’s somehow privileged, defense allies). This seems to be Secretary Tillerson’s intended role.

Martin Wright again: “This is why naming Rex Tillerson as secretary of state was so important for Trump. A week before he was named, Trump’s senior aide Kellyanne Conway told the press that Trump was expanding the list of names for secretary of state and that the most important consideration was that the nominee ‘would be to implement and adhere to the president-elect’s America-first foreign policy — if you will, his view of the world.’ The implication was clear: [Mitt] Romney, David Petraeus, and others would not fit the bill, so Trump would have to look elsewhere. He found Tillerson.

“Tillerson is a pragmatist and a dealmaker. In many ways, he is a traditionalist. After all, he was endorsed by James Baker, Robert Gates, Hadley, and Condoleezza Rice. However, Trump also sees him, based on his personal relationship with Putin and opposition to sanctions on Russia, as someone willing to cut deals with strongmen and who sees national security through an economic lens and is thus an embodiment of his own America First views. Speaking in Wisconsin hours after naming Tillerson, Trump said, ‘Rex is friendly with many of the leaders in the world that we don’t get along with, and some people don’t like that. They don’t want them to be friendly. That’s why I’m doing the deal with Rex, ‘cause I like what this is all about.’” (emphasis added)

Is this – the war with a “hostile Islamic ethos” – then just a ploy, a diversion? Something for Iran to ignore? We suspect that Iran should not assume that Trump’s targeting of Iran and radical Islam is just some harmless diversion. It is not likely that Trump actively seeks war with Iran, but were Iran to be perceived to be deliberately humiliating Trump or America, the President (self-confessedly) is not of a temperament to let any humiliation pass. He likes to repay those who do him harm, ten-fold.

End of White America

But additionally, since, as polls show, and a leading American commentator on religion and politics, Robert Jones, has written, the Trump phenomenon is also deeply connected with the end of an American era: The End of White Christian America (as his book is entitled). In point of fact, the era has already passed. For, as Jones notes, “1993 was the last year in which America was majority white, and Protestant.”

Jones writes of the “vertigo” felt – even within the insular settings of many Southern and Midwestern towns where white Protestant conservatives continue to dominate society, and politics – at their “loss of place at the center of American culture, democracy and cultural power.”

Salt has been rubbed into this wound by a Democratic Party that has somewhat reveled in the passing of white majority America and exacerbated the sore through rebranding itself as the new “majority” of minorities. Jones remarks that while some in America “might celebrate” its passing, white Christian America did provide some kind of “civic glue,” and he ruminates on how the sense of void and anxiety on “what might serve that purpose [in the future], might well turn destructive.”

This is, Iran might recall, Trump’s core constituency, which he must mollify if he is to remain in office. The destructive impulse of Tea Party-ists, if scratched repeatedly, might seek to let off steam at some convenient target.

But secondly, it seems that Trump shares in some measure, this embrace of Judeo-Christian values. Certainly Steve Bannon does. He has said plainly that American capitalism – if it is to survive – must be reconnected to Judeo-Christian values. But what explains Trump’s paradoxical focus on Iran, which is fighting Islamic radicalism, rather than say, Saudi Arabia, which is not?

Here, Martin Wright gives us the clue: “In January and February [2016], Trump was under pressure to unveil a foreign-policy team. The Republican foreign-policy establishment overwhelmingly condemned him, largely because of his America First views. It was at this point that retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn started advising him. … Several weeks after Flynn came on board, Trump rolled out a list of foreign-policy advisors. Most were completely unknown, but the name Walid Phares stood out. Phares has a controversial past as a leading figure in a Lebanese Christian militia, and is known as a hard-liner in the war on terror.”

Mother Jones’ investigative report is plain: Phares, a Lebanese Christian Maronite, is a Samir Gagea man, who has a long history, dating back to Lebanon’s civil war of (intellectual) animosity towards Iran and Syria. It seems Trump (and Flynn too?) may have imbibed deeply at the bitter well of Lebanese prejudice and civil war hatreds?

Translating the Runes

So what do the runes tell us? The occult alphabet of Trump’s foreign policy will prove hard to read. The essential tension between, on the one hand, the “America Firsters” and the religious warriors – and all those who adhere to the American “traditionalist” policy position – portends the prospect of policies that might oscillate, from time to time, between these three diverse and conflicting poles.

Let us remind ourselves – “traditionalist” includes “all those officials who support the institutions of American power, and are generally comfortable with the post-World War II bipartisan consensus on U.S. strategy, even though they may seek to change it on the margins.”

It is quite likely that some of Trump’s team members who are mercantilists (such as Tillerson) or “Christian warriors” (such as Flynn), might be “bi-polar”: that is to say will be pulled in both directions on certain policy issues. We perhaps might be advised, therefore, to disregard most leaks, as more likely to constitute self-serving exercises directed towards influencing the internal struggle within “the team” (i.e. kite-flying exercises), rather than as true leaks that describe a genuine consensus reached within the “team.”

But the runes will be harder to read precisely because of Trump’s tactics of feints and distractions. As one astute chess-coach-turned-analyst has observed, Trump seems to be a pretty accomplished hand at chess:

“Chess is a game where the number of possible positions rises at an astronomical rate. By the 2nd move of the game there are already 400 possible positions, and after each person moves twice, that number rises to 8902. My coach explained to me that I was not trained enough to even begin to keep track of those things and that my only chance of ever winning was to take the initiative and never give it up. ‘You must know what your opponent will do next by playing his game for him.’ was the advice I received.

“Now, I won’t bore you with the particulars but it boiled down to throwing punches, at each and every turn without exception. In other words, if my opponent must always waste his turn responding to what I am doing, then he never gets an opportunity to come at me in the millions of possibilities that reside in the game. Again, if I throw the punch – even one that can be easily blocked, then I only have to worry about one combination and not millions.

“My Russian chess coach next taught me that I should Proudly Announce what exactly I am doing and why I am doing it. He explained to me that bad chess players believe that they can hide their strategy even though all the pieces are right there in plain sight for anyone to see. A good chess player has no fear of this because they will choose positions that are unassailable so why not announce them? As a coach, I made all of my students tell each other why they were making the moves that they made as well as what they were planning next. It entirely removed luck from the game and quickly made them into superior players.

“My Russian coach next stressed Time as something I should focus on to round out my game. He said that I shouldn’t move the same piece twice in a row and that my ‘wild punches’ should focus on getting my pieces on to the board and into play as quickly as possible. So, if I do everything correctly, I have an opponent that will have a disorganized defense, no offense and few pieces even in play and this will work 9 out of 10 times. The only time it doesn’t work for me is when I go against players that have memorized hundreds of games and have memorized how to get out of these traps. With all that said, let’s see if President Trump is playing chess.

“First, we can all agree that Trump, if nothing else, throws a lot of punches. We really saw this in the primaries where barely a day could go by without some scandal that would supposedly end his presidential bid. His opponents and the press erroneously thought that responding to each and every “outrage’ was the correct thing to do without ever taking the time to think whether or not they had just walked into a trap. They would use their turn to block his Twitter attack but he wouldn’t move that [chess] piece again once that was in play but, instead, brought on the next outrage – just like my [Russian chess] coach instructed me to do.

“Second, Trump is very vocal in what he is going to do. Just like I had my students announced to each other their [chess] strategy, Trump has been nothing but transparent about what he intends to do. After all, announcing your plans only works if your position is unassailable. It demoralizes your opponent. You rub their face in it. Another benefit to being vocal is that it encourages your opponent to bring out his favorite piece to deal with said announced plans. This is a big mistake as any good chess player will quickly recognize which piece his opponent favors and then go take them.

“Time has been the one area that our president is having problems. Executive Orders and Twitter Wars have pushed the opposition off balance but he has not been able to use this time to get all of his pieces into play. The Justice Department (his Queen) is still stuck behind a wall of pawns. Furthermore, only 5 of his 15 Cabinet picks have been confirmed as of this writing. Without control over these departments, the president can fight a war of attrition but he really can’t go on the offensive. In chess, I will gladly trade a piece for a piece if it means you have to waste your turn dealing with it. It isn’t a long term strategy if you do not have all of your pieces ready to go.”

Well, maybe its best just to sit and observe, and stop trying to read the runes?

Alastair Crooke is a former British diplomat who was a senior figure in British intelligence and in European Union diplomacy. He is the founder and director of the Conflicts Forum.

Initially published by https://consortiumnews.com/2017/02/11/deciphering-trumps-opaque-foreign-policy/

Published in Tribune
Sunday, 12 February 2017 15:33

Moving towards Geneva: Giving peace a chance

Syria is moving to the fourth round of the Geneva talks. Two days of inclusive talks in Riyadh, bringing to the negotiation table the expanded Syrian opposition, including the Astana delegation and the Syrian Higher Negotiations Committee, finished yesterday. 

The opposition was harmonizing its positions on the threshold of the new Astana round, setting the priorities for Geneva Talks and discussing the outcomes of the previous Astana meeting.

The Astana meeting did not replace the format, but became a supplementary in-strument, a back-up tool for the Geneva negotiations. Astana permitted the realiza-tion of ceasefire, and the first round of talks resulted in the elaboration of trilateral monitoring mechanisms of the ceasefire regime in Syria, guaranteed by Turkey, Russia and Iran. 

On February 15-16, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry will host another round of talks, welcoming delegations from the Syrian government and the rebel side, along with the UN Special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistoura, and the delegations of three guarantors.

Jordanian and the US delegations are also invited to take part in Astana II.  

Resolving problems 

The Astana format is set to solve the problems preventing the Geneva format from being a success, by instituting the communication process and resolving ground is-sues, mostly related to the military sphere, and paving the way for political resolu-tion and the long-awaited and inevitable transitional process. 

The Geneva talks are set to be held on February 20. A lot has changed since the previous round. The third round practically did not leave hope for a political solu-tion. The Opposition, both moderate and otherwise, was so much fragmented, that it could not come to any agreement even within its own ranks. The International community was supporting separate opposition groups, thus somehow fragmenting them even more and politicizing the whole negotiation process, putting it in the framework of global geopolitical rivalries. 

The major changes in the global sphere, the focus of the US on presidential elections first and then on the cataclysms in face of Trump’s administration, with the West watching the goings on in Washington, together with changes on the ground in Syria have significantly changed the situation and prospects of the negotiations. 

The foreign states have cut their financial support to the rebel groups, and there are practically no more voices calling to topple the Syrian regime by force. 

As was stated by prominent Syrian dissident Louay Hussein, “the armed conflict for the state is over”, and the majority in the opposition are going back towards a political struggle. Even though Hussein’s conclusions are premature, his words have a grain of truth.

 

The Syrian opposition has become more united and amenable. However, the Islamist fractions, that have formed a new alliance recently, are reportedly going to launch new attacks on the government’s positions. But most likely from the general perspective, such a decision is counterproductive primarily for themselves. 

Maria Dubovikova


The Syrian opposition has become more united and amenable. However, the Islamist fractions, that have formed a new alliance recently, are reportedly going to launch new attacks on the government’s positions. But most likely from the general perspective, such a decision is counterproductive primarily for themselves. Such attempts to disrupt negotiation and political process do not correspond to the expectations of the majority of the rebels and opposition forces. They alienate themselves from the political process, lose credibility, drifting to the terrorist Islamist formations in the company of which they have all chances to end up their fight. But this will hardly inflict significant damage to the negotiation process. 

Assad’s stubbornness 

What can be done about the stubbornness of the regime in Damascus. Russia’s in-fluence on the regime is overestimated than real. Damascus will keeps listening to advice as long as that that corresponds to its own expectations and vision. 

Iran has more influence on Damascus than anyone else, taking into account the strong Iranian support of the ruling regime. Iran is not interested in transition and in toppling Assad. Iran is interested in guaranteeing its influence on Syria in the post -war scenario. That is Tehran’s main priority. And during the negotiation process, Iran will do its best not to let anyone kick it out from the post-war political system rebuilding in Syria. 

Nothing is guaranteed for the outcome of the Fourth Geneva round. However, the sides attending it are far more organized than ever, and the opposition is looking forward to these talks with more enthusiasm and hope, than before, when the for-mat was considered mostly useless for them. 

There is a high risk that Damascus and Tehran can sabotage the talks with their stubbornness, as their positions are poles apart on many issues to the expectations of the opposition. Even in case of success there are many issues that will have to be faced during the political process and that will provoke at best tough debates. One such issue is the Kurdish matter.

While all the sides are seriously getting ready for talks, Syrians are looking to the future with hope. Reportedly, people have started to return to Syria, mostly to the ruins of their past, but they are strongly motivated to restoring their country and homes with their own hands. 

Life is returning even to ruined East Aleppo. Peace got a chance it did not have before, during all the long years of the bloody war.

Initially published by Al Arabiya English: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2017/02/12/Moving-towards-Geneva-Giving-peace-a-chance-.html 

Published in Tribune

Over the past year, Russia has become an increasingly pivotal player in the Syrian war and, by extension, in the broader Middle East. Amidst the noise Russia’s impact in Syria has caused, the underlying drivers of its strategy – domestic, security and ideological – remain too often ignored. As a result, Russian decisions regarding Syria often seemed unpredictable and irrational to observers. However, Hanna Notte argues in her guest contribution, published by KAS and Maison du Futur, Russia’s strategy and fundamental interests in Syria have been remarkably consistent over the past six years.

To download a paper you can clicking the cover.

Research by our member Hanna Notte was made for Konrad Adenauer Center.


 

Published in Research
Wednesday, 01 February 2017 17:02

Moscow offers stage for Palestinian talks

Moscow recently hosted its second intra-Palestinian meeting, where high-ranking members of numerous Palestinian political organizations, including Fatah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, directly engaged in conversation. In contrast to the first negotiations of the kind, which were held six years ago, the dialogue has become more inclusive, involving a dozen groups. 

Although the Jan. 15-16 talks brought together Russian Foreign Ministry officials and enabled the parties to meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia emphasized the unofficial and purely intra-Palestinian status of the meeting, noting Russia was only involved as the host.

The event was organized by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Foundation for the Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education.

The venue and date for the talks raised some questions. Foreign observers wondered why Palestinians would hold talks among their own factions in Moscow, especially when another meeting had just been held in Paris a few days before. Other factors in this process include the Beirut intra-Palestinian meeting that also took place a few days before the Moscow event; UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which addresses the illegality of Israeli settlements; and, naturally, US President Donald Trump’s statements about moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Obviously, Trump’s rise to presidency and the subsequent changes expected in US Middle East policy acted as catalysts for this diplomatic flurry, which will have little true influence on the peace settlement.

Trump’s Islamophobia and his seemingly pro-Israeli stance do not augur well for Palestine, but then, they’re not a safe bet for the Jews, either.

Palestinians feel the need to demonstrate their ability to constructively interact with the international community and their genuine desire to resume negotiations. At the same time, they appear to be seeking more active support from other powerful extra-regional players — above all, Moscow, which has been playing a greater role in the region. Moreover, Russia has close ties with various factions within the Palestinian leadership.

Moscow, in turn, seeks to extend its role as a mediator in the Middle East beyond the Syrian agenda. Testifying to this were the first intra-Palestinian meeting, the 2015 intra-Syrian consultations and Syria-related cooperation with Turkey and Iran. Thus, the Kremlin’s courtesy is developing into a clear alternative to America’s straightforward approach, which is typified by irksome lecturing.

The Moscow talks produced a Jan. 17 joint statement that Palestine should soon see the formation of a national unity government. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ consultations with the parties’ officials would determine the particular structure of this government. Russia’s leading Orientalist, Vitaly Naumkin, who moderated the meeting, believes that under a positive scenario the government could be established by this summer, followed by elections for the Palestinian National Council. Palestinian diasporas worldwide, as well as residents of the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem, would be able to cast their ballots.

The participants think these steps could help overcome disunity among Palestine’s political establishment and society. The moves could also help resolve the conflict, because the Israelis would be deprived of their argument concerning the absence of a Palestinian representative to talk with, which they perennially use to justify their reluctance to conduct bilateral talks.

Hamas’ inclusion in a new government is a very sensitive issue, an Achilles’ heel of the plan. Paradoxically, many countries still regard Hamas, the party that won the democratic elections held at the West’s insistence, as a terrorist group.

The political process is very likely to reach a deadlock if, as projected, Tel Aviv and several members of the world political community insist on politically isolating a government that includes Hamas members, even though Hamas has significantly softened its stance over the past decade. The ball, however, is now in Israel’s court. Admittedly, the Palestinians may be counting on the mediation of Moscow, given its growing influence in the region.

The Palestinians are counting on Moscow’s assistance in several other matters as well. One issue is Israel’s continued settlement building and the “Judaization” of East Jerusalem. Second, Palestinians are concerned with Trump’s inflammatory promise to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Both Russian and Palestinian experts see that proposal as inflicting catastrophic damage to the entire peace process.

Finally, the talks also focused on the Middle East Quartet, which the Palestinian attendees unanimously considered discredited.

The issues discussed, as well as the assessments made, were predictable. As for the final communique, Moscow regarded it as “the best possible.” Such moderation makes one think again about the best strategy for the Palestinians in the current international situation, on the one hand, and about how to modify the international community’s approach to a settlement, on the other.

Today, the Quartet’s inefficiency, as well as the gradually declining interest of the world community in the endless and hopeless Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are apparent. Some actors will probably keep paying tribute to the Quartet’s symbolic role in the region from time to time and will be full of good intentions. But now, the more marked right-wing bias in the West presupposes the diminishing involvement of Europe and the United States in the Middle East. In the medium and short term, Israel will benefit from and be fully content with the current situation. Nevertheless, Russian experts say that in general this approach is disastrous for Israel as it will end up in a stalemate.

Until now, nothing has prevented Tel Aviv from relishing the situation. The growing role of regional powers, whose attitude toward the seemingly unchangeable conflict has become ever-more ambivalent, does not seem to affect the Israeli stance, either. Though support for the Palestinians remains sine qua non for any Arab politician at the emotional level, many of them are faced with much more acute issues at the pragmatic level. Moreover, Arab and Israeli leaders share some similar concerns, such as security issues and religious radicalization.

In this case, it is vital to back up the Palestinians. To address the matter, Palestinian political elites should restore public trust, which they lost after their failed attempts in the past to reconcile with each other. The unity government will be the first step to reach this objective. If Israel impedes its progress, it will be necessary to start all over again.

If global and regional political actors — even if some opt out — manage to sacrifice short-term self-interest for the sake of enhancing a strategy that will allow for a new regional balance of power, it will be possible to come to grips with the problem.

However, the developments in the Middle East over recent years demonstrate that, increasingly, tactics beat strategy.


Article from Al-Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/moscow-russia-palestine-israel-peace-process-talks.html

Published in Tribune

Russia's relationship with the Persian Gulf and the independent Arab monarchies, which have formed in the region over the past century, is proving complex and malleable. It ebbs and flows, characterized by significant political differences, which are related to various aspects of regional and global politics and are ultimately also a function of internal political transformations, both within Russia itself and the states of the region.

However, it should be pointed out that – all disagreements and heated discussions about the Syrian crisis and the Iranian nuclear deal notwithstanding – Russia and the GCC have never been such close partners, as they are during this current complicated and painful turn in Middle Eastern history, in that they share a wide range of common interests and understand each others' concerns. There is a mutual impact between, on the one hand, prolonged regional destabilization, multiple sources and theatres of violence and the loss of governability in the region, and the internal processes within the GCC member states, on the other. The GCC, a political-military alliance with great financial and economic potential, has - in Russia's view - transformed into a real power centre, exercising leverage on the overall situation not just within the region.

Everything is relative, so the mutual appeal between Russia and the Persian Gulf is best understood in its historical context. Let us take, for instance, the longstanding relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia, which plays a leading role in the GCC:

The Soviet Union was one of the first states to recognize, and establish diplomatic relations with, the Saudi Kingdom in 1932. The Soviets viewed the momentum towards integration on the Arabian peninsula as a progressive development, especially against the backdrop of the colonial policies of Western powers, which had competed to divide the spoils of the Arab world amongst each other. The Saudis never forgot that Moscow, in those difficult initial years of the Kingdom's development, provided Riyadh with oil products, especially gasoline. This interesting historical fact must appear amusing and paradoxical today.

Later, after the Russian Ambassador was recalled from Riyadh, bilateral relations were frozen for a protracted period. The reason was not any foreign policy disagrement, but rather the internal political repression arising within the Soviet Union, which claimed many respected diplomats as victims.

During the post-World War II period of bipolar confrontation, the Soviet leadership viewed the Gulf region as a sphere of Western preponderance. This view was reflected in Soviet ideology at the time, which divided the Arab world into states characterized by a Socialist orientation and perceived as acting compatible with Soviet foreign policy doctrine, and into the «reactionary» oil monarchies, considered US satellites. This artificial distinction was also fuelled by Nasserist Egypt, which at the time was ambitious to spread Arab nationalism across the region, especially towards the Arabian peninsula with its significant oil resources. Soviet Middle East policy was then undoubtedly driven by apprehensions about Cairo's intentions, and it was occasionally difficult to establish, who was exercising the greater influence on whom.

A reinstatement of relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia at the end of the 1970s – a period when conditions seemed ripe for reconciliation – was complicated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which caused great damage to Moscow's position in the Muslim world. It was not until the 1990s that both countries established diplomatic representations in each other's capitals, though bilateral relations were overshadowed by a whole range of irritants, such as the conflict in Chechnya and events in Kosovo. While the Saudi perspective on these conflicts prioritized the need to protect the Muslim population, the Russian leadership, urging the reestablishment of constitutional legality in Chechnya and refusing to recognize Kosovar independence from Serbia, looked at the situation through the prism of international legal norms, such as the sanctity of territorial integrity and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs.

Russia's internal problems in the 1990s, causing it to reduce its political activity and economic ties in the Middle East, additionally complicated relations with Saudi Arabia, as well as the other GCC states. To many in the world, Russia appeared to have turned its back on the region. This impression was reinforced by the fact that Moscow, against the backdrop of rapidly unfolding democratic changes inside Russia, embarked on an increasingly pro-Western oriented foreign policy course. Hence, the Persian Gulf was not so much looked at from Moscow as a region that ties should be fostered with bilaterally, but its importance was rather assessed within the overall context of Russia's partnership with the US, which was to provide the framework in which to devise a reliable Middle Eastern regional security system[1].

Russia's return to the region from the early 2000s then occurred under very different circumstances. There was a change in the very paradigm of Russian-Arab relations, which became mutually beneficial and evolved in different spheres. Purely pragmatic considerations assumed priority: the support of a stable political dialogue, whatever the disagreements, the strengthening of economic ties, as well as regional security. On this basis, Russia started building relations – rather successfully – not just with traditional partners, but with all Arab Gulf states, which were gaining in political and economic weight at the time.

During the same period, the GCC underwent a process of increasing institutionalisation internally, for instance in the spheres of common defense, coordination of actions on the international stage, coordination of oil policies, as well as economic integration. Given the emergence of this new, more integrated center of power in the Gulf, relations with Russia acquired an additional dimension.

From 2011, a Russian-GCC dialogue started to develop in parallel to the nurturing of bilateral relations; the former was aimed at the convergence and coordination of the participants' positions on regional and global problems of common interest, as well as the development of trade and economic relations. Five rounds of talks between all foreign ministers were held in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Kuwait, Moscow, as well as New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Regional security, especially the fight against international terrorism and a political solution for the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen – both intended to stabilize the Middle Eastern situation more broadly – became the central item on the Russia-GCC agenda. In this context, the Gulf participants emphasized, in particular, Iran's regional role and its relations with Russia, since they viewed Tehran as the main threat in the region.

The extent to which questions related to Gulf security are of utmost priority to the Arab states of the region is well understood in Russia. These questions already acquired heightened significance in 1990 during the First Gulf War. At that time, the priority for both the GCC and, by the way, Russia was to neutralize the threat emanating from Iraq. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the GCC started to view Iran – a state with substantial military might and wide-ranging possibilties to influence the Gulf states through its support for their Shiite communities – as their main enemy.

As a result of this development, the challenges of Gulf regional security acquired a new, more complex character, especially considering the heavy legacy of relations between these two centers of power in the region, a legacy that has its roots in the emergence and spread of Islam as a world religion.

The destruction of the old state foundations and the social and political upheavals, which afflicted the entire MENA region with the beginning of the «Arab Spring», forced the GCC to adapt to changing circumstances and to seek additional resources, in order to forestall the spillover of destabilization into the Persian Gulf at a time when power relations between major regional players were in flux. Egypt, living through two revolutions and suffering from their disruptive consequences, was temporarily weakened. Syria and Iraq have been torn by internal strife between groups close to either Saudi Arabia or Iran. And Turkey, which claimed the universality of its model of «Islamic democracy», has ceased to be regarded in the Arab world as a role model, given its growing domestic and external problems.

Unlike Jordan and Morocco, which swiftly embarked on a path of political modernization, the Saudi kingdom decided for more gradual development, starting by introducing economic reforms. And this is understandable: Saudi Arabia, as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam, carries a particular responsibility for the maintenance of stability, especially at a time when it found itself, as officials in Riyadh argued, caught between two perils: that of revolution and acts of terrorism, on the one hand, and that of surging Iranian regional ambitions, on the other. It should be noted that, while these worries shared by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies were not entirely unfounded, they were in some instances overexaggerated, according to most Western and Russian experts.

It is certainly true that Shiite Iran has enhanced its position in Iraq over recent years, paradoxically enabled by the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, which changed the sectarian balance in positions of power in favour of the Shia, a fact that Iran has used in its favour. Saudi hopes that the Assad regime, close to Iran, would be swiftly overthrown did not materialize. Iran's influence in Lebanon, exercised through the militarily well-equipped Hezbollah movement, also increased. And at the same time, the Shia opposition in Bahrain became more active, as did the Houthis in Yemen, which are considered an outright product of Iran, though this is well known to be a stretch of logic.

Developments North to the Gulf, where a Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis was perceived to form, as well as South, where the Houthis overthrew a legally elected President, were seen by the Arab Gulf states as a real threat to both their security and very existence. A new strategy, comprising a whole range of political, military, financial, economic and propagandist counter-measures, had to be devised. Changes at the top echelons of power in the Saudi kingdom hastened this strategy, which was ultimately intended to contain Iran, into action.

Given these assessments of developments in the Middle East, which are prevailing among circles in the Gulf, the US' changing regional policy, especially in relation to Iran, and its possible impact on regional relations, has been of particular concern. Should recent US policy be understood as the manifestation of a new regional strategy, aimed at rapprochement with Iran and the creation of a new regional equilibrium, or rather as a tactical feat? Especially Saudi Arabia viewed the toppling of Hosni Mubarak as resulting in the loss of a trusted ally and, even worse, as evidence of the unreliability of American patronage. America's flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood, ascending to power at the time, caused yet more suspicion, which was then further exacerbated by President Obama's decision to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran. The not unfounded Saudi allegations that the US' policy of supporting Shia authoritarian leaders in Baghdad further allowed Iran to enhance its sphere of influence in Iraq, became an additional irritant in Gulf-US relations. The two sides also differed sharply on how to deal with the conflict in Syria. US policy in Syria was regularly criticsed in the Gulf as weak and inconsistent. As a result of the above-discussed irritants, and for the first time in history, US-Saudi relations were seriously tested, a development which reached its apogee in Riyadh's renouncing of the strategic partnership and heralding a «sharp turn» in its foreign policy[2].

Worries about losing the US as the traditional security guarantor in the region also precipitated the GCC's activisation of political contacts with Russia, including at the senior level. The Saudis figured it wise to assess the extent to which Russia could play a moderating role with respect to Iran, as well as to broaden their foreign policy ties in the international arena, given the new system of flexible and self-regulating balances in the region. Russia, in turn, had already from the early 2000s adopted a balanced foreign policy course intended at the levelling of relations with states of the «Arab bloc», which it viewed as an increasingly influential player and serious partner not just in the region, but also on global political and economic issues.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and the «P5+1» on July 14, 2015, generated a whole range of commentary and prognoses. Two opposing camps, each assessing the deal in terms of its likely global ramifications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as its impact on Iran's regional politics, emerged.

The JCPOA's opponents in the US, like those in the region itself (including Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states) are far from convinced that the deal will lower Tehran's nuclear ambitions and moderate its regional strategy. Some even fear a regional nuclear arms race, driven by Iran's apprehensive neighbours[3]. The Gulf States do not hide the fear that the financial resources released to Iran post-sanctions relief will be used by Tehran to support the pro-Iranian forces and movements within the entire so-called «Shia crescent». The JCPOA's supporters, on the other hand, argue that the deal will not lead to a distortion of the region's military balance and that the US remains committed to its security guarantees in the Middle East. They also hold that the deal will strengthen moderate elements in the Iranian leadership, which compete with those who continue to support a harder line, especially on Syria. According to the supporters' logic, an Iran emerging from international isolation will act more responsibly, be ready for compromises, and the other Gulf states, having received guarantees that they will be protected against possible Iranian expansionism, will equally conduct a more restrained foreign policy in the region.

The agreement with Iran did not have any negative impact on Russia's relations with the Gulf countries. There is even reason to argue that – the disagreements regarding Iran and the Syrian crisis notwithstanding – meetings and conversations at the heighest political and diplomatic level became more frequent and assumed a more pragmatic outlook.

 President Putin, for instance, met with King Salman in Antalya in November 2015, and with Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud in June 2015 in St. Petersburg, as well as in October of the same year in Sochi. Of course, in view of the complexity and multifaceted nature of the situation prevailing in the region, it was difficult to expect any major breakthroughs. Nonetheless, the two sides agreed on those issues, on which they differ most acutely and agreed to continue the political dialogue and cooperation in the trade and economic sphere. A mutual understanding prevailed that differences, whatever they may be, should not become a pretense for breaking relations. Both sides were cognizant of the fact that their disagreements were outnumbered by their converging interests and approaches on a wide range of issues on the regional and international agenda, including the Middle East peace process, regional security (including in the Persian Gulf), the promotion of a dialogue among civilizations, the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy and drug trade. Such agreements, if carried out by both sides, would in themselves be a good achievement, if compared with the ups and downs in the history of relations between the two countries.

It is possible that the change in the very style of negotiations – from emotional outbursts to candid, business-like conversations – occurred precisely because both sides recognized their own and  their respective partner's important role in averting the materialization of worse-case scenarios in the region. This is especially true after Russia called for a broad antiterrorist coalition and started supporting the Syrian army decisively with airstrikes.

It is also worth pointing out a special relashionships between Russia and the Kingdom of Bahrein which are on the rise in all spheres – political, economic, banking, scientific, cultural etc. The relationships of the kind are based on close personal ties on the highest level between President Putin and His Majesty the King Hamad who had been visiting Russia four times during the last six years.

The Russian side, in the context of bilateral and multilateral (with the GCC) consultations, has been eager to convey to its Arab Gulf partners which regional and global considerations drive its policy in the Middle East. This has concerned, in particular, Moscow's relations with Tehran and its views of Iran's regional role, as well as Russia's perspective on international cooperation in the fight against ISIL and other terrorist organizations, which instrumentalize Islam to hide their political objectives.

It is critical to pause and discuss these issues, which take a central place in the Russian-Arab common agenda, in somewhat greater detail – especially given that mutual mistrust and mistaken interpretations of the respective other's intentions and motivations prevail in both the Gulf countries and Russia. From time to time, distorted ideas about Russian strategy in the region circulate in Gulf political circles.

For instance, before the Moscow meeting between the Russian and GCC foreign ministers in May 2016, the Al Hayat newspaper alleged that Iran assumes «the central place in Moscow's system of regional and international alliances», that «whoever rules Iran, be it radical or moderate mullahs, or even the Revolutionary Guards, Moscow views its bilateral ties with Tehran as of overriding concern, whether the Gulf Arabs like it or not» [4]. It is also no secret that, besides those who support building a constructive relationship with Russia, there are also those in Saudi Arabia who believe that an «either-or» choice – being with the Saudis or with Iran – will be inevitable for Russia[5].

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed these questions, which appear of particular concern to the Gulf, during yet another round of the Russian-GCC strategic dialogue in Moscow. At the joint press conference with his Saudi counterpart Adel al-Jubeir, Lavrov noted that any country has the right to develop friendly relations with its neighbours and to strive to grow its influence beyond its borders. He also emphasized that this has to be done with full respect for the principles of international law, transparently, legitimately, without pursuing any hidden agendas and without trying to interfere within the internal affairs of sovereign states. The Russian side has also always warned of the dangers associated with portraying disagreements between Iran and the GCC as reflecting a split in the Muslim world. Russia believes it is unacceptable to further provoke the situation exploiting sectarian prisms[6].

The majority of Russian experts view Iran as one of Russia's major southern neighbours, with whom mutually advantageous cooperation on a wide range of bilateral, regional and international questions – including trade, energy and (military) security – is absolutely essential. Not just the Middle East counts here, but the entire Eurasian context. Russia is interested that Iran become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a political alliance comprising non-Western states, which was founded by China and Russia.

Given these considerations, it is not realistic to confront Russia with an «either-or choice»: either Iran or the GCC. And though Russia and Iran have many common interests and their cooperation looks promising, their relationship is not without challenges. Moscow's and Tehran's foreign policy objectives coincide in some areas, but diverge in others, depending on the concrete circumstances. Russia recognizes Iran as a major player in the Middle East, yet like the Arab states does not want Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons. And the Rouhani regime understands perfectly well that Russia cannot build relations with Iran to the detriment of the GCC states' security. In Syria, Russia and Iran form a close military alliance, which however is not tantamount to a common political strategy. While both Moscow and Tehran seek to prevent the victory of Islamist extremists, their long-term goals and visions for a post-Assad Syria differ substantially. Russia is not set on retaining Assad personally, or the Alawite minority, in power, but is principally concerned with the integrity of the Syrian state, albeit a reformed one friendly to Moscow. In the security realm, Russia also closely coordinates its actions with Israel and therefore views Iran's reliance on Hezbollah suspiciously[7]. Iran's most prominent politicians are also far from contemplating the formation of an outright alliance with Russia. As Rouhani stated, «good relations with Russia do not imply Iran's agreement with any of Moscow's actions.» [8]

In general, many Russian and Western experts agree that, regarding Syria, there is Russian-Iranian agreement on the basis of  a situational confluence of interests, but that one cannot speak of a full-fledged military alliance between the two powers[9]. Unlike Tehran, Moscows maintains pragmatic contacts with a wide range of political forces inside Lebanon, eager to support national consensus and to prevent a slide of the country into the abyss of violence and religious strife. And regarding Yemen, their positions equally clash. While Tehran unequivocally supports Ali Abduallah Saleh and the Houthis, Russia has adopted a more neutral position on the conflict.

Drawing conclusions, it is critical to emphasize that Moscow does not support any Iranian great power ambitions in the Persian Gulf and categorically avoids interference in the Sunni-Shiite conflict, aware that - in conditions of acute rivalry for spheres of influence in the region - Iran instrumentalizes various Shiite forces in pursuit of its narrow political interests. Relations with Saudi Arabia are without a doubt valuable in themselves for Russia. Therefore, it is important to appreciate, just how difficult a balancing act it is for Moscow to simultaneously develop what it views as an indispensible partnership with the Saudi kingdom, to strengthen friendly ties with the other Gulf monarchies and to deal successfully with its Southern neighbour Iran, with which it shares a centuries-long history. Especially at the current stage, when the regional confrontation has gone too far and, most alarmingly, has become conceived as a clash between the two religious centers of the Muslim world, the Saudi leadership has decided to contain Iran by force.

As the two opposing camps deplete their resources, and the international community feels increasingly tired and powerless to stop the vicious circle of violence, conceptualizing a new regional security order, as proposed by Russia, will become all the more urgent. The Arab states have agreed in principle to such an initiative, but are against Iranian integration into a regional security system until Tehran starts pursuing a policy of good-neighbourliness and non-interference. But without Iran, the Russian project is not viable. Therefore, Russia has signalled its readiness «to use its good relations with both the GCC and Iran, in order to help create the conditions for a concrete conversation on the normalisation of GCC-Iranian ties, which can only occur through direct dialogue.» [10]

However Russian-American relations will develop, the Gulf States need to understand that, in recent years, the balance of power in the Middle East has been changing, alliances have been forming and breaking. The level of unpredictability is growing, new risks are emerging. Today, the US' allies in the region are not necessarily Russia's enemies, in the same way that Moscow's friends are not Washington's foes. All their disagreements about Syria notwithstanding, a further escalation in the Gulf – a region of utmost importance for the world economy and global financial systems – is not in the interest of either power. In the search for what would be a historical reconciliation in the Gulf, the common terrorist threat posed by ISIL and Al Qaeda could be a critical uniting factor. The number of supporters of the «caliphate» in Saudi Arabia and in the South of the Arabian peninsula is far from insignificant. Both also have ambitious plans for economic development and are very interested in creating a favorable external environment for their aspirations.

Dr. Alexander Aksenenok, Ambassador (ret), member of Russian International Affaires Council, senior researcher, Institute for Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Siencies.

 

 

[1] См. Свободная мысль, Россия и Саудовская Аравия: эволюция отношений, Косач Григорий, http://svom.info/entry/608-rossiya-i-saudovskaya-aravia-evoluciya-otnosheni/

[2] см. http://lenta/ru/articles/2013/10/23/unfriended/.

[3] См. РБК, Ричард Хаас, Скрытая угроза: чем опасно ядерное соглашение с Ираном, http://daily.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/16/07/2015

[4] «Москва арабам: Иран наш первый союзник», «Аль-Хаят», 19 февраля 2016 года, http://www.alh

[5] «Аль-Хаят», 26 февраля 2016 года, http://www.alhayat.com/m/opinion/14165741 ayat.com/m/opinion/14041679

[6] Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова, http://www/mid/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/...

[7] Russia and Iran: Historic  Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership, Dmitry Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center, http://carnegie.ru/2016/08/18/russia-and-Iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-part...

[8] См. Газета RU, 06.03.2016

[9] См. Брак по расчёту. Перспективы российско-иранского регионального сотрудничества, Николай Кожанов, Россия в глобальной политике, №3 май-июнь 2016

[10] Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова 15.09.2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy_/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/...

Published in Research

IMESClub MESClub vice-president Nick Soukhov took part in the live dialogue on the France 24 Arabiya on January, 19, 2017: Syria - what the equation after the Astana?

 

مفاوضات مرتقبة في أستانة بشأن الصراع السوري مقررة يومي الاثنين والثلاثاء القادمين. جولة أخرى من المحادثات السورية السورية لكن هذه المرة كل شيئ اختلف في الميدان السوري كما على الساحة الإقليمية والدولية. مهندسو أستانة مختلفون عن مهندسي جنيف، وشاغلو مقاعد طاولة مفاوضات أستانة مختلفين عن من جلسوا إلى التفاوض في جنيف. الروسي والأتراك سيرعون المفاوضات والأمركيون مدعوون لكن لم يعرف بعد إن كانوا سيحضرون أو من سيرسلون ولا بأي نية سيشاركون. سيكون على الطاولة إيرانيون وسيغيب عنها الخليجيون. فهل سينجح مؤتمر أستانة حيث فشل آخرون ؟

 

Published in Members activity

Following the launch of the ambitious Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has started a new chapter in its history, turning itself from a US dependent indecisive closed shadow-country, to the mighty power of the Middle East, with enormous potential, strength, opening its doors to the whole world step by step.

Saudi Arabia is intensifying its diplomatic efforts to change its perception to start a new era.

The kingdom uses current challenging circumstances as opportunities for taking a new path and succeed in it. It successfully diversifies its investment flows, thus putting money in different baskets. It attracts foreign technologies that assist with boosting innovation in the kingdom, and it lays the basis of its independence from natural resources. It invests significant money in youths, their studies in Western countries, because upon their return they will bring the most precious treasure - knowledge - that will contribute to the successful development of the country. Through all these moves the kingdom also cuts its dependency from the US - an ally that is becoming less reliable and less predictable. So diversification of political ties is also an important move of the country to become stronger and less dependent on vicissitudes of fate.

Russia is one of the partners of the kingdom in its far reaching ambitious plans is, however not such an evident one. Bilateral ties between Russia and Saudi Arabia are permanently developing the last couple of years opening new opportunities for both countries and their business circles, but not moving as fast as they really could. Potential of bilateral relations development is extraordinary. But this potential is not opened and not properly used.

Russian purposes in Syria are not clear for the Kingdom at all. Why does Russia declare that its military contingency in Syria is to fight terrorism, but ISIS stays, mostly unhindered by Russian fighter planes, Palmyra is lost again, but Russia announces ending its military contingency in Syria after the fall of Aleppo?

Maria Dubovikova

Bilateral ties, despite the more or less warm relations between the two governments, are dominated at least in the level of the two societies in general, by suspicions, mistrust and ignorance.

Facing barriers

Saudi business circles are very poorly informed about doing business in Russia. They face significant language barriers each time they try to find counterparts in Russia, due to the low level of English proficiency among Russians. Western media is their key source information about Russia, as long as there is no Russian media source in Arabic or English they consider reliable and of a high quality. The public opinion of Saudis is dominated by numerous traditional stereotypes - vodka, bears on the streets, Matryoshka - no one really tries to tackle from the Russian side.

Russian laziness and passiveness of business also does not add any positiveness in the situation. Another problem business risk facing each time coming to Russia is at the least being stuck with security officers for several hours in the airport, or at worst being deported right from the border in the Russian airport - even with the relevant visa. It is hard to explain that this can happen to all people coming from the Middle East because of security measures, as such a situation happens to innocent people coming to develop business ties, and it is humiliating and demotivating to do anything on this track. Also business circles are paralyzed by the restrictively short visas given, limiting their business opportunities.

Getting Russian visas is in general the talk of the town. I still remember how I was inviting my colleague from France to take part in a conference in Moscow, and she decided to go with her husband, thus applying for a business visa herself, following the official invitation, and her husband applied for a tourism visa. He was refused for strange reasons, as his wife was going for business reasons, he could not go for tourism. She was given a three-day visa.

Common interests

Nevertheless there are many common interests that can finally break down boundaries. Investment projects have all chances to be a true ram. However some political issues remain as sensitive points between the two countries. Two of them are Iran and Syria, and mostly they are connected.

For Riyadh, Russia’s close partnership with Iran is a reason for strong worries as it is considered as a threat for national interests. Mostly it is perceived as Moscow’s refusal to build on strong cooperation and friendship with the kingdom. This approach to the analysis is not right, however its roots are quite understandable.

In this context Russian cooperation with Iran in Syria raises many questions. The main being if Russia considers the possibility that Iranian geopolitical strengthening in the region through Shia communities has been used for its own interests, to bring destabilization of the region and sectarian wars?

Russian purposes in Syria are not clear for the Kingdom at all. Why does Russia declare that its military contingency in Syria is to fight terrorism, but ISIS stays, mostly unhindered by Russian fighter planes, Palmyra is lost again, but Russia announces ending its military contingency in Syria after the fall of Aleppo? These questions rarely receive properly articulated answers. And the problem is not even that there is nothing to say, but that Russia still does not pay much attention to the straight articulation of its positions and principles, that sometimes can have a feeling that it does not really know what it is doing and what the target is.

This vagueness creates a mistrust and an unwanted freedom to interpret as they choose. It also forms the climate where members at all levels are inclined to see the spread of obstacles, instead of forests of opportunities. Meanwhile positions of the two countries on many issues are common and can lay the perfect basis for an intense bilateral boost. The core is a proper communication and articulation of positions. Russia and Saudi Arabia both stand strong against terrorism, in the face of which both stay vulnerable.

In Syria both countries agree upon the need for a period under the control of the international community, the impossibility of Syrian federalization and fragmentation. Both countries consider the installation of a secular government in Syria important. In case of Iran Russia could play a role of a mediator between Riyadh and Tehran, assisting in easing of tensions and helping to build a constructive dialogue. As long as Donald Trump occupies the White House, Iran will supposedly become far more flexible and compliant.

No matter the difficulties experienced, the two countries have a mutual interest of developing bilateral ties and strengthening cooperation. But the main precondition of successful development of ties is firstly effective mutual prejudices fighting, the improvement of the climate of trust and fair cooperation.

 

Initially published by Al Arabiya English: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/world/2017/01/21/Saudi-Russia-relations-in-the-emerging-new-world-order.html 

Published in Tribune

United States has officially announced the suspension of diplomatic cooperation with Russia on Syria. That brings to an end coordination of efforts to counter terrorism and also the ceasefire that was in place.

Basically, it seems, Washington failed to distinguish between Jabhat an-Nusra and the so-called moderate rebels. Russia, on the other hand, has failed to fulfill its commitments. Irre-spective of whether this is due to lack of influence on Damascus, Russia has driven itself to a narrow corridor with not so well thought out policy. It seemed to be following Napoleon’s logic of jumping into the fray and then figuring out what to do next.

There have been miscalculations, difference over stated and real objectives in the Syrian conflict while the geopolitical intrigues and mistrust have brought about the paralysis of the entire political process.

The UN has failed in its mission due to many reasons including tension between global players such as Russia and the US. This has been exacerbated by the opposition’s lack of be-lief in any talks with Damascus and the UN’s failure to invoke the international system.

A new round of talks was scheduled to be held in the end of August but is now unlikely in the near future. Under these circumstances, which are pushing the world to the brink of a global conflict, we need more than ever the strong a truly powerful United Nations.

The election of the new Secretary General of the UN deserves special attention. Ban Ki-moon’s successor will not only inherit unresolved conflicts but also the full new pack of rapidly developing threats coming from two superpowers.

The problem is that while promoting their candidate countries are guided not by the desire to strengthen the UN as an institution, to enable it to tackle global threats, but instead fol-low their own interests. The US seems to be interested in a female candidate to occupy the chair, while Russia promotes Eastern European candidate.

The leader of the UN should have enough courage to push the entire organization toward reforms. For this the UN needs a very determined and resolute person who is ready to take risk and bear the responsibility for each step taken and its consequences. The new UN Sec-retary General should be truly independent and try to return to the UN its damaged reputa-tion.

The new Secretary General should also be as active as possible in the media, competing with the major world leaders in popularity. Theoretically he or she should be a well-known per-sonality with an unblemished reputation and enjoy universal esteem. The UN needs a leader that helps the world body truly serve the cause of peace, not interests of any player or a group of players.

The problem is that among the candidates to the Secretary General there is no figure that would correspond to all of these parameters. It is likely that the UN will continue to face the same challenges, which means it will continue to become more and more irrelevant and far removed from the global agenda leaving crisis resolution to the US and its allies. Russia, on the other hand, will try to bring debates back to the UN, trying to use the advantages of the UN in its current form; based on the same mechanism as in 1945.

The debates over comprehensive UN reforms have continued for too long and will not change no matter who is elected. However, it is the right moment to fully realize the fundamental importance of the UN.

The conflict seems to have reached a dead-end in Syria with all sides having little under-standing of what to do next. What is clear is that the country will be generously fueled with arms. The US and Russia tensions and mutual accusation will continue to rise.

Even as diplomacy stalls, Russia continues to deploy its advanced anti-missile and anti-aircraft system SA-23 Gladiator and bombers. This time the air defense system is deployed not just to protect Russia’s contingency, but Damascus and the ruling regime even as the already deployed S-400’s purpose is changing as well.

Russia will try all possible means to prevent the repeat of Libyan scenario in Syria. The sig-nificant build-up of weapons in Syria and the deepening rivalry enhances the possibility of the Russian collision with coalition forces in the air.

To prevent the worst case scenario, we need the strong and mighty UN, to convincingly en-courage the parties involved to understand the dangerously developing situation and act to ensure peaceful coexistence. Otherwise it seems like we are all doomed.

Article published in Al Arabiya English

https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/10/05/Can-new-UN-Secretary-General-help-resolve-the-Syrian-crisis-.html

Published in Tribune
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