ISIS is the first terrorist organization to have successfully gained power through the use of modern media.

Its media system is working in two key dimensions. First of all, it targets the audience inside the ISIS ranks. Propaganda is used to maintain morale and to manipulate ISIS fighters.

Secondly it targets the “outside” audience. The propaganda is performed on both systemic level – through the so-called Al Hayat Media Center, the ISIS media arm – and on the network level, through social media, messengers, Skype and the direct work on the ground of so-called “ISIS emissaries”, or recruiters.

The Al Hayat Media Center produces videos shared via social media and mobile messengers, as well as publishing journals in several languages, with most issues weighing in at 60 to 70 pages.

 

The words of the Quran, and the true sense of Islam, should be the main weapon in this war on ISIS propaganda.

Maria Dubovikova

That’s 60 to 70 glossy pages of total evil, blood and terror – with the name of Allah and quotations from the Quran repeated on the each page, even though ISIS has nothing in common either with Allah or the Quran. The group just use both for the sake of its own devilish and bloody interests.

The core of the propaganda is the idea of “us and them”. We are righteous Muslims, ISIS declare. “They” are kafirs – infidels – and crusaders.

But ISIS is also putting Muslim communities under pressure, through threats and oppression. The group knows that even the calmest Muslims cannot bear sustained oppression and humiliation for a long time, and finally they will become radicalized.

So why is ISIS propaganda proving so successful? The reasons are simple.

1. Visual communication

The first reason is the high quality work produced by ISIS ideologists, with specialist design and promotion. The visual quality of their journals is very high. Across the world, societies value images over text, and so ISIS has chosen the right form of propaganda. By spreading images through the modern media, ISIS reaches millions of people.

2. Preying on ignorance

The second reason is the historically ill-conceived system of integration of Muslim immigrants in Western societies, and the lack of a coherent promotion of the true image of moderate Islam to the broader public. ISIS is successfully using religious texts, playing on the weak religious literacy of some Muslims, and an absolute ignorance of many non-Muslims about Islam.

3. West’s Mideast policy

The third reason is the Western countries’ policy in the Middle East leading to the chaos in the region. The dangerous play on the discords and the regional contradictions, and the imposition of Western models of behavior and politics inapplicable to the region, lead to the growth of anti-Western sentiments and tensions inside the societies. This is successfully used by the ISIS ideologists. ISIS constantly reminds people of what it sees as historical injustice, or a constant humiliation by the West – the ‘kafirs’, the ‘crusaders’ – on Muslim civilization. ISIS uses the actions of the international coalition and Russian ideologists to promote the idea that the West and Russia are waging a war against the Muslim world.

4. Social environment

The fourth reason for the propaganda success is the state of the social environment. The modern world is gradually losing its reference points for values. This is witnessed in the mutation of the institution of family, social isolation, and the paradox of wealthy societies, in which some are led to seek thrilling experiences. The social inequality and lack of justice also play to the hand of ISIS. And to the lonely, ISIS promotes the idea of a society where everyone is a brother or sister. They promise justice and equality. But they also propose a ‘thrilling’ experience – to those who are seeking it: to kill not only in PC games, but in real life.

How to fight the war

The moment to counter the propaganda battle is already lost. And while there is no guarantee we will win the wider war, there is still a chance to fight an idea with another. And the words of the Quran, and the true sense of Islam, should be the main weapon in this war on ISIS propaganda.

 

initially published by Al Arabiya: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2015/12/10/ISIS-s-propaganda-success-and-how-to-fight-it.html

Published in Tribune

Pursuing an active policy in Syria up to direct involvement in the military conflict seems to be bringing Moscow both fresh opportunities and new risks, both internal and external, that range from the palpable to the obscure.

Risks

The most obvious risks are image-related. While the denigration of Russia in Western media has become routine in recent years, the perception of Russia in the Arab and Islamic information field has always been more nuanced. While some TV channels (Al-Arabia, Al-Jazeera and the Gulf media) have vilified the Kremlin for supporting Bashar Assad, others such as Shiite TV station Al-Manar, Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, etc., have been openly supportive about Russian anti-Americanism.

But now the situation has changed.

Under certain circumstances, the Syrian operation may help Russia in its relations with the West, but information-wise the status quo is likely to remain for a long time to come. As a result, some will see Russia as a country that defends dictators and bombs the moderate opposition and civilians, while others will see it as an enemy of the Sunnis. Details regarding the groups bombed, real targets for air attacks, or the fact that Russia has 20 million Sunnis residing in its territory will be virtually ignored.

The most obvious risks are image-related. 

Russia is, as always, rather weak in information warfare, and apparent absurdities like the total defeat of ISIS in areas controlled by the Free Syrian Army [1] voiced by official sources only serve to aggravate the situation. The Arab community, including Christians, rejects Russian commentators’ attempts to interpret the Syrian campaign in religious terms as a holy war, the Russian Orthodox Church’s religious mission, etc. Such statements not only revive the image of Western crusades in the Middle East but also echo with the offensive missionary rhetoric of George Bush Jr.

 

Russian domestic propaganda correlates poorly with foreign media outreach, and a comparison of the two information streams gives the impression that Moscow's policy is neither consistent nor transparent.

However, these image-related losses are far from being the biggest problem, as the looming political risks are much more ominous.

The three main domestic risks have been much talked about and boil down to possible popular discontent over the Kremlin's policies.

First there is the terrorist threat, which seems to have firm foundation. On the one hand, there are ISIS sympathizers resident in Russia who see the Syria operation as an assault on genuine Islam. The other involves thousands of battle-hardened and well-networked Jihadis who will be driven out of Syria first to Iraq and then to their homelands, which seems to be exactly the scenario Moscow is trying to prevent by interfering in the Syrian affairs.

The logic of ISIS’s evolution has prompted the inevitable gradual ouster of romantic jihadis out of their current territory and the future export of jihad. Southern Russia is definitely high in their priorities list. Hence, President Putin's approach "strike first if the fight is unavoidable" seems to perfectly match this logic.

First there is the terrorist threat. 

Risk number two involves the unpredictable response of Russian society to any future battlefield losses. When ISIS captured a Jordanian pilot and burnt him in a metal cage, thousands of people in Amman went out onto the streets to protest both against ISIS and the participation of Jordanians in the war on the Islamists. There has been no similar trigger-event reported involving Russians, and any similar public response by Russians has yet to be seen, not least since Moscow's previous military campaigns in the southern Russia left a negative impression Russian public consciousness.

Risk number two involves the unpredictable response of Russian society to any future battlefield losses. 

At the same time, it is no secret that weakening of traditional bonds combined with the underdevelopment of liberal values and civil society have atomized Russian society, undermining its ability to mobilize and increasing its tolerance regarding human victims.

 

Finally, the third domestic risk involves economic impact of the Syrian campaign. Irrespective of the burden on the Russian state budget (which is not thought to be enormous, in terms of purely military costs), given the broader economic downturn, the general public will find it hard to understand the need for yet another round of belt tightening, this time for the sake of murky geopolitical interests in a faraway and essentially unknown country.

The likelihood of this risk becoming a real concern will grow with time. If the operation lasts several months and produces striking political effect, the population is unlikely to launch serious protests.

All these obvious risks only prove that the Syrian operation must be swift and bring political resolution acceptable both for the Arab world and the West. Only in then would Russia's reputational losses be more or less compensated and its claims for leadership justified.

The third domestic risk involves economic impact of the Syrian campaign. 

This prompts us to look at the issues that Russia needs to resolve in Syria.

Obvious and not so Obvious Issues

All these obvious risks only prove that the Syrian operation must be swift and bring political. 

What Moscow requires is the establishment of a relatively friendly Syrian regime to guarantee continued Russian military presence there. This scenario may indicate Russia’s real return to the region and its ability to effectively resolve large-scale problems beyond its near abroad, as well as its claim to the role of Europe's shield, which could radically alter the entire relationship with the EU on Russian terms.

The need to solve this triple conundrum, i.e. a swift operation, a settlement recognized globally and regionally, and the establishment of a stable regime, brings to the fore the problem of political resolution according to a scenario that should determine the military operation.

What Moscow requires is the establishment of a relatively friendly Syrian regime to guarantee continued Russian military presence. 

The official aims proclaim counterterrorism and support of statehood, which allow for very broad interpretation, as terrorism may apply both to ISIS and the armed opposition, and statehood support – to strengthening the incumbent president or the preservation of Syria on the world map.

In fact, looking at these political issues opens the way to analyze the aims in greater detail.

Russia will not be pleased either with an excessively broad or excessively narrow interpretation of the term terrorism, because the former would boil down to a mere strengthening of the ruling Syrian regime (unacceptable to the international community and Middle East), and the latter would deprive Damascus of any motivation to participate in the resolution, effectively taking us back to the situation that existed two years ago. Hence, the problem is in drawing a red line dividing the opposition into moderate and radical segments, and further engaging the moderates in the settlement process.

 

In most cases, it is hardly plausible to rate the opposition's radicalism by religion or commitment to violence or by political agenda. In the final count, the religious discourse is employed by too many sides of the conflict, this civil war has already claimed over 200,000 lives, the level of violence is already excessive, and political agendas of many parties involves have nothing to do with reality.

Methodologically, it would seem more sensible to single out ambitious structures orientated at nation-building, comprising Syrians and trusted by some elements in the Syrian population. Such groups may be quite small but still emerge as constructive actors in the peace process despite ideology and other factors.

As far as statehood is concerned, the formation of a relatively stable political system implies the need for this military operation to be accompanied by other activities aimed at strengthening institutions and the country’s reintegration.

Elites in Russia and other countries plus the expert community have been criticizing the U.S. intervention in Iraq for 12 years. The invasion should clearly have been avoided, with all the attendant gross errors, the ensuing protracted crisis and terrible violence that has taken almost 200,000 lives. However, the United States attempted to provide Iraq with a new political system and preserved statehood, suffering enormous financial, image-related and human losses.

Russia will not be pleased either with an excessively broad or excessively narrow interpretation of the term terrorism, because the former would boil down to a mere strengthening of the ruling Syrian regime and the latter would deprive Damascus of any motivation to participate in the resolution. 

For five years, the West has been censured for its Libyan operation that differed from Iraq in its limited dimensions and was limited to air support of anti-Qaddafi forces. Given the Iraq experience, neither Europe nor the United States were ready to take responsibility again. But the Libyan state fell apart.

Neither scenario would suit Russia.

The rapid completion of the operation and restored statehood would offer a small or very small Syria, with the government bolstered by Russia within a limited territory, e.g. in Latakia and Damascus. At the same time, President Putin's remark at the Valdai Forum that forgetting the country’s previous borders would entail the emergence of several permanently warring states is also quite true. The only way out seems to lie in some kind of decentralization of Syria and the division of responsibility for its territory among other powers, primarily regional countries that could help Syria strengthen institutions in its interior areas.

The rapid completion of the operation and restored statehood would offer a small or very small Syria. 

Finally, the restoration of statehood would require massive assistance to overcome the economic consequences of the war, which primarily involves financial aid (USD 150-200 billion over a period of 10 years by ESCWA estimates), as well as establishment of bodies for the distribution of funds and control over spending.

Certainly, neither Russia nor any other country would be able to do this on its own.

As a result, all these goals, i.e. turning the moderate opposition into the government's partner, reintegration of the Syria territory, and economic revival, necessitate a reformatting of the approach to external participation in the Syria settlement on Russian terms, and the identification of partners able to operate within the boundaries set out by Moscow.

 

With due respect to the Western role in the Syrian settlement and the significance of Russia-West relations, the key partners should come from the region.

First, the West is the potential target audience of Russia's efforts in the Middle East and has to show it has received the message about Russia's return to the regional theater. Russia is working to alter the format of its relations with the West and to display its readiness to be a global power.

Second, although Russia's relations with certain Middle Eastern states are hardly healthy, they are free of the kind of burdens seen in Russia-West dialogue. Cooperation on Syria with the West will always remain a sort of projection of the entire bilateral relationship.

Third, it is the countries in the region that are most interested in Syrian normalization and the restoration of order to this territory swamped in chaos.

As for the search for regional partners, until recently Russia's Middle East strategy was described by Western analysts as "the art of being everybody's friend." But things are different now. By supporting the Syrian government and establishing an information center in Baghdad, Russia has effectively built a Shiite coalition in a Sunni-dominated region dominated.

All these necessitate a reformatting of the approach to external participation in the Syria settlement on Russian terms, and the identification of partners able to operate within the boundaries set out by Moscow. 

The Russia-Iran rapprochement hardly seems a guarantee for a long-term alliance. With the military operation completed and the settlement process launched, the two powers would naturally become rivals competing for influence in Syria, while Iran, exhausted by its pariah state status, is likely to choose the pro-Western track.

Tehran is too close to Damascus and is short of resources, which would seriously limit its ability to influence the solution of these three problems.

To this end, Russia should be especially interested in engaging the Sunni states, i.e. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, countries that have become estranged from Russia because of its Syrian operation.

Relationship normalization requires a degree of accommodation of their interests. Turkey needs to see the Kurdish threat minimized, and Saudi Arabia would like to check the rise of the Shiite belt. Theoretically, and both problems could be handled (to a lesser extent that involving the Kurds) within the process of Syria's political transformation and its territorial reintegration.

With due respect to the Western role in the Syrian settlement and the significance of Russia-West relations, the key partners should come from the region. 

Besides, Moscow could offer Riyadh diplomatic assistance in the Yemen settlement, as the military operation there appears undeniably flawed.

Concurrently, Russia could also exploit the grave differences that exist between the Sunni states.

Although Egypt is dependent on Saudi Arabia, it views their relationship as rather burdensome and would be glad to see Russia as an alternative partner. The creation of a counterbalance to the Shiite alliance in the Moscow-Cairo-Algiers axis for stabilizing North Africa would help Egypt gain regional clout, while Russia would demonstrate its refusal to take part in the region's confessional confrontations.

Besides, minor Gulf states will not always support the Saudis' anti-Iran policy, whereas Turkey views Russia as a key economic partner.

By supporting the Syrian government and establishing an information center in Baghdad, Russia has effectively built a Shiite coalition in a Sunni-dominated region dominated. 

Finally, Moscow could boost its efforts in the Palestine settlement by lending momentum to the intra-Palestinian political process and taking practical steps to strengthen state institutions of the Palestine Authority, thus demonstrating its constructive role in the region.

In theory, all these measures coupled with the Russia-Iran partnership and effective cooperation with Israel could spawn conditions amenable not only to a Syrian settlement but also to building a new stable system of regional relations in the Middle East. However, the requirements for a healthy outcome are so numerous that an optimistic future appears essentially indistinct.

INITIALLY WAS PUBLISHED ON RIAC: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=6789#top-content 

 

1. See: http://syria.mil.ru/news/more.htm?id=12060220@egNews and http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/10/06/en-syrie-la-russie-frappe-plus-l-opposition-que-l-etat-islamique_4783454_4355770.html

 

Published in Tribune

During last week’s G20 summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that according to his country’s intelligence, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is financed by private individuals from 40 countries, some of them G20 members.

He highlighted the scale of the illegal trade in oil and petroleum products. “The motorcade of refuelling vehicles stretched for dozens of kilometers, so that from a height of 4,000 to 5,000 meters they stretch beyond the horizon,” Putin said, comparing the convoy to gas and oil pipeline systems.

Turkey is using its involvement in the fight against ISIS to hit the Kurds, whose militias are among the most effective forces against the group in Syria. Turkey’s weakly controlled 565-mile southern border is the main gateway for foreign extremists from all over the world to join ISIS. In Turkey jihadists get all they need, even fake ID cards and passports.

 

Ankara violated international law, as the jet should have been escorted away from Turkish airspace, not shot down

Maria Dubovikova

Ankara apparently does little to stop these dangerous activities. The passports of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks were fake and made in Turkey. Turkish businessmen make deals with ISIS oil smugglers, providing the group with billions of dollars.

After the G20 summit, Russia launched a true war against ISIS’s oil infrastructure and the caravans of trucks transporting oil to the Turkish border. This has made Ankara nervous. Last week, following intense Russian bombing in Syria along the Turkish border, Ankara summoned the Russian ambassador, warning that bombing Turkmen villages could lead to “serious consequences,” and urging Moscow to “to immediately end its operation.”

The whole article is available herehttp://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2015/11/25/Turkey-s-downing-of-a-Russian-jet-is-a-grave-error.html 

Published in Tribune

BEIRUT -- As soon as Russia launched the first stages of its military campaign in Syria, world media erupted with epic slights on President Vladimir Putin and the deprecation of Russia's strategic motives in Syria. Is this information operationsimply a recrudescence of Cold War neuralgia, or is there something more profound at work here?

One can see, too, that the U.S. administration's response to Russia's initiative has oscillated uncertainly. Initially, Washington took a "business as usual approach," suggesting that it and its allies' air campaign would proceed unchanged. But the administration then seemed blindsided by the speed and extent of the Russian action. Last week, a Russian official arrived at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to announce the immediate start to the Russian air operation in Syria, and to insist that the U.S. keep its aircraft (and personnel) out of Syrian airspace altogether that day. Since then, the Russian tempo of air attacks has been impressive, leaving little or no space to others.

Clearly, "business as usual" in these circumstance was impractical (if some calamitous air incident in the Syrian skies was to be avoided). And President Obama's opponents immediately pounced: Putin was wrong-footing America (again). Secretary of State John Kerry hotly demanded military coordination that would at least keep the U.S. coalition flying -- and in the game.

The second approach has been to try wrest at least the political initiative back into American hands -- by conceding to Russia its military role -- whilst trying to set parameters (essentially President Bashar al-Assad's removal), that would require a major reworking of the Syrian leadership, in which America would have a major say. (Britain and France similarly lifted a leg, to mark their territory of having a claim in any final outcome, too.)

During all these maneuvers and rhetorical skirmishing, however, the U.S. has also been quietly re-positioning itself towards the political settlement which it now sees as coming somewhat into focus. In London and Berlin, Secretary Kerry modified the U.S.'s initial absolute objection to President Assad remaining in office: Now, he said, Assad might remain for a transitional phase, however long that might be, "or whatever," adding that ultimately this was for the Syrian people to determine (see our last Weekly Comment). On Wednesday, Kerry went further, and said something equally significant: Exiting his discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Kerry said that Syria must remain "united ... [and] be secular." This represents a huge (if barely remarked) shift: It cuts the ground from under the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the jihadists -- in fact, from all Islamists who cannot accept a secular state, which, to be clear, effectively removes pretty well all the Gulf protégés from having any significant slice of the cake. 

No doubt, Lavrov had made it plain to Kerry that Assad has told the Russians that he is open to political change and to reform (and that Russia believes him). But perhaps Lavrov also explained why the particular historical circumstances of Syria voided any prospect of a Brotherhood insertion into government being a workable prospect. In any event, Kerry changed tune.

The third U.S. tactic seems to be "containment" -- that old standby: a massive information war is underway to suggest that the Russians committed themselves only to attack ISIS, and nobody else (when Russia never made any such undertaking). Lavrov is explicit: Russia is targeting ISIS and "other terrorist groups," as they had always "said they would do." Nonetheless, the info war campaign continues in order to put pressure on Russia, and to contain its military campaign. American officials have been on record saying that "moderates" turned out to be as rare as mythical unicorns amongst the Syrian armed opposition, and that only "four or five" were in the field now -- and yet suddenly it seems that there are all these "moderate CIA trainees" under attack now. In fact, there are no "moderate jihadists." The term is an oxymoron: there are only jihadists who are more -- or less -- close to ISIS or al Qaeda. It is a parsing of definitions that simply does not interest Russia.

Tom Friedman puts a somewhat different gloss on events from his well-briefed perspective: Let Putin and his allies have a go at defeating ISIS (and good luck to them). But when they fail, and find the Sunni world has turned against them, then they (the Russians) will need a ladder out of the tree, which only Washington will be able to lend, to help Putin recover from his strategic mistake. This is too reductive. Putin well understands the difference between traditional Sunni Islam in the Levant and the very recent blow-in of militant Gulf Wahhabism, which is at odds with this traditional Sunni Islam of Syria and Iraq. He knows, too, that many Sunnis still hold to the notion of citizenship within a secular, or non-sectarian state; and that Syria and Iraq are both inheritors to venerable, old civilizations (Greater Syria and Mesopotamia); each with their own political cultures and visions. The fight against contemporary orientations of Wahhabism has never been the reductive struggle between a Shia minority (the Alawites) and a Sunni majority; it is as much a struggle to preserve the Levantine tradition against a foreign (Gulf) culture, Wahhabism, floated into the region on a tide of petrodollars

Why should President Putin understand this cultural war better than Western leaders? It is because Orthodox Christianity (of Russia) never entertained the Western binary opposition between the Roman Christianity and Islam. Orthodox Christianity and traditional Sunni Islam share many attributes together, and have a history of close relations.

So what are the Russians doing? Firstly, they are running through a "bank" of "terrorist" targets assembled by Syrian, Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah intelligence services. It is unlikely that this phase will last long -- and then, the mode will smartly change. With the primary targets destroyed, the ground offensive will begin, led by the Syrian army (with direct support from Hezbollah, and with advice from Russian and Iranian officers). What will be different now, however, is that the ground forces will have the benefit of all-weather and nighttime air support, plus real-time imagery. Whilst Russian soldiers will not be directly involved in boots-on-the-ground operations in support of the Syrian army, Russian forces will be directly involved in securing a safe area around their air base near Latakia. To the extent that this keeps Latakia secure, it will as a byproduct, free up the Syrian army from the need to station troops there, thus making them available for other tasks. 

For now, the Russians seem (as evidenced by their airstrikes) to be intent firstly on eliminating any hostile threats adjacent to their forces in the area of Latakia (the Russian air base is located some 20 miles south of Latakia). This is standard military modus operandi. Their secondary and tertiary objectives seem to be to secure the M4 highway between Latakia and Aleppo (targeting pockets of insurgent forces adjacent to the highway), and in striking insurgent-held areas along the M5 highway.

There is nothing political behind such strikes -- in the sense of strengthening one insurgent group in opposition to any other. It seems, rather, very clear that the Russians are preparing for the subsequent ground sweep by the Syrian army: the Russian air force is securing lines of logistic support to the Syrian army, and concomitantly denying those same lines to the jihadists. It is, in short, all rather military -- and in line with what Russia says are its objectives.

So, why this flood tide of snide commentary, disinformation and claims of a covert, "underhand" Russian strategy? What is it that so irks the West? Well, of course, one part of it is that Putin has put Washington on the spot, and made the West's claims to have been fighting ISIS for the last year to appear hollow. But there may be more to it than this.

For the past few decades, NATO effectively made all the decisions about war and peace. It faced no opposition and no rival. Matters of war were effectively a solely internal debate within NATO -- about whether to proceed or not, and in what way. That was it. It didn't matter much about what others thought or did. Those on the receiving end simply had to endure it. But whilst its destructive powers were evident, its strategic benefits have been far from evident -- especially across the Middle East. 

What probably irks the West most is that Russia has unfolded -- and begun -- a sophisticated military campaign in the flash of an eye. NATO bumbles along much more slowly with its complicated structures. Iraqis have long complained that in military terms, assistance promised by the NATO powers takes (literally) years to materialize, whereas requests to Russia and Iran are expeditiously met. So Tom Friedman's condescension towards the Russian military intervention does have more than a whiff of orientalism to it.

But all the hoo-ha probably stems also from the sense that this Russian initiative could mark the coming into birth of something more serious -- of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a putative military alliance. Admittedly, the "4+1 alliance" -- Russia, Iran, Syria and Iraq, plus Hezbollah -- is not branded as SCO (and the coalition partners do not overlap with SCO membership), but the 4+1 allianceventure might well yet prove to be a "pilot" in non-Western, successful coalition-operating. Furthermore, its objective is precisely to preempt NATO-style regime change projects -- a prime SCO concern. This prospect certainly would irk the Western security establishment -- and would potentially change many an existing NATO calculus.

Not surprisingly, then, it might be seen in some Western quarters as hugely important to set a narrative of failure for the 4+1 alliance, and to denigrate any sense that its military example might have strategic importance for the non-Western world.

 

INITIALLY PUBLISHED ON HUFFINGTON POST

Published in Tribune

This September, President Vladimir Putin has, on several occasions including during the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, voiced Russia's readiness to act against the ISIS as part of a broad coalition incorporating countries in the West and the Middle East. This prompts some questions. What does a broad coalition mean in this context? Does Russia intend to join the U.S.-led alliance? Will Moscow continue advancing cooperation with Tehran and Damascus while coordinating its moves with Western states to avoid clashes? How feasible is interaction of all or at least some of the players in Iraq and Syria that are engaged in operations against ISIS, which is viewed as a major global threat? The statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on September 10, 2015 goes some way to providing answers to these questions, as he said that the war against the ISIS is viewed by each participant as entirely individual, including due to the convoluted nature of relations between the various different state and non-state actors in the region.

In fact, it is theater shared by two parallel coalitions, i.e. the United States and Europe on the one side, and Russia, Iran and Syria on the other. The past two weeks have seen European states declaring their varying degrees of willingness to take a more active direct role in the Middle East conflict. The U.S. allies in the region are also expected to join the Western coalition, even though they often choose to pursue their own interests, which frequently run counter to U.S. aims. In order to back Russia's effort, the West would obviously have to make its peace with the government and army of Bashar Assad being rightful members of the coalition, at least as along as the war against the ISIS lasts. As of now, we see Western leaders slowly drifting in this direction. However, this scenario remains only a remote possibility. Given the current state of U.S.-Russia relations, it is hard to imagine Russian troops under U.S. command or even a loose coordination of operations with the Syrian Arab Army, if Americans are not open to direct contact with President Assad. 

In order to avoid the need to deploy its own ground troops, Russia may try to expand the existing alliance with Iran and Syria by appealing to such neighbors as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

At the same time, Russia and Iran continue to strengthen their cooperation in Syria and beyond, with their goal being to preserve its legitimate government. Russian and Iranian diplomats, generals and military experts have met several times in Moscow to coordinate their approach. A Russia-Iraq-Iran-Syria coordination center was recently established in Baghdad for planning operations against ISIS. Russia seems to have two opportunities under such a coalition. One involves a combination of missile and air strikes against ISIS positions plus engagement of its ground forces, and two, support for the Syrian army, Hezbollah contingents and Iranian volunteers with air strikes, logistics and intelligence. Although many global and regional actors would be happy to see Russian troops involved in ground operations against ISIS, this would not be desirable from Russia’s perspective because the inevitable losses would spark negative responses in Russia, reviving the ‘Afghan syndrome’ in Russian society’s collective consciousness. The second option is fraught with the same risks, although to a lesser extent. It would also be less efficient, since the Syrian army and its allies have all but exhausted their morale and physical resources. However, this is the scenario that seems to be developing, with Russia required to coordinate its operations with the U.S.-led coalition to avoid ‘collateral damage’ which would be undesirable for every party.

In order to avoid the need to deploy its own ground troops, Russia may try to expand the existing alliance with Iran and Syria by appealing to such neighbors as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. If this were to happen, then pressure on ISIS would mount, even though its crushing defeat would be by no means certain..

The Syrian crisis and the ensuing expansion of ISIS have triggered polarization in international relations, which complicates coalition building in the Middle East. In its anti-ISIS crusade, the United States has discovered to its dismay, that its allies are not willing to provide armies for a ground operation. The attempt to build a force comprising local combatants has failed, apparently prompting the resignation of General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS.

U.S. foreign policy flops in the Middle East have opened avenues for other countries to step up their activities. Enjoying the status of the key U.S. partner, Great Britain has considerably expanded its regional presence. China has followed Russia's example to streamline its Middle Eastern policy, positioning itself as an economic and military-technical alternative to the United States. In addition to China’s other recent moves, the trend has prompted Russian China specialist Vitaly Naumkin to the ostensibly utopian but de factorealistic idea of establishing a Russian-Chinese counterterrorist coalition.

 

This would rest on several factors. First, China is expanding its military-political role in the region, building a naval base in Djibouti for about 1,000 PLA troops. Talks are ongoing regarding engaging the Snow Leopards, i.e. Chinese special operations forces, in counterterrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Beijing has supplied UN peacekeepers in Lebanon and South Sudan with 1,000 troops each, in addition to 500 in Mali. Second, China is gravely concerned by the rise of jihad in its territory, especially after the Turkestan Islamic Party – a Uighur terrorist group – has been seen in Syria to capture an airbase. It also views the spread of ISIS affiliates in Asia and Africa as a clear threat. Third, Russian and Chinese forces are becoming increasingly operationally coherent thanks numerous joint land and sea exercises, which would be significant in any future joint anti-ISIS operations.

In its anti-ISIS crusade, the United States has discovered to its dismay, that its allies are not willing to provide armies for a ground operation. 

Of course, there are certain limitations on China's Middle Eastern policy due to its ties with energy suppliers, primarily Saudi Arabia, as well as its intricate relationship with the United States. On the other hand, some U.S. officials seem to openly welcome involvement of China and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the war on ISIS. In any case, Chinese diplomacy is clearly testing the waters regarding joining just such a counterterrorist operation.   

In terms of defeating ISIS, this latter scenario appears most feasible, although it is up to the interested leaders to take appropriate decisions.

Published in Tribune
Saturday, 29 August 2015 21:22

Fighting Against ISIS’s “Soft Power”

British Prime Minister David Cameron devoted his recent speech in Birmingham to the struggle against religious extremism, primarily Islamic. This speech is a prelude to the expected publication of a new five-year strategy for combating extremism. Apparently, it reflects the main elements of this strategy, above all, the need for the ideological consolidation of Britain’s civil society.

Describing the current state of affairs, Cameron emphasized ISIS's attractiveness for a considerable number of young Brits. According to various estimates, from 700 to 1,500 Brits have joined ISIS since 2012. Cameron mentioned four main reasons why ISIS seems so attractive: the question of identity, ISIS’s “energizing” nature, its appealing ideological concepts based on radicalism and a conspiracy-based world view, and finally, the fact that extremists are allowed “to set the terms of the debate”: “Ask yourself, how is it possible that when young teenagers leave their London homes to fight for ISIL, the debate all too often focuses on whether the security services are to blame? And how can it be that after the tragic events at Charlie Hebdo in Paris, weeks were spent discussing the limits of free speech and satire, rather than whether terrorists should be executing people full stop?” 

Describing ways of countering these four root causes of extremism, Cameron emphasized the need to oppose ISIS’s mad ideas with traditional British values: freedom of speech and assembly, sexual equality, multiculturalism (sic!), freedom of convictions, a parliamentary system, etc.

All this is very typical and indicative.

First, the Birmingham speech in and of itself demonstrates the growing importance of fighting extremism in the domestic political arena, and this applies not only to the United Kingdom but to many other countries as well.

Second, unlike many domestic analysts who speak about the failure of multicultural policy, Cameron sees it as the foundation of the British nation and one of its basic values.

Third, to follow the logic of the British Government, the fight against ISIS should primarily be waged on the ideological front, thereby promoting the consolidation of society, and this is an important point.

In fact, this is a confrontation of two systems of values or two “soft powers”: Britain's “soft power” versus ISIS's “soft power”. Britain’s “soft power” means Western “soft power”; all British values mentioned by Cameron are identical to European or liberal values.  

In general, a striving to consolidate a value-based identity has become a trend of the past year across the most diverse countries. Speaking at Al-Azhar University last January, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi urged Islamic scholars to create “a revolution inside Islam.” He said a bunch of extremists should not be allowed to speak on behalf of a world religion.

It would be appropriate to mention in this context numerous initiatives of Muslim intellectuals, decisions adopted by the Organization of Islamic Conference on countering the ISIS threat and new programs on the development of Islamic education in Tunisia.

It is also possible to recall the Russian Government's stake on enhancing patriotism and traditional values. Statements in this vein have been made throughout the past year. Although in the Russian case the ideological quest is primarily determined by the confrontation with the West rather than the extremist danger, the ISIS threat is playing a key role in some Russian regions (primarily Chechnya). Typically, the British and Russian (especially Chechen) concepts of countering extremism are built on opposite logic to a certain extent. The British Government insists on the consolidation of liberal values while Cameron is indignant over the debates on freedom of speech following the Charlie Hebdo tragedy. In the meantime, the Russian Government is trying to demonstrate its super-conservative attitudes, in religion as well. It is no accident that participants in numerous rallies in Chechnya and other Muslim regions of Russia protested against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad rather than supporting the victims of the terrorist act.

It's clear that attempts to confront ISIS ideologically are an admission of the inability to deal with it militarily, and not only because ISIS is stronger than, say, al-Qaeda, but also because the world has become weaker. It simply does not know how to defeat ISIS (nor does it know how to defeat the Taliban or what to do about Libya, Syria and Iraq).

At the same time, placing emphasis on extremism (which may be embodied not only by ISIS but also by nationalists) has become a convenient instrument for consolidating societies. To a certain extent, the authorities are interested in exaggerating the threat. Cameron compares ISIS with the ideologies of nationalism and communism.

Finally, the most important point is that the popularity of extremism compels the governments of the most diverse countries to revise their own value systems. The problems that societies are facing along this path in Britain, Russia and a number of Arab countries are not political and not even ideological, but philosophical. They lie in the deteriorating crisis of the world outlook that has taken shape in the modern era. This crisis, which was described by post-modernist philosophers half a century ago, is now entering its final stage, in which ideological concepts resting on a certain philosophical basis – cogito ergo sum – no longer allow people to answer major existential questions. The absence of answers prompts people to seek consolation in archaic philosophical systems like those of ISIS or neo-Nazis, whom Cameron also mentions.

The common feature of these systems is their emphatic anti-humanism, which allows them to find in the surrounding world values that are more important than humans.

Politicians, propagandists, journalists or advertisers cannot win the battle against such philosophies, such worldviews, but it can be won by intellectuals, whose philosophical ideas have become an urgent political necessity.

Previously published by Valdai Club  

Russian version of the article was exclusively published by IMESClub: http://imesclub.org/ru/component/k2/item/370-fighting-softpower-isis

Published in Tribune

Estimations of the size of the ISIS army differs from 20,000 to 200,000 militants. What is clear is that the recruitment drive is intensifying. Recruiters fuel the ISIS forces coming both from the territories taken by ISIS and the web it effectively uses as its soft power.

ISIS–held territory is rich in natural recourses and the negligence of some players provides them with the financial capital needed to make their system function and to guarantee its relatively stable existence. 

The recent trends show that ISIS recruitment doesn’t only seek to make people come to the territories of the self-proclaimed Caliphate, but to make each recruiter a terrorist cell himself: its leader, member and soldier.

There is no more need for sophisticated, expensive terrorist plans. After the Arab Spring, the Libyan collapse and the devastating consequences of the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi collapse, access to weapons that flooded the region became an easy matter.

Luring in vulnerable minds

The over-simplified scheme of luring in vulnerable minds with false religious promises is still being practiced in such places as Tunisia. For the most part, ISIS members are far from representatives of the prosperous, successful and well-educated circles of society. They emerge mostly from the most socially risky underprivileged classes, who have a limited future in the societies to which they belong, or just have a strong feeling of the unfairness of the world and system they live in. Some people are joining ISIS to achieve Paradise, some for money, some for equity that the supposed Islamic State also promises. So, ISIS has the most dangerous army, full of blind and thoughtless people with already washed out brains and a strong feeling of resentment and the will to fight for their miserable state.

We should be ready to witness the new destruction of the World Heritage monuments, to witness and to “thank” world leaders for making all this nightmare possible through their lack of will

Thus there are many scenarios of ISIS’ survival as a state or state-like structure and one can only guess at when it will collapse. And even its collapse also promises nothing good to the international community. Thus, both options have negative elements, one more than the other, either ISIS will stay or ISIS will fall.

On the one hand we have the most probable development of the situation, in which ISIS will stay and all the current effort of the international community will collapse as it is ineffective and out-of-date in the face of the new challenges. 

To read the whole article: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/07/08/Any-decision-on-ISIS-is-too-little-too-late.html 

Published in Tribune

via Al Arabiya English: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/05/26/How-can-Russia-contribute-to-the-fight-against-ISIS-.html 

It’s a high time to look at the measures taken by the international community in the fight against ISIS and to ask ourselves a question: If we keep going like this, how soon will ISIS reach the borders of the West? How much has already been lost? How much are we ready to lose in the upcoming months in our unwillingness to change approach, to rethink the situation and to understand that in this war no one can get off lightly. We cannot remain aloof or only relatively involved through assistance and useless air strikes without a full-scale international ground operation and global involvement in the settlement process. While Western aid stays inefficient and insufficient, the countries devastated and suffering under ISIS are seeking other options.

The Iraqi premiere’s visit to Russia is a sign that the pressure of ISIS is becoming enormous and that the country is running out of forces to resist it and has little hope that the sufficient aid will finally come from the West.

 

Iraq has a long history of bilateral relations with Russia, the rise of which started in the epoch of the Soviet Union. Since 2003 and the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which was strongly condemned by Russia, the contact between the two countries was practically lost and the parties have spent years on rebuilding the ties and once prosperous cooperation. Russia invests a lot in the country even now, when the investments are very risky, and this is highly appreciated by the Iraqis. Russia’s president has mentioned that the overall trade turnover between the two countries stays relatively low, but it has grown ten-fold in the past two years even despite the deep crisis in the Middle East and the economic problems.

Bilateral relations

The visit of the Iraqi PM to Moscow is a continuation of the long and sustainable process of the bilateral relations building, but in the current historical moment it’s much more significant especially in terms of regional stability.

Russia, is a needed partner for Iraq in terms of the urgent weapons deliveries. Russia can really deliver the needed weaponry in the shortest time, with no any precondition or stipulation. Then the price on the Russian weapons is lower, while the quality is very high.

Iraqi military trade with Russia is not a new trend. What is new is the word “aid” that was used while talking about the military cooperation. According to Russian officials, it is eager to take all possible measures to assist Iraq in its fight against ISIS. Iraqi’s PM arrival to Russia for assistance and support doesn’t mean the break of its relations with its Western allies, while the criticism of them will rise in Iraqi decision-making circles. Nevertheless it does not mean that Russia competes with or ousts the traditional dominant players in the region. Firstly it has no such interests, as its presence in the region is still very limited and the region is not in its high priorities. Secondly it has no such capacities and influence.

Non-involvement

The West has been willing to make Russia join the U.S. led anti-ISIS coalition for a long time. Opposing the core and philosophy of the ongoing operation that has no approval and mandate of the key international organization, Russia took the position of non-involvement in the direct fighting however keeping an eye on the processes there and cooperating with the regional powers in terms of security issues as well as delivering weapons to the allied Syrian regime, in what was seen with much skepticism and discontent by the international community. The threat of ISIS is far more tangible threat for Russia than for any other country outside the Middle East.

Now Russia, keen to condemn and demonstrate skepticism towards the coalition forces and measures taken, takes its own steps to contribute to the general attempts to stop the spread of ISIS. These steps and maneuvers are in the interests of all the players.

The problem of the ISIS spread, the barbarity and mass killings that follow each of their victories, needs to be countered by a common and united response. There will soon be a point of no-return, when either we send ISIS to hell or this world is turned into hell by ISIS.

Published in Tribune

A round table “Sunni-Shia divide: the roots of the phenomenon and the ways to overcome it” on the situation in the Middle East took place at MGIMO-University (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) on the 14th of April. The leading experts (from MGIMO, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, of the Institute of the General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, of the Diplomatic Academy, Institute of International Relations and World Economy of the Russian Academy of Science, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives and from other political and scientific institutions were brought together. The eminent Russian diplomat Veniamin Popov, who leads the Center for Dialogues of Civilizations at the MGIMO-University and holds IMESClub membership, chaired the meeting.

The participants of the meeting have discussed the Shia-Sunni clash on the current historical moment, the origins of this clash in the historical perspective, the reasons of the regional conflicts. Yemeni, Syrian and Iraqi crises were in a special focus.

In the opening address to the audience Alexander Orlov, the director of the Center of international Studies of MGIMO, shared his thoughts over the current destabilization in the Middle East that he links with international crisis having brought the global system to the state of a deep imbalance. 

George Mirsky, famous Russian expert from IMEMO, has noted among other important issues an aspect, that there is a dangerous trend of simplification of all the processes in the region to the level of Saudi Arabia vs Iran clash, that is irrelevant for the understanding of the processes we witness now, as there are numerous inner processes that rather often form the core of the ongoing developments. 

Andrey Fedorchenko, the director of the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, IMESClub member, has mentioned in his speech, that the tradition of compromises is not well developed in the Middle East, particularly in the religious field. Maria Dubovikova, President of IMESClub, has stressed that there is a dangerous trend of politicization of the religion and instrumentalisation of the existing discords, that is often used by the external and non-regional players as well serving their national interests they have in the region. All these trends, according to Ms. Dubovikova, lead to the extreme aggravation of the regional situation.

Nikolay Soukhov, researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies, IMESClub member, has focused in his speech mostly on the Russia's role in the current discords and the role the Russia's expats and children from the mixed marriages can play as a factor of mediation and harmonization of the processes, and has also shared the observation, based on the Pew Research Center report over how Sunnis and Shia's percept each other, that the farer the country is situated from the Shiite concentrated region, the less positive attitude the Sunnis have towards the Shiites, even considering them as non-Muslims. And the nearer the country is to the Shia concentrated region, the more neutral attitude to Shiites is.

During their speeches the experts have noted taking into consideration the controversial interests of both regional and external players, the solution of the existing problems seems rather unlikely in the near future.

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Published in Events
Wednesday, 15 April 2015 22:32

ISIS takes its fight to Russia’s backyard

More and more terrorist groups swear allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the international attempts to bring down ISIS seem in vain.

The strongest extremist organization gains the terrain, both on the ground of Syria and Iraq and in the minds of people far from the Syrian and Iraqi borders. ISIS challenges the Security Services all over the world, as the way it spreads is extremely difficult to be cut and controlled.

ISIS spreads primarily through the Internet, using it as a sophisticated instrument of propaganda, recruiting and expanding, along with personal contacts of its recruiters. Spreading over the net, they create cells as metastases, far from the Syrian and Iraqi borders – in Nigeria, in Libya, in Yemen, in Afghanistan, in Algeria, in Tunisia and others. The list is already long and is becoming longer.

The alarming message has come from a Russian senior security official after a session of the SCO’s regional anti-terror body, saying that some warlords of the prohibited Emirate of Caucasus have pledged their allegiance to ISIS. This trend challenges not only Russia, over 1700 citizens of which have joined ISIS, and who fight in Syria and Iraq (this figure is an estimate, the real numbers could be higher still), but for the whole Caucasus region and the neighbouring countries.

To read the whole article: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/04/14/ISIS-takes-its-fight-to-Russia-s-backyard.html

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