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Friday, 24 January 2014 17:39

INTERVIEW WITH MARC HECKER [in Fr]

Comment qualifieriez-vous la décennie écoulée au Moyen-Orient ? Quelles erreurs ont été commises ? Quelles leçons peut-on tirer de ces erreurs ?

Les années 2003 – 2013 ont été une décennie de bouleversements au Moyen-Orient. Lorsqu’on pense à la première date, une image vient immédiatement à l’esprit : celle de la statue de Saddam Hussein, renversée par un blindé américain à Bagdad. Dix ans plus tard, les Américains ont quitté l’Irak mais ce pays est loin d’être stabilisé. Au contraire, les tensions entre chiites et sunnites sont très fortes et les attentats se multiplient. Une première leçon, pour les occidentaux, est que la puissance militaire ne permet pas de résoudre tous les problèmes : l’armée américaine a facilement gagné la première phase de la guerre face à l’armée irakienne mais s’est ensuite empêtrée dans une guerre asymétrique.

En 2013, c’est un pays voisin de l’Irak, la Syrie qui a fait la « une » de l’actualité. La révolution qui s’y est déclenchée en 2011 s’est transformée en guerre civile dans laquelle des puissances régionales comme l’Iran, la Turquie, l’Arabie saoudite et le Qatar cherchent à placer leurs pions. A la suite de l’attaque chimique du 21 août 2013, une action militaire occidentale a failli avoir lieu mais celle-ci n’a finalement pas été déclenchée. Les occidentaux hésitent : s’ils condamnent clairement le régime de Bashar el-Assad, ils se rendent bien compte qu’au fil des mois, les jihadistes étrangers sont venus gonfler les rangs de l’opposition syrienne. Une deuxième leçon est que si l’on souhaite intervenir dans une crise, il vaut mieux le faire relativement tôt, ou alors beaucoup plus tard, quand les belligérants se sont épuisés.

La révolution syrienne n’a pas plus été anticipée par les experts occidentaux que les soulèvements en Tunisie, en Egypte, en Libye, à Bahreïn ou au Yémen. Cet enchaînement révolutionnaire – qui a été qualifié un peu rapidement de « printemps arabe » – laisse aujourd’hui un goût amer : aucun des pays concernés n’a connu de transition démocratique sans accrocs et certains ont sombré dans une situation chaotique. Des experts réputés avaient parlé de « révolution post-islamiste » en 2011. En réalité, on a assisté à une poussée spectaculaire de l’islamisme dont les différentes composantes sont loin de former un mouvement unifié. La troisième leçon est que la prévision n’est pas une science exacte et que même les meilleurs spécialistes peuvent se tromper.

A l’heure actuelle, on constate un recul de l’influence occidentale au Moyen-Orient. Les Etats-Unis ont clairement annoncé leur intention de se réorienter vers l’Asie. Quant à l’Europe, usée par la crise économique, elle a partiellement perdu sa capacité  de projection et attire moins que par le passé. La Turquie semble par exemple s’être considérablement éloignée de l’Union européenne. Les puissances régionales ont profité de ce recul occidental pour placer leurs pions. Un « grand jeu » se joue ainsi entre l’Arabie saoudite – défenseur d’une vision rigoriste du sunnisme –, le Qatar – supporter des Frères musulmans – et l’Iran, chantre du chiisme.

 

Les soulèvements arabes : qui sont les vainqueurs et qui sont les perdants ?

Si cette question avait été posée à la fin 2012, la réponse aurait été : les islamistes ont été les grands vainqueurs des soulèvements de 2011. Il faut dire que les révolutions avaient non seulement permis aux islamistes de bénéficier d’une liberté dont ils ne jouissaient pas auparavant mais, de surcroît, de prendre le pouvoir. Les résultats aux premières élections législatives de l’ère post-Moubarak  étaient à cet égard saisissants : les Frères musulmans ont obtenu près de la moitié des sièges et les salafistes, arrivés en deuxième position, en ont raflé plus de 20%. Toutefois, des changements importants sont intervenus depuis lors : en Egypte, Mohammed Morsi a été renversé et le général al-Sissi a pris le pouvoir. Cette situation a provoqué d’importantes manifestations et la répression des autorités : plusieurs centaines de militants islamistes ont été tués tandis que leurs dirigeants ont été emprisonnés. En Tunisie, au terme d’une longue crise politique, le Premier ministre Ali Larayedh, issu des rangs d’Ennahda, a quitté le pouvoir au début de l’année 2014. Les libéraux qui avaient manifesté en nombre en 2011 et qui se sont sentis dépossédés de « leur » révolution demeurent toutefois très circonspects quant à l’avenir de la Tunisie.

 

Quels sont les problèmes de sécurité du Moyen-Orient après le printemps arabe ? Y a-t-il de nouvelles menaces susceptibles d’affecter la sécurité mondiale ? Ou les problèmes sont-ils demeurés les mêmes ?

 Avant le printemps arabe, le Moyen-Orient était déjà une zone instable, source de tensions internationales. Il suffit, pour s’en convaincre, de penser à la guerre en Irak, au conflit israélo-palestinien ou encore au dossier du nucléaire iranien. Rappelons aussi que la plupart des pirates de l’air du 11 septembre 2001 étaient saoudiens.

L’évolution de la situation post-révolutions de 2011 a compliqué l’équation. La guerre en Libye a eu, entre autres conséquences, de déstabiliser le Sahel, où la France a dû intervenir militairement pour endiguer le développement d’AQMI. Aujourd’hui, le sud-ouest et le nord-est de la Libye apparaissent comme des centres importants du jihadisme. La Syrie en est un autre et cela concerne directement les occidentaux puisque des centaines de jeunes Européens se rendent sur place pour combattre. Al Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique (AQPA) demeure également une menace.

L’onde de choc des révolutions arabes n’en a pas fini de secouer la région : certains pays, comme le Liban et dans une moindre mesure la Jordanie, sont affectés par les conséquences de la guerre civile en Syrie.

 

Quelles mesures les pays européens pourraient-ils prendre pour prévenir la montée de l’extrémisme et de l’instabilité au Moyen-Orient ?

 L’Europe traverse une double crise : économique et politique. Ces deux aspects limitent la possibilité d’une action militaire européenne. La crise économique se traduit sur le plan militaire par une baisse des budgets de défense de plusieurs grands Etats européens. Certains pays sacrifient des pans entiers de leur armée sur l’autel de l’austérité. La crise politique a trait aux divergences profondes qui s’expriment régulièrement entre les différents Etats de l’Union européenne et qui empêchent une action militaire commune. En 2003, les Européens n’étaient pas unis au moment de la guerre en Irak. Ils ne l’étaient pas non plus en 2011 au moment d’attaquer les troupes du colonel Kadhafi. L’absence de consensus n’interdit pas l’action : les Etats ont toujours la possibilité d’agir seuls ou sous la forme d’une coalition ad hoc. Dans le cas de la Syrie, on a vu en 2013 que la France n’envisageait une opération militaire qu’en soutien aux Etats-Unis. Quand Washington a reculé, Paris a fait de même.

Outre l’option militaire, d’autres moyens d’action existent. La diplomatie est active. Des programmes d’aide (aide technique, aide au développement, soutien à la société civile, etc.) et d’échange sont mis en œuvre dans différents Etats de la région. Des initiatives sont prises pour relancer les relations commerciales. Des projets d’échanges culturels sont  développés. Toutes ces actions visent non seulement à établir des ponts entre les rives de la Méditerranée mais aussi à faire converger le monde arabe vers le modèle de la démocratie libérale. Toutefois, là encore, les moyens européens sont limités. La solution aux problèmes du Moyen-Orient ne se trouve pas à Bruxelles.

 

Comment peut-évoluer le conflit israélo-palestinien ?

Au cours de la décennie écoulée, Israël a mené pas moins de 4 guerres ou opérations militaires importantes : la deuxième Intifada, la guerre au Liban en 2006 (qui comprenait aussi un front à Gaza), l’opération « Plomb durci » en 2008-2009 et l’opération « Pilier de défense » en 2012. A la fin de l’année 2012, les perspectives paraissaient très sombres : le gouvernement israélien était inflexible sur la question de la colonisation et le Hamas, soutenu par les Frères musulmans égyptiens, était fort malgré sa rupture avec la Syrie de Bachar el Assad. La possibilité de l’éruption d’une troisième Intifada faisait alors débat parmi les experts.

Depuis lors, l’horizon s’est quelque peu éclairci. Du côté israélien, des élections ont eu lieu. Un nouveau gouvernement, penchant davantage vers le centre droit, a été constitué. Du côté palestinien, le Hamas a pâti du renversement du président Morsi. Mahmoud Abbas jouit d’une plus grande marge de manœuvre même s’il reste relativement faible. C’est dans ce climat que les négociations de paix ont repris. John Kerry multiplie les voyages au Proche-Orient pour tenter de faire bouger les lignes. La question est de savoir si la solution à deux Etats est encore viable. Les plus optimistes estiment qu’elle reste d’actualité et qu’elle peut être obtenue en procédant à un échange minime de territoires. Ceci étant, même dans l’hypothèse la plus optimiste, plusieurs dizaines de milliers de colons devraient être déplacés vers l’ouest de la future frontière. En somme, la route vers la paix est semée d’embuches et la probabilité d’un échec des négociations est grande.

 

The resignation of the Cabinet of Ali Laarayedh and forthcoming appointment of a new Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa are the results of the national dialogue, which has been lasting for several months. For the moment the question is how much does the change of the Cabinet will help the country to recover from the political crisis in which it has been plunged at least since February. In my opinion, this resignation is not enough, because the key opposition force "Nidaa Tunis ' didn’t take part in the national dialogue and the candidature of Jomaa  does not reflect the opinion of the major part of the society and of the political establishment. On the other hand, the problem of the political crisis in Tunisia resigns not on only in subjective, conjunctural reasons, related with social polarization and confrontation between the ruling coalition and opposition forces. It is much more resigns in objective reasons as monstrous persisting recession, the lack of public security, the spread of terrorism, etc. Will the new cabinet be able to solve all these problems – the time will show. Despite the optimistic statements by numerous politicians (including - representatives Nidaa Tunis), there is a suspicion that the new Cabinet will be as weak as the previous one. Additional argument in favor of this thesis is that the resignation of the government now has once again happened under the street pressure, and that means that the new cabinet will have very limited ability to take unpopular but necessary measures.

Paradoxically, to some extent Laarayedh’s resignation could play into the Islamist’s benefit because they partly relieves their responsibility  for the political situation in the country and especially for the security situation . After all the Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh in this respect was compromised figure – before becoming the prime minister , he was the Minister of the Interior , and that was a period when the country faced of security problems: such actors as Ansar al- Sharia, Ligue de protection de la revolution and others began to act.

By turn, the consistently nihilistic position of opposition forces can play with them a bad joke. On the one hand, they are supported by the street, that is disaffected towards the Troika , but on the other hand - they are dogmatists , incapable to negotiate and to reach any consensus.

Despite the obvious benefits of this position today, tomorrow the situation may turn against them and add points to the Islamists.

Vasiliy Kuznetsov specially for IMESClub

We present you one more paper in the framework of IMESClub-CDCD partnership. 

This policy paper implores the international community and major regional actors to insist on the consideration of the Gaza Strip within the current Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.  Additionally, this policy paper provides a recommended approach to negotiations, particularly examining political, economic, and security components of the current peace negotiations.  Further, a regional envelope must be simultaneously cultivated to support negotiations and achieve effective results. 

The Gaza Strip represents a significant portion of Palestinian land and population (1).  Currently, a dire humanitarian situation exists in Gaza, which will only become worse if the status quo continues.  Further, Hamas is positioned to undermine Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations and reject any agreement that may be reached.  Therefore, it would be a fatal flaw in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations to disregard the importance of addressing the situation in the Gaza Strip. 

Part Two of this paper provides background on the current situation in the Gaza Strip, highlighting the need for immediate action.  Part Three explores political components of the current negotiations.  Part Four focuses on the Gaza Strip’s economic situation, examining plans for reconstruction and development.  Lastly, Part Five recommends security arrangements.  Regional support is referred to throughout each discussion, as regional participation is essential to a sustainable agreement. 

 To read the whole document (PDF) just click:

 

In the IMESClub-CDCD partnership framework we present you a paper by Miles Mabray. 

"This proposal is the result of multiple discussions, conferences, workshops, and papers that have been conducted and written in the past few years of the peace process. The inspiration for this proposal came from discussions that took place over the course of three days (August 15–18) in a European capital among approximately fifty politicians, ex-politicians, and civil society actors from the United States, Europe, Israel, Palestine, and several Arab and other Muslim countries, regarding the possibility of creating a regional envelope to reinforce the initiative of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. This proposal explains and outlines the construction, implementation, and promotion of a regional envelope of support for the peace process."


Click to read (PDF): 

Tuesday, 05 November 2013 21:15

INTERVIEW WITH SEMA KALAYCIOGLU

AROUND THE MIDDLE EAST

WITH

SEMA KALAYCIOGLU  

 

Having her BA in Economics at Istanbul University (1973); MA in Economics at University of Iowa (1977); PhD in Economics at Istanbul University (1982), Sema Kalaycioglu became an assistant professor in 1982, an associate professor in 1986 and a full professor in 1992. She worked at Yildiz Technical University (1982-2003), Isik University (2003-2008) and Dogus University (2008-2010), where she served as the chairperson, the graduate dean and the dean. For the last 2 years she has been actively involved in the academic councils, activities and seminars of Turkish Asia Strategic Research Center (TASAM) and the Marmara Group Foundation. 

IMESClub: How would you characterize the past decade for the Middle East? 

Pr. Sema Kalaycioglu: I would definitely call the past decade of the Middle East as another lost decade for countries of the region with the exception of the Gulf and perhaps for Algeria and Morocco to certain extend. Human resources, wealth, opportunities and hopes have been wasted over promises of reforms, corrupt practices, futile political squabbles, civil strives, tensions, border disputes conflicts, foreign occupations or interventions, tribal and sectarian warfare. The pportunity cost of not investing resources in the physical infrastructure, education, health, housing and industrial (and all other sectors of production) upgrading has been too high to compensate the potentials the well- being of future decades.

 The first decade of the 21st century actually witnessed the slow process of the demise of national identities in many countries of the region from Iraq to Libya only to be replaced by sectarian(religious), ethnic or tribal identities. With the lid of national identity lifted the perils of all divisive elements broke loose or in the process of breaking loose. That is the situation we have been witnessing in Iraq; what is likely to grow deeper in Syria and definitely what further threatens Egypt because of the increasing polarization between the secular and the mild and ultra-religious segments of the Egyptian society, as well as between different religious groups.    


IMESClub: Which mistakes were committed by intra-regional and outer-regional players? 


Pr. Sema Kalaycioglu: Intra-regionally different kinds of mistakes can be classified as follows:

i. The classical political rivalry between countries play an important and destabilizing role in the Middle East turmoil. Each country or groups within intra-regional countries take advantage of  civil strives in other countries by taking sectarian sides, hosting opposition groups to the point of assisting them in choosing their leaders or governments in exile, sending arms or actually volunteer fighters (militia) to support who they consider close to their ideological preferences(eg. Iraqi and Iranian Shiites fighting along the Syrian National Army against the Syrian opposition, while Sunni groups of all spectrum from the Al Qaida to the Chechen volunteers fighting alongside with the Free Syrian Army). Porous borders, when no proper control exists or in the absence of control allow and/or facilitates these actions, which mass up the political situation further.

ii. Some intra-regional (as well as extra-regional) countries with high ambitions of regional power practice over other regional countries ideologically support, finance or host divisive movements in targeted countries with or without declared agenda.

iii. Inability, inaction or lack of interest of intra-regional institutions (The Arab League) in confidence building, peace- making and conflict resolution also make the situation difficult to find alternative solutions to existing or potential problems at regional levels, which opens door to foreign intervention especially in countries where foreign interest is intensified for one reason or another (energy concerns, oil or natural gas interests)

iv. Refugees going beyond borders to adjacent countries to problem spots constitute major sources of problems even though they are the consequence of the civil wars per se. Although it is mandatory to accept refugees at times of urgent request, allowing factions, armed groups and politically moved parties under the groups of refugees with no proper control nourishes the ongoing problems and deepen them further.

v. Allowing the Palestinian-Israeli problem continue for so long with refugee problems of its own kind attached to it has been a major obstacle against the Middle East peace process for a long time.

vi. Iran and Israel have also been sources of divisive problems for idiosyncratic reasons of their own. Iran as an exporter of radical ideologies also constitutes an actual and a potential threat not only against Israel but also to its immediate neighbors surrounding the Arab(Persian) Gulf, which make these countries either seek extra-regional supporters, or try to play some sort of a destabilizing regional power game to counter Iran’s alleged regional ambitions or actually to weaken the parties, which seem to support Iran to guarantee its reciprocity by means of Hezbollah(in Lebanon and Syria) or Hamas in Palestine. 


IMESClub: The Arab uprisings: Who are the losers and the winners in the East and in the West?

Pr. Sema Kalaycioglu: The process which is called as the Arab Spring has not ended yet. The countries, which were hoped to make a transition to democracy has not given any sign of such transition from taking place and they are not going to do so for a long time as it seems. Therefore, it is merely impossible to talk about any winners in the MENA, in terms of regained political stability (with the exception of Tunisia), increasing prospects for economic growth and job creation, alleviated poverty, increasing life standards, guaranteed human rights in general and rights for women in particular and establishment of law and order. If political stability returns with democratization in the process; if economic growth picks up to ensure secure jobs, if productivity over takes inertia then gains can be talked about.

Intra-regional actors Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are among the countries, which did not particularly gain from the Arab uprisings. On the contrary, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar lost a lot of prestige on the way, Turkey risked its role as an honest broker in the Middle East Peace process, while losing its impartiality at the same time and overtook the burden of providing housing, lodging, food, security, education and health services to almost half a million Syrian refugees around its Southern border and deep into its cities. Nevertheless, Turkey’s not getting involved in a military action against Syria, in other words moving and deploying troops in Syria can be considered as an important gain from a potential  loss and an important economic and social cost. The only potential gain Turkey can talk about is with the intensifying civil uprisings surrounding its Southern border, it decisively concentrated to cure its domestic Kurdish problem.

Internationally the USA, which has lost an important leverage over the region because of the Iraqi mission of 2003, can hardly claim any gains in the Middle East at least in the short and the medium run. But it continues to ensure the well-being of the Israeli state and continues to orchestrate possible peace process.

The soft power EU could not remedy any regional ill so far. For that matter, aside from Germany, which from the very on start distanced itself from all Middle East squabbles, France still tries to recover from its Libya mission in the MENA, which did not particularly contribute to the political gains of Mr. Sarkozy, who lost the elections of 2012 to Mr. Holland. The only positive side of the non-involvement of the EU in the MENA problems is that it did not choose to act aggressively in the search of a remedy for its economic ills, especially when it came to Syria.   

Many more years we will be talking about the problems of the Middle East. For we if we talk about any gains of the dire circumstances in the region we can only make reference to the prestige gain of the Russian Federation because of its staunch persistence on the non-military, but political solution thesis for Syria over all countries and the UN.  Russia might have transformed its prestige gains into material gains if it were able to keep its natural gas prices at desired levels because of unrealized Gulf pipeline project and if its arms sales have increased to the Middle East after the Arab Spring in general, and after the Syria civil war in particular.

The same argument might be true to a certain extend for China, and Iran. The latter will prove to have a real gain if sanctions are alleviated because of the initiation of the new Iran and the P5+1 talks over the country’s nuclear enrichment project. I sincerely believe that the mild political change through democratic elections in Iran from the previous administration to the era of the newly elected Rouhani is also due to the electorate sensitivity with respect to the Arab Spring and what Rouhani administration offers as reforms is also due to the very same cause. 

 

IMESClub: What are the Turkey's regional aspirations in the MENA? 

Sema Kalaycioglu: Through economic, diplomatic, cultural, demographic presence and somewhat military involvements Turkey had been trying to exert decisive influence on the region at large with a special emphasis on religious ideology in the form of constructing an area of Muslim solidarity before the Arab Spring. 

There is certainly an element of strong religiosity in the Turkey’s political mission to the MENA.  With a more religious outlook and the discourse of the AKP governments, Turkey on the surface has been discovering a more hospitable environment in the MENA and even in the Sub-Saharan Africa.  As an attempt of mild form of political cooperation, Turkey has been discreetly following a new political approach, which is often interpreted as “neo Ottomanism”.6 

Since after the 2008 elections Turkey has seemed to adopt a newly defined policy approach of “zero problems with neighbours”. Although it contained elements of make-belief in a region with multiple problems this new definition did not conflict the traditional foreign diplomacy line of Turkey, which based upon the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world”. 

Proud of its success of overcoming a major financial crisis in 2001, achieving high economic and industrial growth in successive years and finding itself among the “enlarged group” of top 20 economies as the 16th top one encouraged Turkey develop new aspirations regarding the geography, which it once had imperial relations until the end of the first World War. If among top global powers, why not practice regional power? If this cannot be done in the EU why not concentrates on the Arab MENA? Turkey not only became economically very active wanted to be at least equally active in regional politics. 

To play this new and mostly self-propelled role of regional power7 Turkey had first started to identify itself with the region more so then ever before. It continued to exert influence by associating itself with the existing religious ideological streams; tried to raise its voice to set the political, security and even the military agenda of the region, and showed willingness to integrate itself with the MENA more by trade, business, investment and foreign aid. Frequent high level state visits, mutual exchange of friendship and brotherhood messages helped secure the new trend in relations. 

 Indeed every single treaty for more liberalised relations with its immediate MENA neighbours beyond the relations of the EU prescribed ones8 at the beginning had been taken as an initiative to reestablish the once integrated system of trade and commerce in the area primarily until Turkey started to react to existing problems of the MENA with political and ideological interest of power practice. Turkey first volunteered for mediation on one of the most complicated issues of the MENA namely the Middle East Peace Process. 

Initiating and pursuing shuttle diplomacies to help conflict resolution between Israel-Palestine (and Syria) had limits from the very beginning. It primarily lacked one essential doze of reality: The recognition of the fact that those conflicts had existed long before Turkey launched the policy shift and many peace initiatives and road maps had been sacrificed or lost on the way long before Turkey decided to design the policy of “zero problems with neighbors”. 

The tragic consequences for the flotilla incident of 2010 did not effectively relax the continental blockade Israel applied against Gaza. Turkey rightfully reacted to the violation of human rights. But the dose of reaction was exaggerated and its proactive approach was not appropriate. For the sake of power practice over intensified relations with its Arab neighbours, Turkey showed too much and too obvious preference for ideological solidarity. 

Turkey failed to be an honest broker, when it lost impartiality, neutrality and tranquility with the notion of being the protector and the voice of the oppressed by siding especially overtly with Hamas. At the end Turkey’s ambition to increase its role as a regional actor on the Middle East Peace Process ceased to be functional at the expense of freezing its relations with Israel. Israel has been aliened to the point of establishing new coalitions in the East Mediterranean on natural gas exploration missions with Cyprus and making joint military manoeuvres with Greece.  Turkey’s effort of reacting or being proactive proved to be unrealistic, when it came to Israel-Palestine conflict.

When it came to Syria, at the beginning being “unaware” of all previous regime conducts in Syria Turkey intensified its relations with it to promote friendly and brotherly contact with Assad and his government9. There too while showing overt preference for the Syrian opposition later it oversaw the role of external actors like China and Russia and a regional actor Iran without analyzing the consequences. 

Almost for every regional conflict in the MENA there had already been other extra-regional and regional actors identifying the same problems before Turkey took its part in the scene.  Turkey at the beginning underestimated the role other regional actors like Egypt and Iran always aspired to play. 

There have also been new actors from the region like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with which Turkey formed a tacit coalition on ideological grounds.   Turkey also acted the same manner towards Iraq, and helped Northern Iraq prosper beyond its relation with the Iraqi central authority to the point of antagonising the Iraqi central authority.      

For more on the issue we highly recommend to read the article by Professor Kalaycioglu: "Changes the Arab Uprisings Promise for the MENA and Turkey". 

Click on it: (available in PDF):

 

IMESClub presents the Report by IMESClub member, Ambassador Alexander Aksenenok, that he has delivered during the international conference " The Middle East - changes and upheavals 2013" organized in Switzerland this summer. The author expounds his overview of the major trends, that take place in the Middle East.
"Geopolitical and Regional Dynamics: an Overview" is available for download in PDF:

 

Egypt’s transition fatigue – a Russian perspective

Professor Vitaly Naumkin, Director of The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences organized by IISS. 


"Egypt’s transition fatigue – a Russian perspective" 

 

Wednesday, 31 July 2013 03:16

The MidEast World: 2013

This is the first and long-awaited issue of The MidEast World journal, official journal of the IMESClub. This issue is composed of papers and articles, prepared for the VII Russian International Studies Association (RISA) Convention, Section «The Arab Spring». That Section was held on the 29th of September 2012 in Moscow (Russia) at MGIMO and appeared to be the constituent meeting of the Club, as the decision to found it was pronounced and supported by all the participants.
This issue presents texts on the «Arab Spring» with a special focus on the consequences for the Middle East Peace Process.
This issue is partly in Russian and partly in English. The upcoming issues of The MidEast World will be in English only and will be issued in printed and cyber editions.
We wish you a pleasant reading and time to spend with IMESClub experts through their papers.

This issue is composed of articles* by:

With best regards,
IMESClub Directorate


*Please, pay attention to the dates of receipt on the front pages of each article.

 

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